Abstract
Inspired by the work of the late Professor Larry Solan, this article proposes that judges recognize as one of the textualist canons of statutory construction a “pet fish” canon. Such a canon would posit that when an ordinary reader would understand two or more words to yield a meaning that is different than the sum of the two words defined separately, the statutory interpreter should not disaggregate them. The Roberts Court has already followed such a linguistic precept in some statutory cases, and this article proposes that the Court recognize this as a canon considered at least as seriously as the dictionary, associated words, and negative implication canons. The pet fish canon reveals surprising power in cases involving criminal statutes, as it proves to be a useful tool for thinking about ordinary meaning (i.e., that meaning of federal criminal law that would be accessible to all of us ordinary speakers of the language).
Recommended Citation
William N. Eskridge Jr.,
THE PET FISH CANON,
33 J. L. & Pol'y
4
(2024).
Available at:
https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol33/iss1/2
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