Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure

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Professor Bernstein considers a theme of Judge Weinstein's judicial and academic writings—that tort law works imperfectly to effect justice in mass disaster cases—through the vehicle of thalidomide, the paradigmatic toxic substance. Thirty-five years ago, thalidomide poisoned thousands of children, inflicting limb-reduction birth defects. Professor Bernstein argues that the drug has also had a malforming effect on mass tort law. Courts and scholars have used the precedent of thalidomide to build stringent legal standards of proof and causation, without enough attention to the functions and consistency of these standards. Thalidomide has also prompted commentators to celebrate American drug regulation and the American liability system; Professor Bernstein argues that these paeans are exaggerated. She concludes that the United States must confront its thalidomide history, as other nations in the world have done, and build social institutions—strong regulation and social insurance—to guard against toxic disasters of the future.

INTRODUCTION

Although an invitation to write about "one of Judge Weinstein's interests" resembles an invitation to write about Life, anyone considering the innumerable possible topics will eventually reflect on the problem of causation in mass-exposure litigation, a subject illuminated in the writings of our honoree,1 his fellow judges,2 and scholars represented in this Tribute.3 This Essay addresses the venerable and familiar subject of causation in mass-exposure litigation.

* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Law Clerk, Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 1985–1986. The influence of Paul Fanning pervades this Essay, although Paul is blameless with respect to its shortcomings. Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel Tickner provided a wealth of ideas, particularly on the precautionary principle and other themes related to environmentalism. Jamie Schwartz delivered her research assistance sooner and more thoroughly than she promised. My colleagues at Chicago-Kent, especially Katharine Baker, Jacob Corrè, and Hank Perritt, gave me the thoughtful comments on which I have come to depend. The Marshall Ewell Fund provided financial support. I salute Judge Weinstein on this celebration of his long, wise, and influential tenure on the federal bench.


2. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 582–83 (1993) (Blackmun, J.) (reviewing disputed causation evidence), on remand, 43 F.3d 1311, 1313–14 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kozinski, J.) (analyzing statistical proof of causation); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1987) (Winter, J.) (“Proving that the ailments of a particular individual were caused by Agent Orange is also extremely difficult.”).

3. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117 passim (1997); John C.P.
sation through an unusual idiom. My vehicle is thalidomide, a drug that from 1957 to 1961 caused gruesome birth defects around the world, and would have wreaked disaster in the United States if the FDA had not refused to approve it. Though still manufactured and studied today, thalidomide lives on mostly in memory.

Exploring the memory of thalidomide, this Essay considers causation at different levels. Although some writers like to associate the substance with perfect certainty and perfect evil, thalidomide has become a source of ambiguity that now affects both litigated cases and public debate over environmentally induced illness. In particular, thalidomide is an important and underestimated causal antecedent in American liability law; "the aftermath" of thalidomide included substantive and procedural changes in mass tort law. My discussion of causation focuses on one of these changes, arguing that thalidomide has established an unrealistic standard of proof for claimants, both in the courts and in public debate about toxic exposure. Complacency accompanies this unrealistic ideal of causation: Americans have chosen to learn dubious lessons from their experience with thalidomide, using this memory to bolster their faith in mass


7. Consistent with prevailing practice, I use "toxic torts," "mass torts," "mass exposure liability," "toxics liability," and similar terms more or less interchangeably. By "mass torts" I mean to exclude single-event, clear-cause disasters such as airplane crashes and the Bhopal explosion. This Essay focuses on claims of physical injury or disease resulting from "substances [encountered] by inhalation, ingestion, [or] dermal exposure," Gerald W. Boston & M. Stuart Madden, Law of Environmental and Toxic Torts: Cases, Materials and Problems 1 (1994), or other physical contact, where the substance reached numerous persons at about the same time. Common themes running through these cases include long latency periods, problems of proving causation, indeterminacies regarding the source of exposure, and the need for expert scientific testimony. See id. at 6–9.
torts as a cure for toxic exposure. A fairer reading of the thalidomide record supports a contrary inference.

This Essay follows a form related to its content. Part I offers an undisputed history of thalidomide-as-causal-agent. Social change and legal changes occurring soon after the thalidomide disaster are thought to be closely related to that experience. Some types of legal change—for example, settlements between thalidomide victims and national governments outside the United States— are unquestionably tied to thalidomide; other changes, such as the creation of a European supranational drug regulatory agency, appear to be children of thalidomide as well. Part II, “Americans Celebrate Thalidomide,” and Part III, “Current Lessons from an Old Catastrophe,” move freely into an exploration of thalidomide as a signifier, considering this drug as a specter and a metaphor. My contention is that because thalidomide certainly caused some effects (i.e., birth defects), probably caused other effects, and might well have had something to do with even more effects, it is likely that thalidomide indicates a need for variation and flexibility on questions of toxic-tort causation; thalidomide does not mark a pole of causal confidence.

Causation in this flexible, variegated sense has entered public debate. Commentators have pointed out the divergence between two standards of proof, the legal and the scientific. But the thalidomide experience teaches that more than two standards are needed. Social and legal effects following thalidomide, some linked closely to the drug and some more distantly related, support an extension of causation beyond its forensic meaning. Different evidence about the causation of harm justifies different responses.

Here thalidomide retains current vitality. In response to claims about new syndromes—Gulf War illness, silicone-related autoimmune disease, harms ascribed to “offgassing” and “sick buildings,” and others—some recent commentary has opposed the kind of flexibility about the standard of proof of causation that I advocate here. This fashionable

8. See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
11. A determination of liability requires stronger proof of causation than a regulation, for instance, and a regulation requires stronger proof than a decision to investigate further. One standard of causation cannot fit a variety of policy options; many standards are needed. See infra Part II.B. Along similar lines, I mean to suggest that causation can be shown in ways other than a description of mechanistic displacement of particles. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. Cultural influences, for example, lead to new effects, and thus are “causal,” but cannot be shown to exist by Newtonian mechanistic evidence.
12. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
posture obstructs good policymaking about toxic risks. The thalidomide experience indicates that new claims about risks will proliferate, and that they demand varying levels of respect. Never so stark and simple a poison as some observers like to think, thalidomide invites policymakers to use a variety of standards of proof when they assess claims of risk.

Above all, I conclude, thalidomide teaches that toxic risks call for stringent regulation and an expansion of social insurance. A legalistic approach to toxic exposure, with its strict and monolithic standards of proof, allows too much danger to flourish and neglects the calamities that invariably come after the creation of risk. Other wealthy nations, forced to confront their thalidomide heritage more directly than the United States, have drawn this inference. A causal antecedent whose influence is now (thankfully) discursive rather than physical, thalidomide may yet become a source for better law and policy.

I. THE SOCIAL AND LEGAL AFTERMATH OF THALIDOMIDE

A. Thalidomide as a New Signifier

Thalidomide spurred immeasurable political change, extending beyond law and regulation into the cultures of the world.\(^\text{13}\) In medicine and public health, teratology—the study of birth defects—bloomed from neglect and obscurity after thalidomide. A journal by that title began publishing in 1965;\(^\text{14}\) *Neurotoxicology and Teratology* followed later. Thalidomide prompted the adoption of developmental disability surveillance systems in the United States and around the world.\(^\text{15}\) Eight hundred studies by teratologists sought to understand how the substance caused phocomelia.\(^\text{16}\) Physicians became concerned with the ability of toxins to cross the placenta, and slowly became more cautious about prescribing drugs for pregnant patients.\(^\text{17}\) Public perceptions about the causes of harm to newborn infants shifted: before thalidomide, nature was blamed; after thalidomide, "human causes" emerged as a presumptive culprit.\(^\text{18}\)

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13. See Michael D. Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litigation 82 (1996) (calling thalidomide the paradigmatic "dramatic event"); see also id. at 63 (noting that thalidomide "received more public attention than any other drug in history").


17. See Green, supra note 13, at 82.

At an overtly political level, the story of Sherri Finkbine expanded support for abortion rights. A mother of several children who learned in 1961 that she was pregnant and knew that she had taken thalidomide at a crucial time, Finkbine sought an abortion in her home state of Arizona, a state that permitted abortion when sanctioned by a physician. A local hospital agreed to the procedure but withdrew its permission when publicity spread about Finkbine’s reason, and Finkbine had to travel to Sweden for the abortion. Further publicity continued, linking thalidomide with reproductive freedom in particular and individual rights in general. Horrific thalidomide damage seemed to many Americans a good justification to terminate pregnancy, and thus revealed the inadequacy of the “therapeutic” or “health-of-the-mother” criterion for abortion.

Thalidomide quickly entered the lexicon as a metaphor for poison and evil. “For years I have heard the word ‘Wait!’” wrote Martin Luther King, Jr. in his famous Letter from Birmingham City Jail. “It rings in the ear of every Negro with a piercing familiarity. This ‘wait’ has almost always meant ‘Never.’ It has been a tranquilizing thalidomide, relieving the emotional stress for a moment, only to give birth to an ill-formed infant of frustration.” Conservative activists have compared day care to thalidomide, and in congressional testimony thalidomide was mentioned by one witness who sought to denounce child abuse protection as “a new poison, posing as a cure.” Scholars in a variety of disciplines have explored thalidomide as a signifier—a chemical compound that has taken on a multifaceted cultural identity.

25. For a survey of thalidomide-and-culture as seen within a variety of disciplines, see Konrad Bloch, Blondes in Venetian Paintings, The Nine-Banded Armadillo, and Other Essays in Biochemistry 225–26 (1994) (discussing thalidomide and comparative biochemistry); Roald Hoffmann, The Same and Not the Same 129–40 (1995) (exploring carbon compounds that are “the same and not the same” as thalidomide); David J. Skal, The Monster Show: A Cultural History of Horror 289–92 (1993) (linking thalidomide to a preoccupation of 1960s Hollywood films with the evils of sex and reproduction); (Rabbi) Immanuel Jacobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, 22 Hum. Life Rev. 55, 57 (1996) (analyzing debate in Jewish law over the question of abortion when a pregnant woman knows she was exposed to thalidomide); Bob Lamm, Television’s Forgotten Gems: “The Nurses,” 23 J. Popular Film & Television 72, 76 (1995) (discussing public effect of
B. Legal Shifts Outside the United States

In the United States, where thalidomide reached few victims, national-level legal change emphasized regulatory protections but also took form in modifications to common-law doctrine. Elsewhere, where exposure was much greater, thalidomide had a more immediate impact on toxin litigation and national legislation. At the international level, the European Union adopted a products liability reform statute whose origins have been traced to the thalidomide experience in Western Europe.

Outside the United States, thalidomide exposure generated criminal and civil litigation that frequently resulted in state and private compensation of victims. In September 1965, German prosecutors charged nine industry executives with manslaughter and intent to commit bodily harm. The manufacturer, Chemie Grünenthal, eventually agreed to establish a fund of DM 100 million to compensate the victims, a fund to which the West German government, recognizing its responsibility both as a social welfare state and as a government that had been remiss in writing and enforcing licensing laws, also agreed to contribute. Thalidomide victims in Japan brought class actions against two drug manufacturers and the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which concluded with both the drug manufacturers and the state admitting liability. In

thalidomide drama episode aired in 1963); Valerie Grove, Small Body, Big Voice, Big Heart, Times (London), Feb. 2, 1996, at 14 (studying work of classical musician Thomas Quasthoff, a German singer disabled by thalidomide); Carl Mollins, Echoes of the Past, Maclean's, Dec. 25, 1995, at 54, 70–71 (reviewing coverage of thalidomide as news story by Canadian journalists); Roy Porter, The Rise and Fall of the Age of Miracles, Hist. Today, Nov. 1996, at 69, 73–74 (summarizing, from a historical perspective, the view that thalidomide augured a public perception of medicine as a cause rather than a cure of disease).

26. Seventeen cases of thalidomide-induced birth defects have been well documented, with another nine cases suspected of being caused by thalidomide. See supra note 13, at 74. Thalidomide was never approved and thus never marketed in the United States, see id. at 66, but some Americans encountered the substance following foreign distribution. See infra note 110.


29. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.


33. See Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery is Limited by Formidable
Britain, a group of parents brought a lawsuit against Distillers, the British licensee, and won a settlement of about £54,000 per child, topped off with £5 million of government funds to offset the income tax due on the settlement awards. A lawsuit against a Canadian distributor resulted in a settlement of about $200,000 per child and the establishment of a federal compensation fund of about $8.5 million.


See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 146, 204–05.


In order to be compensated, a drug claimant must be injured by a drug that is defective (defect being defined with reference to "damaging effects which exceed the bounds considered justifiable"), with strict liability, rather than fault or warranty, as the basis of responsibility. See Howlett, supra note 31, at 267–68.

Unlike the German scheme, the Swedish system does not require that the drug be defective and covers a variety of other injuries. See Carl Oldertz, Security Insurance, Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical Insurance in Sweden, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 635, 640 (1986). The statute is Produktansar I, Ersattning for Rakemedelsukada (Compensation for Damage Caused to Persons and Property by Industrial Products), SOU 1976: 23, Stockholm, Ministry of Justice. See also Ferdinando Albanese & Louis F. Del Duca, Developments in European Product Liability, 5 Dick. J. Int'l L. 193, 203–04 (1987) (suggesting that a drug need not be defective, but that only injuries caused by medicines are covered).
Injury Relief Fund Act, passed by the Diet in 1979,42 and the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, administered by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.43 Under this legislation new drugs must be approved prior to introduction into the market, and must be overseen after introduction into the market, with attention to toxicity and efficacy.44 Drug regulation in Canada, relatively elaborate before the thalidomide disaster,45 was increased along the lines of the United States model.46

In addition to spurring changes in the domestic law of many countries, the thalidomide experience contributed to a variety of legal changes at the international and supranational level. The European products liability statute of 1985, popularly called "the Directive," imposed comprehensive products liability reform on the European Union, generally in the direction of stricter liability than what had prevailed at the national level.47 Thalidomide shaped the 1985 Directive in several ways, bringing to the fore a concern with nonprivity bystanders, unforeseeable risks, and personal injury (rather than economic loss, even though the jurisdictional basis of the European Union is commercial).48 Scholars link both the Directive and its predecessors—including the 1977 Strasbourg Convention on Product Liability49 and the 1978 Pearson Royal Commission recommendations50—with a public sentiment for reform derived from the devastation of thalidomide in Europe.51

Perhaps influenced by the observation that Grünenthal had marketed thalidomide worldwide, the European Union promulgated numer-

42. See Fleming, supra note 32, at 303; see also id. at 303-04 (describing this fund as a device unlike the German model of strict liability and the Swedish group-insurance approach: it was rather "a special compensation fund with social security overtones").
44. See id. at 685-87; see also Robert B. Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients' Rights in Japan, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 75-76 (1996) (explaining Japan's motivation for "protection of human subjects" as caused by stricter western mandates for drug approval in their markets).
46. See Joel Lexchin, We Need a War on Legal Drugs: Useless and Unsafe Products Still Being Sold, Toronto Star, June 13, 1994, at A15.
ous directives pertaining to the regulation of pharmaceuticals and related products such as medical devices. These regulatory efforts receive additional support by frequent communication between the European Union and regulatory agencies in the United States and Japan as well as international agencies, including the World Health Organization and the Council of Europe. The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, often described as the European counterpart to the FDA, now approves new drugs for marketing in the European Union, and monitors drug safety in the common market. Historical links between this international regulatory scheme and thalidomide may be inferred.

II. AMERICANS CELEBRATE THALIDOMIDE

A. UNWARRANTED CONFIDENCE

1. Agency Regulation. — According to conventional wisdom, thalidomide had a strong effect on U.S. regulatory laws: the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) are said to have originated in the thalidomide disaster. While the thalidomide experience has been given credit for building strong American drug regulations, strong American drug regulations have been given credit for the nation's unique experience with thalidomide. The claim both that strong drug regulations caused the (fortunate) thalidomide experience and that the thalidomide experience caused strong drug regulations, though not entirely silly, betrays an eagerness to proclaim the power of

52. See Kanusky, supra note 43, at 676–83.
American regulation, facts or no facts. Yet the relationship between thalidomide and drug regulation is far from direct. First, thalidomide certainly did not awaken President Kennedy and the United States Congress to the need for more rules; FFDCA amendments were well underway before the thalidomide story reached the United States, although the catastrophe undoubtedly helped Senator Kefauver and others interested in drug reform. Second, it is not regulation as such but rather one regulator's intelligence and tenacity that stopped thalidomide from being marketed in the United States. Third, the 1962 FFDCA amendments focus on efficacy, not safety, and would thus be of little direct effect in preventing a future thalidomide-like disaster.

Despite these gaps between one phenomenon and another, the conventional wisdom linking thalidomide with regulation has proved expedient. Commentators who favor the expedited approval of new drug applications have complained that while patients die the FDA cannot move because it fears approving "the next thalidomide." The FDA looks alert and vigilant if a bit gloomy. Industry looks well-monitored.

Yet if drug regulation was strengthened in Europe because of the disaster of thalidomide, as the record indicates, then it is plausible to surmise that drug regulation was not strengthened in the United States because of the triumph of thalidomide. Postapproval regulation, for example, has been and remains feeble. The sensible proposal that the FDA handle clinical investigations of new drugs, with studies paid for by


61. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.


63. See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Trade-Offs 273 (1992); accord C. Frederick Beckner III, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 Geo. L.J. 529, 543 (1993). The complaint has achieved some success in hastening the approval process. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 410 (emphasizing how AIDS has increased the demand for expediting the approval process).

64. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 246-50.
the pharmaceutical-company sponsors, has languished for twenty years. Few new ideas related to drug regulation, other than exhortation either to speed up approvals or slow them down, have been tried or even heard. By fixing attention on a regulatory "victory," thalidomide has built complacency about American drug regulation.

2. The Isolation of Individuals. — In addition to instilling a sense of unwarranted triumph about American regulatory law, the thalidomide experience in the United States helped to ground the development of mass exposure law in notions of individualism. Thalidomide emphasized the lone hero-regulator rather than the regulatory system, deepened a boundary line separating the United States from other industrialized countries, disconnected injured persons from one another with procedural barriers, and helped to build a destructive myth of the deserving plaintiff.

The American individual who gained the most fame from thalidomide, Frances Kelsey, contributed unintentionally to a perception of toxic exposure as a threat to be countered with a strong personality. Emerging in sharp relief from her gray bureau, the Kelsey persona celebrates many illusory triumphs: the acumen of one mind, even though Kelsey partially misperceived the danger of thalidomide; the ability of individual drug-industry regulators to resist external pressure, a notion belied most recently by the successes of an AIDS activists/industry coalition in changing FDA criteria for new-drug approval; and the victory of a junior official over an industry Goliath, an improbable episode that has not recurred. Unquestionably heroic, and perhaps deserving of even more credit for her efforts against thalidomide, Frances Kelsey nonetheless cannot, by herself, stop or cure toxic exposure.

Just as Kelsey-the-individual grew to proportions beyond American regulation, an emphasis on individuals came to overwhelm the collective nature of American mass tort law. By now the claim that American law is "individualistic" has become a truism in need of no additional elabora-

65. The proposal is tentatively endorsed in Green, supra note 13, at 335. Suggestions along these lines are described in Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 Duke L.J. 155, 177–81.

66. Frances Oldham Kelsey, who had both an M.D. and a Ph.D. in pharmacology, was the FDA official assigned to review the application for thalidomide; this application was the first she reviewed. Her refusal to approve the drug enraged the American manufacturer, Merrell (later known as Richardson-Merrell and Merrell Dow). The company pressured Kelsey relentlessly, even accusing her of libel. When news from Europe came in to support her judgment, Kelsey worked to stop the U.S. clinical trials, while a reluctant Merrell barely cooperated. In August 1962 Kelsey was awarded the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service. See Cindy Pearson, Doctor Who Stopped Thalidomide Celebrates 80th Birthday, Nat'l Women's Health Network News, Sept. 1994, at 1.

67. Kelsey had worried about adult nerve damage rather than thalidomide's much more dangerous threat, phocomelia. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 78–79.

68. See Salbu, supra note 57, at 410–18.
Mass tort law, following thalidomide, was distorted by this predilection for individualism: the sine qua non of mass torts is aggregation, but the thalidomide experience emphasized opposite circumstances.

Courts picked up the theme of isolation when plaintiffs brought thalidomide-related lawsuits in the United States. Although thalidomide crossed national borders, American courts interpreted the law of personal jurisdiction to refuse some claims of thalidomide-injured persons born in the United States, as well as claims of foreigners who were injured by thalidomide manufactured in the United States, but purchased abroad. One commentator identifies thalidomide litigation on the question of jurisdiction as a source of isolation, entrenching national boundaries as false lines in a global reality.

Finally, thalidomide introduced to the United States a concern about individual mass-tort plaintiffs, focusing attention on individual victims at the expense of a thoughtful evaluation of toxic effects. Babies and children injured by thalidomide set a standard of innocence to which few subsequent toxic-substance victims could compare. Elsewhere I have argued that American private law relies on dichotomous contrasts to support its rejections of plaintiffs' demands; such plaintiffs are deemed to fall short of an ideal that, if met, would have justified a favorable outcome in

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69. See George Anastaplo, The American Moralist: On Law, Ethics, and Government 32 (1992) (criticizing the Moral Majority for its emphasis on the individual rather than community); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 241 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) ("however annoying a law may be, the American will submit to it...; he regards it as a contract to which he is one of the parties"); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights and Their Critics, 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727, 750 (1995) (agreeing with rights critics that "American legal discourse is fixated with individual rights").


71. See Harvey v. Chemie Grünenthal, 354 F.2d 428, 429–31 (2d Cir. 1965) (barring claim of American twins whose mother had brought thalidomide from Germany).

72. See Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 38–39 (3d Cir. 1975) (maintaining that Quebecois plaintiffs were bound by unfavorable Canadian law).


74. A book chapter title, "Alone in a World of Horror," conveys some of the isolation of thalidomide claimants. See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 112–21. The innocence of victims did not spare thalidomide parents, who frequently blamed themselves for their children's disabilities, see id. at 115–16; mothers were accused of having "dosed themselves indiscriminately" during pregnancy because they were "neurotic," id. at 117. A psychologist who studied Canadian parents noted that professionals had faulted their various coping mechanisms, based on contradictory criteria. See Ethel Roskies, Abnormality and Normality: The Mothering of Thalidomide Children 14–21 (1972).
court. Caselaw and scholarship reveal this tendency. Robert Rabin, for example, has explored how cigarette manufacturers slurred plaintiffs’ characters during litigation. Judges have faulted asbestos plaintiffs for smoking, with little effort to measure the increment of extra harm that smoking could have caused. Female victims in mass exposure cases have historically been easy to impugn. Post-thalidomide toxics litigation, in sum, frequently appears to blame plaintiffs for being adult individuals.

**B. An Unattainable Ideal of Causation**

Although its mechanism of destruction is still not well understood, thalidomide easily met scientific and legal criteria necessary to prove causation in fact. Limb reduction birth defects (one among many harms thalidomide caused) appeared in about half the children born to mothers who took thalidomide during the fifteen-day period when organs are formed; the background rate of this birth defect is less than one per thousand.

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78. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466–67 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing recovery for increased risk of cancer); Special Project: An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573, 631–33 (1983) (citations omitted) (noting that courts have reduced damages in cases where the plaintiff smokes).

79. See Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon Shield 194–209 (1985) (noting deliberate effort of defendant to humiliate plaintiffs during discovery); Anne E. Simon, Whose Move? Breaking the Stalemate in Feminist and Environmental Activism, 2 UCLA Women’s L.J. 145, 153 (1992) (stating that courts tend to blame women and children for harms caused by ingesting lead paint). One feminist scholar suggests that the very concept of “mass tort” has been “created, defined, and legally recognized” in a way that excludes or slights the interests of female claimants. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159, 1175 n.58 (1995).

80. It is difficult to explain otherwise how asbestos and tobacco defendants could argue simultaneously, and with some success, that their products do not cause illness and that the product’s dangers were obvious to the plaintiffs, or that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent for not heeding information about these dangers. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D.N.J. 1988), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 504, 520–31 (1992); see also Rabin, supra note 77, at 124 (arguing that the current wave of tobacco litigation, brought by government and class action plaintiffs, has been more successful than prior litigation because it escapes the character-flaw scrutiny that defendants deploy against individual plaintiffs).
per thousand.\textsuperscript{81} No substance known to toxic litigation has ever cleared the causation hurdle with so much room to spare. Thalidomide is the pinnacle toxin.

As Frances Kelsey has reflected, however, "teratogens less potent than thalidomide" pose "difficulties of recognition [that are] infinitely greater."\textsuperscript{82} Although teratogens as potent as thalidomide speak for themselves, weaker toxic effects will often be discernible only from epidemiological study (where a group of people, or "cohort," exposed to the substance should reveal significant increases in risk beyond a background rate), and some toxic effects will be too small to be detected in an epidemiological study, even though they are in fact caused by the substance. These findings cannot satisfy the burden of proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard.\textsuperscript{83} Courts have relied heavily on the absence of strong epidemiological findings of teratogenicity: the epidemiological threshold set by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation\textsuperscript{84} and several judges in the Bendectin cases\textsuperscript{85} precluded plaintiffs from meeting their burden of proof. As Michael Green and others argue, however, poisons can escape blame when epidemiological evidence is demanded, because of recurrent biases and flaws in epidemiological research and the tendency of aggregation to obscure effects on individuals.\textsuperscript{86} When courts insist on epidemiological findings and reject as inadequate or irrelevant other types of evidence on causation (such as animal studies or in vitro research) they carry forward a memory of one toxin that could meet such high standards, to the detriment of persons injured by other substances.

Another scholar of causation in mass exposure cases, Troyen Brennan, identifies a different hierarchy. Professor Brennan argues that "corpuscularian" evidence, or reasoning based on Newtonian mechanistic


\textsuperscript{82. Green, supra note 13, at 72 (quoting Frances Kelsey). A teratogen, literally "monster-maker," is a substance that causes birth defects. See Dowie, supra note 16, at 66.}

\textsuperscript{83. See Green, supra note 13, at 305–06, 316–17; Green, Expert Witnesses, supra note 81, at 81, at 653.}

\textsuperscript{84. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).}


models of particles moving in response to earlier movements, has been
unduly privileged to rank above “probabilistic” evidence, such as that of
epidemiological studies. Only a few toxins can meet this high standard
of causation: “Unfortunately, toxic substance injury cases cannot pro-
duce mechanistic, deductively-derived causal evidence, and a corpuscu-
larian judge cannot process the available probabilistic evidence.”

A third type of hierarchy in the law of toxic causation ranks single,
unitary causes ahead of contingencies and conditions that are part of a
causal constellation. Kenneth Rothman, a leading epidemiologist whose
work played a part in the Bendectin litigation, has written that “[m]ost
causes that are of interest in the health field are components of sufficient
causes, but are not sufficient in themselves.” Thalidomide, a sufficient
causal antecedent by itself, easily fulfills the high standard; whereas other
toxins would require a modified standard of cause-in-fact in order to sup-
port a finding of liability in tort.

Read against this backdrop of scholarly writing, case law emerges as
strongly influenced by hierarchies of causation. In judicial opinions, sub-
estances that could be deemed toxic based on a record of scientific evi-
dence are often exonerated. Courts tell plaintiffs, in effect, good evi-
dence (that is, epidemiological for Green, “corpuscularian” for Brennan,
and unitary and exclusive for Rothman) will deem true toxins to be toxic,
but all that you, plaintiffs, have is low-grade causation evidence (for exam-
ple, animal or in vitro studies in the Green hierarchy, probabilistic or
statistical findings for Brennan, and “components” of constellations in
Rothman’s phrase) and accordingly you may not recover. That these
hierarchies are inconsistent with one another—statistical evidence, for

87. “A corpuscularian judge would not want to deal with probabilistic notions, as he
would regard these as inferior methods of reasoning.” Brennan, supra note 86, at 490–91.
88. Id. at 491.
90. Kenneth J. Rothman, Causes, 104 Am. J. Epidemiology 587, 588 (1976); see also
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1789 (1985) (referring to a
“set of antecedent conditions . . . . [that] is sufficient for the occurrence of the
consequence”).
91. For a proposal along these lines see Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the
92. See Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1360 (rejecting animal studies because they raise only a
possibility rather than a probability of harm in humans); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting animal-studies evidence in the absence of
confirmatory epidemiological evidence); Hupp v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 25, 30 (S.D.
Ohio 1982) (holding that only epidemiological evidence could prove that a swine flu shot
casted multiple sclerosis). But see Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that “[a] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established
by animal or epidemiological studies”); Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266
(N.D. Ga. 1985) (stating that plaintiff’s burden was not to “produce an unassailable
scientific study” on causation), aff’d and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
example, is high enough in the Green scheme but too low in the Brennari scheme—suggests that courts set up causation hurdles not in fidelity to one ideal but rather to assuage their concerns about the expanse and diffusion of mass-exposure litigation. Thalidomide makes a useful contrast. As a matter of tort history it existed; its harms formed a basis of worldwide litigation; it can pass every feasible test for toxic causation including the difficult corpuscularian standard, if that standard can be interpreted to accommodate some peripheral ignorance about the mechanics of thalidomide on an embryo during organogenesis. With thalidomide as a contrast, judges assure themselves that their high standards on causation are not too high for the real world.

III. CURRENT LESSONS FROM AN OLD CATASTROPHE

A. The Poor Fit Between Liability and Mass Exposure

As countless writers have noted, procedural elements of civil litigation such as the plaintiff's traditional burden of proof, the preponderance of the evidence, and the evidentiary standards courts use have all played a significant role in determining whether a plaintiff can establish causation in toxic tort cases. These elements are often interpreted to reflect judges' concerns about the expanse and diffusion of mass-exposure litigation. For example, the approach to toxic-substance causation of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for instance, appears to favor results over principle. Compare Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 887 F.2d 823, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's claim because of the absence of epidemiological evidence) with Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535 (holding that neither animal nor epidemiological evidence is necessary to establish cause and effect). For an argument that courts fear opening the floodgates in toxic substance litigation, see Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 Va. Envtl. L.J. 1, 4 (1996) (suggesting that judges following Daubert are excluding too much evidence); for a partial defense of this concern see Boston, supra note 86, at 187–91 (contrasting diffusion of mass-exposure cases with particularity of traditional torts and arguing that the former requires strict thresholds of causation).

Other criteria for causation that thalidomide would pass include case reports and disease clusters, see Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: Does Daubert Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs?, 10 J. Envd. L. & Litig. 189, 204 (1995), as well as specific variations on the epidemiological standard that courts have discussed, see, e.g., DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 958–59 (“A relative risk greater than ‘2’ means that the disease more likely than not was caused by the event.”); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 856–57 (3d Cir. 1990) (“meta-analysis” of prior studies). Because thalidomide does not produce birth defects in many animals, however, it cannot be identified as a teratogen by animal studies on certain species, such as rats and mice. See Sanders, supra note 62, at 314 n.57.


96. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 Duke L.J. 848, 879 (proposing burden-shifting scheme for toxic torts); Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact
ance of the evidence standard, statutes of limitation, class action pre-
requisites, jurisdictional requirements, discovery procedures, choice-of-law rules, and settlement practices have functioned poorly in American mass tort cases. One scholar devotes 549 pages of her casebook to a part called "Mass Tort Litigation and the Failure of the Procedural System." Notwithstanding the familiar bias in favor of attacks and critiques in legal scholarship, this consensus about failure is striking.


97. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 96, at 892, 900 (recommending recovery in proportion to probability of causation); Green, Expert Witnesses, supra note 81, at 644 (suggesting that "acceptable evidence of causation" has been confused with "enhanced judicial scrutiny of expert testimony"); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale L.J. 376, 380–82 (1986) (discussing confusion between burden of proof and preponderance standard); cf. D.H. Kaye, Science in Evidence 30 (1997) (stating that Minnesota excludes "well-founded, numerically expressed probabilities and population proportions" in its law of evidence, although this exclusion is equivocal).


103. See Boston & Madden, supra note 7, at 648–55 (describing settlement strategies and problems in toxic tort litigation).


105. The law review bias in favor of attacks allows for defenses of the status quo. See, e.g., Boston, supra note 86, at 211–74, 351–81 (defending traditional approaches to toxic
Although some British writers have supposed that American legal procedures might have permitted thalidomide plaintiffs to flourish in mass-exposure litigation,\textsuperscript{106} this bit of wishful thinking is misplaced. Thalidomide litigation in countries similar to the United States produced settlements that have been labeled, without challenge, "relatively modest,"\textsuperscript{107} "inadequate,"\textsuperscript{108} and "a pittance."\textsuperscript{109} Thalidomide claimants obtained next to nothing directly from U.S. courts.\textsuperscript{110}

The bigger lesson is that mass-tort litigation will provide neither just compensation nor meaningful deterrence for the benefit of those persons at risk from a toxic substance. Demonstrably inadequate according to theory\textsuperscript{107} and experience,\textsuperscript{112} tort liability cannot cope with the unanswerable questions of fact, temporal changes, multiples sets of conflicting interests, and onerous default rules (particularly the plaintiff’s burden of proof and condoned delays in the payment of damages) that inevitably accompany toxic-substance litigation. When ruling against plaintiffs, American courts have been tempted to believe that these problems would not have obstructed a hypothetical mass-exposure thalidomide lawsuit.\textsuperscript{113} They have used this belief to convince themselves that a strong mass-exposure case could exist—that civil litigation can cure the ills of mass exposure—in the teeth of every possible kind of evidence, including the history of thalidomide.

\textsuperscript{106} See Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 136; Harvey Teff & Colin R. Munro, Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath 138 (1976).


\textsuperscript{110} Some American families exposed to thalidomide while Richardson-Merrell was scattering the drug throughout the United States in ill-supervised clinical trials received settlements. Of these plaintiffs, some may have received the drug while abroad. One plaintiff, Shirley McCarrick, brought the only thalidomide action in the world that went to a verdict: in 1971 a California jury awarded her and her daughter Peggy a then-astronomical $2.7 million, although Richardson-Merrell ultimately paid them significantly less. See Drugs in Litigation: Damage Awards Involving Prescription and Nonprescription Drugs 918 (1992); Knightley et al., supra note 30, at 131–34.

\textsuperscript{111} See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{112} See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{113} See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (suggesting that thalidomide is part of the reason that proof rules on causation are inconsistent and burdensome).
Attention to evidence, however, also indicates that the drastic remedy of eliminating or preempting tort law for claims of toxic exposure is a bad idea, at least for the moment. Administrative compensation schemes are especially vulnerable to many of the charges now levied at tort liability: similar problems of causation, transaction costs, and defining what is compensable would persist in such a plan.\textsuperscript{114} Mass torts are a false cure for toxic exposure not because tort liability is pernicious but because it is inadequate. Accordingly, tort law should not be "preempted," in Mary Lyndon's phrase, but rather supplemented by regulation and other policy initiatives.\textsuperscript{115} The thalidomide experience gives focus and particularity to the effort of balancing difficult choices.

B. Living with Causal Uncertainty in Policymaking

In the forum of public debate, as in the courts, assertions about toxicity fall short of causation ideals. Yet a brief survey of literature describing Gulf War syndrome, breast implant accusations, endocrine disruptors, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia syndrome, and the like reveals that although skeptics publish trenchant and persuasive arguments they cannot defeat the believers.\textsuperscript{116} The confidence of claimants and their spokespersons is equalled, but not bested, by the confidence of self-appointed rationalist defenders of truth.

A memory of thalidomide ought to squelch this feeling of certainty on both sides of the new-syndrome debates over substances alleged to be toxic. Thalidomide demonstrates that a synthesized toxin can poison thousands of people, and rationalists must respect the reality of this point. For their part, new-syndrome claimants must recall all the certainty that thalidomide offered observers—short limbs and other stark consequences, strong correlation between exposure and effect, and (subsequent) replications of phocomelia in laboratory animals. Vaguer claims and a long list of symptoms or manifestations dilute this certainty.

The post-thalidomide approach to toxic exposure requires a change from all-or-nothing causation standards to graded responses. Some allegations about dangerous conditions and the harms they cause are strong enough to support the proverbial further study; stronger claims warrant regulatory action; a different set of claims may justify special compensation plans; other claims are, have been, and will always be arrant non-

\textsuperscript{114} See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 726–30; Ruhl, supra note 105, at 653–56.
\textsuperscript{115} Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 Yale J. on Reg. 137, 143 (1995).
sense. All these gradations occupy lower places than traditional positivist standards of causation that scientists often favor and will also frequently fail the preponderance-of-the-evidence rules of civil liability. But they do not all deserve equal measures of the same skeptical dismissal.

Unvarying skepticism about toxic risks is an irresponsible stance. "Innocent until proven guilty," writes journalist Mark Hertsgaard, "may sound fine in theory, but it lets the bodies pile up before the truth gets written." Conventions of scientific knowledge, research design, and business practice limit the accretion of evidence about toxicity. For example, most studies about exposure hazards look at one substance rather than combinations; low doses and slow exposure are seldom investigated, in part because of methodological difficulty; and the risk of cancer has tended to be overemphasized at the expense of studying other health effects. Add to these biases the staggering quantity of possible sources of harm—in 1989 the United States made and imported 5.9 trillion pounds of industrial chemicals, excluding pesticides, pharmaceuticals and food additives, to say nothing of natural poisons and alleged toxins, such as Gulf War exposure, that implicate sources beyond the list—and the conclusion of "proven guilty" becomes even more impossible. Environmental scholars have struggled mightily with such questions.

117. For analogies from the regulation literature, see Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 35 (1992) (describing "pyramid" of regulatory options, ranging from "persuasion" at the bottom to "license revocation" at the apex); Dale Gieringer, The FDA's Bad Medicine: Overregulation is Dangerous to Your Health, Heritage Found. Pol'y Rev., Summer 1985, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, POLICY File (outlining drug regulations in the range between approval and no approval).

118. See Angell, supra note 116, at 108–10 (describing traditions of scientific knowledge); see also Feldman, supra note 86, at 42 (noting tendency of scientists to favor delay rather than closure in the face of uncertainty).


120. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773, 784–90 (1997).


124. See Zeeman, supra note 122, at 544.
of risk assessment and so, rather than belabor the subject of a mature literature, I would only add a word related to thalidomide.

In 1965 the term *vorsorgeprinzip* emerged in Germany soon after the devastation of thalidomide, a time when policymakers surveyed industrial expansion and the weaknesses of pollution-control legislation. The *vorsorgeprinzip*, or precautionary principle, asserted that society should seek to avoid harm to the environment by blocking the flow of potentially harmful activities. Expressly endorsed in the 1992 Rio Declaration and other international agreements, the precautionary principle is an influential reminder of past industrial calamity. One critic writes that "[t]he theory can be traced back to Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*," but its public acceptance must owe some credit to the concrete, particular disaster of thalidomide.

Thalidomide continues to have meaning for policymakers seeking to live by the cryptic precautionary principle. It focuses concern: because regulation is constrained by scarcity, serious and real risks to human beings ought to be at the center of public health regulation, with lesser hazards—trivial risks, risks for which there is only weak causal evi-


127. See Tickner, supra note 122, at 3–4.


130. The maxim “better safe than sorry” is often inane, even destructive in application. Regulators have invoked it against new technologies that are safer than old ones, see Peter Huber, *Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts*, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 292 (1985), and in its name have ignored fatal hardships—malaria, starvation, contaminated medical supplies—while fretting over synthetic chemicals that have ameliorated these hardships for millions, see Louis W. Sullivan, *Chemical Villains: A Case Unproved*, *L.A. Times*, Apr. 1, 1996, at B5. Targeted selectively at chemicals and industry, the precautionary principle has begotten environmental regulations whose costs in public health outweigh benefits, even though it could with equal logic be applied against proposed new regulations themselves. See Cross, supra note 129, at 859–61.
Thalidomide provoked extensive research about hazardous substances, an initiative of staggering value that must persevere in light of evidence that environmental hazards to human health have been increasing. Thalidomide disrupted settled beliefs about causation of injury; today's policymakers and researchers ought to permit their own beliefs—especially the dread of false-positive errors—to be disrupted as they investigate environmental culprits.

C. Regulation and the Welfare State

Academic critics of mass tort litigation as a source of compensation, deterrence, corrective justice, or any other goal are often enthusiastic partisans of strong regulation and social insurance, ideas whose time in the United States they have deemed unlikely to come. Again thalidomide serves as a pertinent reminder. Though impervious to tort liability and unsatisfactory as a source of principle about causation, a thalidomide-style catastrophe—either the historical event or a similar disaster—stands as a reminder that progress can be made.

131. For suggestions on how to allocate scarce resources in making judgments about human health risks, see Brennan, supra note 86, at 502–09 (discussing tests for carcinogenicity); Wagner, supra note 120, at 780–82 (describing National Academy of Sciences recommendations for tests to determine certain chemicals' potential health risks). Although the thalidomide experience indicates that serious health risks are indeed central, it frowns on scarcity or "cost-benefit" arguments against burdening manufacturers and regulators with duties to test. Dangers to plants and animals, for example, warrant serious attention, even if costs and benefits to human beings cannot yet be quantified. See Colborn et al., supra note 121, passim (relying heavily on animal evidence to support broad-scale environmental reform proposals).


133. See Colborn et al., supra note 121, at 179–95 (noting increases in age-adjusted rates of prostate cancer, ectopic pregnancies, endometriosis, and breast cancer (among postmenopausal women with estrogen-responsive tumors); authors also suggest that increases in hyperactivity and learning disabilities are related to exposure to endocrine disruptors); L.F. Seachrist, Estrogen Linked to Adult Asthma Risk, Science News, Oct. 28, 1995, at 279 (noting that women receiving estrogen replacement therapy are 50% more likely to suffer from asthma).

134. See David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 665, 675 (1985) (calling widespread social insurance "a long way off"); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 Md. L. Rev. 951, 975 (1993) (suggesting that hostility to "welfare" makes social insurance a remote prospect); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershonov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 324 (stating that authors favor government action rather than tort as a source of medical insurance and compensation, but "as realists, we deal with the system we have"). Not all admirers of regulation and social insurance are liberal Democrats. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 18 (1988) (endorsing a combination of regulation and insurance in place of liability); Richard A. Posner, The Path Away From the Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1029, 1041 (1997) (suggesting that if the law heeded the teachings of social science, tort would be replaced by social insurance); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 66 (1989) (recommending increased regulation and insurance).
aster in the future—can be handled by the welfare state and its regulation of hazardous substances. Industrial calamities of the future will be neither prevented nor remedied by tort law; the thalidomide experience tells us that public monies must be spent.

Scholars have made valuable contributions to the welfare-state cause, complementing the law-review attacks on mass torts with writings that defend state regulation of health risks and explain how the fragmentary American safety net might be extended to provide social insurance. These ideas cannot be dismissed as idle, gauzy theorizing disconnected from the real world; the real world has progressed. The second Clinton administration has taken a firm proregulatory stand, for example, and efforts by state attorneys general against cigarette manufacturers depict tobacco exposure as “compensable” (via Medicaid recoupment) as well as “tortious.”

In a welfare state persons injured by thalidomide would be compensated; so too would persons with birth defects whose mothers took Bendectin during pregnancy and who have, in the main, been turned away from American courts. Perhaps the regulatory powers of the welfare state will forestall the next thalidomide. If they fail, social insurance would remain. This new society might even be attainable—who knows? Thalidomide is, among other things, a lesson in possibilities, a warning to expect the unexpected—and it would behoove persons who understand the effects of a disability whether through personal experience.

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135. See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
139. See Feldman, supra note 86, at 4; supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
ence, caregiving, advocacy, research, or the practice of law to lend their firsthand knowledge to the cause of building regulation and social insurance.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

To bury or praise thalidomide? News stories describe a substance that can wreak its destruction in a beneficial way, fighting malignant growths, unwanted new blood vessels, painful symptoms, and a host of diseases.\textsuperscript{142} In this Essay, thalidomide has served as a contrary metaphor, invoking malformation and error rooted in iterations of the past. I have argued in particular that thalidomide not only left American plaintiffs uncompensated but put future mass-tort plaintiffs in a worse position, having set up perilous ideals of individualism, self-congratulation, and unattainable certainty about causation.

Yet I have also confessed my hope that thalidomide might be put to beneficial use in law and policy, just as it continues to serve humanity in medicine and public health. Like other countries, the United States has a thalidomide heritage, and that heritage ought to limit, not bolster, the American faith in mass torts. Mass-tort liability has done much good in the United States, but not enough. A wealthy nation has the money—as well as the pressing challenges created by threats to public health—to invest much more, through regulation and social welfare spending, in its own prosperity.

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\textsuperscript{141} Randy Warren of Canada and Freddie Astbury of Britain are two thalidomide-afflicted activists whose efforts could be extended to argue more generally for the kind of social insurance available to all citizens of their countries.
\textsuperscript{142} See Sherman & Strauss, supra note 58, at 468; Ready, supra note 5, at A1; Stolberg, supra note 5.
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