Abstract
The purpose of this article is to examine the role of administrative deference when decisions of the Social Security Administration are reviewed by federal courts. The concept of administrative deference to administrative agencies in federal courts goes back to the 1930’s during the rise of the New Deal—with the high-water mark reached by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council. Since this point, there has been a growing chorus calling to re-examine or outright roll back the deference owed to these agencies when their decisions are reviewed in federal court. Prior to rewriting the standards, this article seeks to fill in the gaps and show where administrative deference matters when decisions of the Social Security Administration are reviewed and in what circumstances.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas M. Ohanesian,
Administrative Deference and the Social Security Administration: Survey and Analysis,
30 J. L. & Pol'y
337
(2022).
Available at:
https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol30/iss2/1
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