The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements

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THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LISTING REQUIREMENTS

Roberta S. Karmel*

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is addressed to the future of qualitative stock exchange listing requirements; that is shareholder protection or corporate governance standards that go beyond market size or financial criteria for listing. Although some qualitative listing standards became incorporated into the federal securities laws, most standards of this type are considered appropriate to state corporation law, rather than federal law.

This tension between securities law and corporation law is not unique to the United States, but our federal system gives that tension a particular antithetical complexity which frequently has to be resolved by the courts and Congress.

Since most large public companies are listed on a national stock exchange, listing standards have become national, although not necessarily a part of federal law. In this context, since the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq") is the functional equivalent of a stock exchange, Nasdaq listing requirements will be analyzed as having the same legal status as requirements of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE") or other national stock exchanges.1 Part II of this paper will discuss the historical development of qualitative listing standards and their function as a bridge between federal and state law in the corporate governance area. Particular attention will be paid in Part III to the development of standards with regard to audit committees and the one-share, one-vote controversy. The history of these standards highlights the shaky legal footing of listing requirements as "rules" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").2

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1. Nasdaq is a partially owned subsidiary of the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). Although it has been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as an exclusive information processor, it has filed for registration as a securities exchange. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,852 (Dec. 22, 1998).

Stock exchange listing requirements have a long history and will probably remain in effect for a long time to come. However, trading market competition and the demutualization and public ownership of stock exchanges could call into question the ability of exchanges to formulate and enforce listing requirements. Part IV will discuss these developments. This could mean that listing standards simply fall by the wayside as casualties of stock market competition and legal uncertainty. That is not a political likelihood, however. Rather, over time demutualization of stock exchanges may lead to more direct government regulation of corporate governance. If such regulation is undertaken by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), a significant change in the balance of federal-state power with respect to corporate governance will occur. Currently, there is an upsurge in investor activism fueled by anti-business political agitation. Further, this resurgence of interest in corporate governance matters is leading to the development of some new academic theories about corporate and securities law. Part V will discuss the emergence of a new social protest movement and its possible effect on the policies of the SEC with regard to stock exchange listing requirements.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL STATUS OF LISTING STANDARDS

A. THE HISTORY OF STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING STANDARDS

1. The NYSE

The first NYSE listing standards were not considered a set policy by the exchange but instead were flexible terms inserted in listing agreements negotiated between each issuer and the exchange. The contractual flexibility of listing agreements meant that listing standards were not uniformly enforced and were subject to change. Also, because such standards were not retroactively applied, nonconforming issuers who had obtained listings prior to a new rule were not delisted. Thus, the NYSE employed no uniform set policy which applied to all listed companies. Nevertheless, this flexibility allowed the NYSE to change its listing agreements according to its economic needs.

As early as 1869, a Committee on Stock List, a subcommittee of the NYSE Board of Governors, was formed to evaluate applications to list with the NYSE. The Committee was primarily concerned with the qualitative character of the issuer: "the degree of national interest in the company, its standing in its particular field, the character of the market for its

4. Id. at 1466.
8. Cooke, supra note 5, at 215; Dice & Eiteman, supra note 6, at 110.
products, its relative stability and position in the industry, and whether or not it is engaged in an expanding activity and ha[d] prospects of maintaining its position." Applicants were required to disclose information including, but not limited to, the history and nature of its business, detailed information regarding management, capitalization structure, stock provisions and business financials, including a description of its accounting policies. However, the NYSE was faced with an uphill battle and achieved little success in regard to obtaining financial information from its listed companies.

After 1869, listing standards developed gradually. The slow rise in standards occurred for two reasons: first, at that time, financial disclosure was seen as antithetical to good business practices, and second, listing agreements were not binding on future agreements. However, with the abolition of the NYSE's "Unlisted Department" in 1910, the exchange successfully campaigned for more thorough disclosure from listing companies. Between 1910 and 1929, the NYSE gradually secured agreements with its listed companies to provide substantial financial disclosure and to provide certain safeguards for investors.

Historically, listing standards were seen as a substitute for government regulation. The NYSE argued that if its listing standards for securities offered for sale adequately protected the investing public, then government regulation would be unnecessary. Former President of the NYSE, Richard Whitney, stated in a memorandum submitted to the Committee on Banking and Currency of the United States in 1932 the following in support of furthering self-regulation of securities exchanges:

New forms of securities are frequently evolved, and changes in the corporations acts of the states, together with changes in economic conditions, give rise to frequent new problems as to forms of charters, accounting methods, and business practices. The attitude of the exchange is one of constant watchfulness to prevent the admission to its list of securities of corporations the nature of whose business and character of whose charters, or whose business and accounting practices, do not appear to adapt such securities to widely disseminated public ownership.

9. DICE & ETTEMAN, supra note 6, at 110.
10. Id. at 111-16.
11. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 429
12. See id.; Cooke, supra note 5.
13. See LEFFLER, supra note 7.
14. Prior to 1910, the NYSE maintained "listed" and "unlisted" trading departments. Issuers which did not disclose sufficient information about their issues were carried in the unlisted department. However, with the recommendation of the Hughes Commission, the unlisted department was abolished on April 1, 1910. ROBERT SOBEL, A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1935 – 1975 (1975).
15. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 430.
17. Id. at 1298 (citing Hearings on S. 84, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 285-56).
Initially, the NYSE was concerned with financial disclosure, but this emphasis precipitated several corporate governance listing standards. An annual stockholder's meeting, the first corporate governance standard, was imposed as a term within the listing agreement and was eventually linked to annual reporting requirements. By 1900, listing agreements required companies to distribute annual reports to its stockholders. By 1909, those reports had to be distributed prior to the stockholders' annual meeting. By 1914, agreements provided that a listed company notify the exchange of any change in the rights of stockholders or in the redemption of preferred stock. By 1917, agreements provided for the disclosure of a semiannual income statement and balance sheet. In 1926, the NYSE adopted a one-share, one-vote listing standard. The history of this standard and its demise will be discussed in Part III.

However, it was only after the stock market crash of 1929 that regulators began to take seriously the need for and importance of financial disclosure for listed companies. Changing public attitudes led to the establishment of a new policy on corporate publicity. The policy urged, but did not require, companies to prepare financial reports by independent accountants and to prepare detailed income statements. By 1932, independent audits became mandatory for all new listed companies. Also by 1932, companies agreed to report their earnings quarterly. Finally, with the enactment of the Exchange Act, the policies of the NYSE regarding independent audits became a matter of federal law. The value of the NYSE's listing requirements was demonstrated by the fact that "Congress closely tracked the NYSE disclosure requirements when it drafted the Exchange Act."

Prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, listing agreements required issuers annually to disclose all significant details about their financial condition, such as changes in the character of their business, capitalization, and accounting policies, prior to the stockholders' meeting. Further, a listed company promised to have its books audited by certified public accountants and to maintain a transfer agent and regis-
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Even after the promulgation of the Exchange Act, the NYSE was still concerned with the practices of its listed companies. However, the impetus for these changes may have been "the NYSE's focus during that time on bolstering trading volume." The NYSE believed that by appealing to the needs of the individual investor and improving corporate governance practices, it could attract additional investors for already listed shares.

By 1953, minimum quorum rules were established for shareholder meetings. Beginning in 1940, minimum voting rights were also required for preferred stockholders. In 1955, the NYSE required shareholder approval for any acquisition resulting in an increase of more than 20% of its shares. Then, in 1956, an independence requirement for directors was initiated, a standard of future importance and controversy. The NYSE's emphasis on corporate governance included scrutiny of the financial practices of listed companies. The NYSE's early statements regarding financial disclosure laid the groundwork for future rules; the NYSE "did not desire to list companies unless their accounting policies were sound and logical and found common acceptance among engineers and accountants." However, it was not until the 1970s that the Exchange required independent audit committee members, and this change was the result of SEC pressure as will be explained in Part III.

Today, the NYSE's listing standards include policies and requirements regarding "independent audit committees, ownership interests of corporate directors and officers, shareholders' voting rights, and other matters affecting shareholders' ownership interests and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in listed securities," including the election of independent directors, holding annual shareholders' meetings, and the solicitation of proxies. It has been argued that the NYSE's incentives were disingenuous concerning investor protection, since its primary goal was to successfully compete in the marketplace for listings among the exchanges. Notwithstanding those accusations, history illustrates that the NYSE, since its inception, was dedicated to ensuring the integrity of the securities markets and used listing standards as a device to protect investors and the market in general. If the NYSE believed that better listing

32. Id.
33. See Michael, supra note 3, at 1469.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 432.
37. See Michael, supra note 3, at 1469.
38. Id.
39. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 432.
40. See Michael, supra note 3, at 1469.
43. See Pritchard, supra note 30, at 1001-09.
standards gave it a competitive edge, this does not mean investor protec-
tion was an unimportant goal. Stock exchange listing standards are
deply rooted in NYSE history and may not be as easily compromised by
competition and demutualization as critics of the NYSE assume. Never-
theless, competition among exchanges and demutualization may reduce
the NYSE’s bargaining leverage in pushing for higher standards. These
issues will be further discussed in Parts III and IV.

2. The American Stock Exchange

Compared to the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX")
adopted significantly more lenient listing standards and initiated them at
a much later date in history. One possible explanation for this inaction is
because throughout AMEX’s entire history, it competed with the NYSE
for listings. AMEX, previously known as the New York Curb Exchange
(the "Curb"), was used as a springboard for many smaller and less estab-
lished issuers to enter the market. A survey in the 1950s showed that
more than half of the securities listed on the NYSE were previously listed
on the Curb. It was because of AMEX’s position on many listing stan-
dards that it was able to maintain its name as the "great unlisted market
of the country." Although AMEX’s listings standards were more com-
petitive than the NYSE’s, self-regulatory efforts were dismal and the ex-
change came under strict scrutiny from the SEC in the early 1960s.

A seasoner for the Big Board, the AMEX listed those securities which
could not meet the strict listing requirements of the NYSE. Issuers try-
ning to avoid making corporate disclosures under the NYSE’s disclosure
requirements would trade as an "unlisted" security on the Curb. The
1936 Amendments to Section 12 of the Exchange Act extended unlisted
trading privileges and enabled the Curb to survive since most of its issues
consisted of unlisted securities which could not meet the registration re-
quirements. The 1936 amendments also brought added competition
from regional stock exchanges. As a result, the Curb, as well as other
exchanges, sought additional listings during the 1930s, with scant atten-
tion to regulatory concerns. Despite the effects of new legislation and
increased competition, “the Curb remained the great unlisted market of
the country.” But “it was clear that the AMEX’s campaign for more

44. Id. at 1008.
45. Id. at n.72.
47. Id. at vol. I, 220.
48. Id. Those exchanges which permitted securities to be traded on a “unlisted” basis
were those who campaigned most against the abolishment of unlisted trading. Whereas
the NYSE abolished its unlisted trading department in 1910, AMEX was steadfast in re-
taining its unlisted securities and only took its first steps toward dismantlement in 1934.
Michael supra note 3, at 1472.
49. ROBERT SOBEL, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, 1921-1971 129
(1972).
50. Id.
51. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at vol. VI, 2770.
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listings in the 1950s resulted in a higher quantity but arguably lower quality of listed companies. 52

During the 1960s, reforms swept through the AMEX. 53 In 1962, following the exposure of several scandals, the SEC issued a report criticizing almost every aspect of the AMEX's operations, including its board, methods of stock listing and retention, and trading methods. 54 The SEC concluded that the AMEX failed at achieving any type of self-regulation. 55 Only then, the AMEX began to initiate several reforms regarding its organization and listing standards. 56 Soon thereafter, AMEX listing standards required proxy solicitations and shareholder approval of certain transactions. 57 In 1968, AMEX published its first edition of the AMEX Company Guide, which included policies regarding conflicts of interests, directors, and voting rights. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and their officers, directors, or substantial shareholders were considered on a case-by-case basis. 58 The size and significance of the conflict as well as its possible resolution were also taken into consideration. Although not required, the AMEX policy "recommended" the appointment of at least two independent directors, 59 a factor also considered when evaluating the significance of a conflict of interest. The AMEX Company Guide also included minimum quorum requirements. 60 Except in the areas of voting rights and independent directors and audit committees, AMEX listings standards have remained relatively static since the 1970s.

Until 1976, the AMEX did not have an official policy concerning voting rights. In 1972, AMEX's stated policy was to prohibit all issues of non-voting common stock, but its practice was to consider each case on an individual basis. Further, on several occasions, the AMEX did not refuse to list such companies with disparate voting rights for its shareholders. 61 In particular, the AMEX decided to list Wang Laboratories, Inc. ("Wang") even though it had been rejected for listing by the NYSE because of unequal shareholder voting rights. In 1976, the AMEX published the listing agreement with Wang, permitting a capitalization which included a Class B common stock having one-tenth of one vote per share. After 1976, listings on the AMEX were held to this so-called "Wang Formula." 62 As will be described in Part III, this willingness by the AMEX to list issuers which did not have a one-share, one-vote common stock capitalization led to a race to the bottom between exchanges with

52. Michael, supra note 3, at 1473.
53. Id.; SOBEL, supra note 49, at 280-85.
54. SOBEL, supra note 49, at 297.
55. Id.
56. Michael, supra note 3, at 1473.
57. Id. at 1474.
58. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, § 121 Conflicts of Interest (1968).
59. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, § 122 Outside Directors (1968).
60. Michael, supra note 3, at 1473.
61. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at vol. IV, 1839 n.302.
62. See Seligman, supra note 24, at 704.
regard to a voting rights listing standard. However, in 1994, the NYSE, AMEX, and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") jointly adopted a minimum voting rights rule which prohibits any reduction or restriction of shareholder voting rights through corporate action.63

The AMEX has similar, but "less exacting" independent audit committee standards than the NYSE.64 The independence of audit committee members, originally a recommendation for listing in 1980, became a mandatory listing requirement in the early 1990s. Following the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, the independence of those audit committees and the financial literacy of directors were mandated, as will be more fully explained in Part III.

3. Nasdaq

The history of Nasdaq listing requirements is rooted in state blue sky merit regulation. Every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico has a securities regulation statute. Some state blue sky regulation is merit regulation. A merit regulator has the authority to prevent an issuer from selling securities in the state because the offering or the issuer's capital structure is "substantively unfair or presents excessive risk" to investors.65 Although the blue sky laws vary from state to state, they all contain a requirement for registration of securities to be sold in the state. However, most state securities laws traditionally provided an exemption from their securities registration requirements to issuers which were listed on a national securities exchange. This was known as the "blue chip" exemption. Some states also provided an exemption for certain over-the-counter securities.66

In 1985, the Nasdaq initiated its first corporate governance listing standard in an effort to secure blue sky exemptions in a greater number of states.67 These standards included the submission of annual and periodic reports to shareholders, appointment of independent directors, an independent audit committee, required shareholder participation in certain corporate transactions, and execution of a listing agreement.68 This was part of a campaign for broader exemptions from state registration so that securities listed on Nasdaq or designated as "National Market System Securities"69 would be exempt from state blue sky registration requirements.

63. Loss & Seligman, supra note 46, at vol. IV, 1848-50.
65. Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW 785, 787 (1986).
66. Id. at 833-35.
67. Michael, supra at note 3, at 1475; Seligman, supra note 24, at 705.
68. Michael, supra note 3, at 1475.
This controversy concerning the merit of Nasdaq listing standards in contrast to the standards of national securities exchanges was settled by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, which preempted state regulation of the securities registration and offering process for "covered securities." This means merit review is not applicable to nationally traded securities, including Nasdaq listed securities. As a result, competition was eliminated between the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq for better listing standards where this competition was an effort to exempt issuers from state blue sky merit review.

4. Foreign Issuers

Foreign issuers can obtain a waiver from many NYSE corporate governance requirements if an independent counsel licensed in the issuer's home country opines that its practices are not prohibited by the issuer's domicile. This means, in effect, that if the laws in the issuer's home country are silent or do not explicitly require the standard, the foreign issuer will be able to obtain a waiver. Under the AMEX and Nasdaq listing rules, similar exemptions are available.

Although the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq all purport to apply financial reporting and corporate governance requirements to foreign issuers, in 1987, the SEC approved rule changes which allowed the exchanges to waive or modify certain enumerated listing standards for foreign issuers on a case-by-case basis. Instead, a foreign issuer's compliance with the "laws, customs, and practices" of its country of origin became determinant for a U.S. listing. Those enumerated standards which may be waived or modified include: "(1) [q]uarterly reporting of interim earnings; (2) composition and election of the Board of Directors; (3) shareholder approval requirements and voting rights; and (4) quorum requirements for shareholder meetings." The relaxed foreign issuer

72. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 41, § 103.00 Non-U.S. Companies.
74. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the Exchanges' Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 23, 1987) [hereinafter Foreign Issuer Rule Changes]. Prior to 1987, the NASD did not have any corporate governance or shareholder reporting requirements. Id. at 3. In 1987, under a new rule change, securities traded on the Nasdaq are considered as part of the National Market System and are subject to the Commission's reporting requirements as well as corporate governance requirements similar to the NYSE and AMEX. Self Regulatory Organizations; Transaction Reporting Plan; Order Approving Amendments to the Transaction Reporting Plan with Respect to NASDAQ/NMS Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 24,633, 1, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,234 (June 23, 1987). In 1997, these requirements were extended to Nasdaq SmallCap issuers as well. Id.
75. Foreign Issuer Rule Changes, supra note 74.
76. Id. at 2.
listing standards stemmed from a recognition that many differences exist between the corporate governance practices of foreign companies and U.S. companies in the areas of voting and independent directors, quorum requirements, and financial reporting. For example, the AMEX asserted that “many foreign issuers are incorporated in nations which lack a history of providing shareholders with the same degree of participation in the choice of management, and in voting of stock issuances, as is the norm in this country” and that “[o]ther means of corporate accountability and discipline are favored over shareholder voting as a check on management.”

However, the real impetus for change was global competition among exchanges. A critic of the foreign issuer listing standards has argued that the rule change was an SEC response “to the need[s] of its constituencies, the U.S. stock exchanges and their investment banking members to develop a U.S. market for foreign securities.” Differences among the corporate governance practices of foreign issues would unduly inhibit those companies from listing on American exchanges unless foreign issuers were afforded special treatment.

The SEC concluded that the foreign issuer listing rule would not have a “detrimental competitive impact on domestic companies.” The SEC stated that it was “appropriate to permit differentiations from the requirements imposed on domestic companies in order to permit the exchanges to be more competitive on an international basis and to provide access to U.S. investors to investment opportunities in a large number of foreign securities.” Nevertheless, there is some concern that domestic issuers will eventually campaign for a reduction in listings requirements under the same justifications cited for foreign issuers, an argument for equal treatment of all issuers.

Because the reporting and disclosure requirements for listed companies are much more onerous than those required by a foreign issuer’s home country, it is very common for foreign issuers to seek waivers. Waivers are routinely granted as long as the practices of the issuer do not

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78. Id. at 177.

79. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the Exchanges’ Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 1, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 23, 1987). Supporting the exchanges’ proposals, the SIA International Committee, in a comment letter to the SEC, noted that the “NASDAQ’s current lack of corporate governance standards may have been a factor in the decisions by these companies to choose NASDAQ.” Id. at 4; see also Fanto, supra note 73.

80. Foreign Issuer Rules changes, supra note 74, at 3.

81. Foreign Issuer Rule Changes, supra note 74, at 6.

82. Id.
violate the law of the issuer's home country. The NYSE has stated that it does not intend to limit waivers or exemptions to situations where it would be impossible for a company to comply with a specific corporate governance requirement and also comply with home country law, but abuse of the rule will not be allowed. In an SEC release, the NYSE stated the following: "If, for example, a waiver were available any time compliance with SRO rule requirements imposed any additional burdens on foreign companies beyond those imposed by law or custom by the country of domicile, the proposals would be tantamount to eliminating all listing standards in this area from foreign companies."

Despite the adoption of several corporate governance listing standards for U.S. issuers, the exchanges' policies toward foreign issuers have remained accommodating. In 1991, the SEC approved exchange rules which mandate that issuers have at least two independent directors and an audit committee composed of a majority of independent directors. However, these requirements do not apply to foreign issuers as long as the U.S. practice is inconsistent with the custom or practice of a foreign issuer's home country. Advancing its position, the NYSE stated that its policies are consistent with the SEC's foreign issuer guidelines.

Similarly, foreign issuers are exempt from changes to the NYSE, AMEX, and NASD's rules governing the voting rights of common shareholders adopted in 1994. The exchange rules exempt issuances or actions by foreign issuers from these voting rights rules as long as the company's voting structure is not prohibited by the issuer's home country's laws. Accordingly, foreign issuers could meet exchange listing standards regarding voting rights if it either complied with the requirements of Rule 19c-4 (discussed in Part III(C) below) or was in compliance with the issuer's home country laws.

In 1989, the SEC approved another NYSE rule change liberalizing the

83. Id.
84. Id.
86. "The fact that its proposed audit committee requirements will not apply to foreign issuers if the requirement is inconsistent with the custom and/or practice in the company's country of domicile is consistent with the Exchange's foreign issuer guidelines." Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 3.
procedures for foreign issuers listing on a U.S. exchange. The rule allows the exchange to consider any "nonconforming practice" of a foreign issuer which is not prohibited by the laws of the issuer's home country rather than limiting the exchanges' consideration to those "nonconforming practices" which are consistent with the practice of the issuer's home country. The purpose of the rule was to reduce administrative burdens on foreign issuers; the exchanges claimed that obtaining certification that nonconforming practice is not prohibited under the law is easier than showing that the practice is consistent with the custom of a particular country.

Excusing foreign issuers from listing standards can be justified on the ground that corporate governance is generally a matter of home state regulation, but it can also be viewed as a means to attract foreign issuer listings in a competitive global market. Thus, the competition for listings can result in races to the top or races to the bottom, depending upon how an exchange perceives its competitive edge with regard to particular listing standards.

B. The SEC's Authority Over Corporate Governance

Corporate governance is primarily a matter of state corporation law. This was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in a non-securities law case as follows:

Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.

Thereafter, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, the Court applied this principle in a case arising under the federal securities laws involving a

91. Amex Foreign Issuers, supra note 90, at n.3.
short form merger. Under Delaware law owners of at least ninety percent of a subsidiary's stock may merge with that subsidiary without requesting the consent of minority shareholders—who, in turn, must receive fair value for their shares. The plaintiff, the minority shareholders in Santa Fe, did not allege any material misrepresentation or omission. Rather, they argued that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws were applicable to a breach of corporate fiduciary duty, in that the majority shareholders were not pursuing a legitimate corporate purpose. The Court, however, refused to apply Rule 10b-5 to allegations of internal corporate mismanagement. It stated: "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."

In Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., the Supreme Court indicated that Santa Fe would not be confined to its facts, but rather was a general holding concerning fiduciary duty. Schreiber raised the issue of whether the withdrawal of a hostile tender offer bid and the substitution of a partial bid, following negotiations with the target company's management, constituted a manipulative act under the Williams Act. The Court held that the term "manipulation" in sections 10(b) and 14(c) of the Exchange Act should be similarly interpreted and that manipulative acts require misrepresentation or nondisclosure.

Nevertheless, the SEC has long claimed authority and expertise with respect to corporate governance and made its views felt through disclosure and other regulation. William O. Douglas, an early SEC Chairman and then Supreme Court Justice wrote:

Both prior to and during my SEC days I had promoted the idea of having 'public' directors of our large corporations... The reason was that, by and large, directors tend to become subservient to the management, courteously servings its interests, which are not necessarily consistent with the interest of stockholders or compatible with the public reputation of the company... at least some of the directors of our large corporations must not be subservient to management. This was a policy which the SEC had power to enforce.

The views of Justice Douglas remain controversial. The more common view is that the Securities Act is a full disclosure, rather than a merit, statute and the SEC does not have the power to regulate corporate governance. Even in the case generally cited as the first to focus on management integrity and corporate governance issues, In re Franchard, the

96. Id. at 479.
98. The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained in §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) and the regulations thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13e-101, 240.14a-1 to 14f-1.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), n(e).
100. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST YOUNG MAN 272 (1974).
SEC backed off from sanctioning directors neglect of duty in failing to deal with a CEO who was making unauthorized loans to himself. In this stop order proceeding, the staff had argued that prospectuses were deficient in not disclosing that the directors, in overseeing the operations of the company, failed to exercise the degree of diligence required. The Commission viewed this as an "issue raising fundamental considerations as to the functions of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act." In deciding this issue, the Commission held that the Securities Act did not define Federal standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary operations of business enterprises and nowhere empowers us to formulate administratively such regulatory standards. The diligence required of registrant's directors in overseeing its affairs is to be evaluated in the light of the standards established by State statutory and common law.

In this case, the Commission thus anticipated the holding of the Court in Santa Fe.

Nevertheless, the SEC has had a tendency to use disclosure requirements for their prophylactic effect of regulating corporate conduct. In addition, various provisions of the Exchange Act can and have been used by the SEC to effect corporate conduct. These include regulatory authority over proxy solicitations and regulatory authority over tender offers. Further a catch-all antifraud provision and broad rulemaking authority gave the SEC the ability to utilize enforcement cases and disclosure rules to impose its notions about corporate governance on public companies. In a wide variety of management fraud cases and disclosure rules concerning management remuneration the SEC succeeded in regulating corporate governance. Another weapon which the SEC was given that might have been used to federalize corporate governance was its power to define "qualified securities" in a national market system. But, as will be discussed in connection with the one-share, one-vote controversy, the potential for using this power to achieve corporate governance objectives by way of SEC changes to stock exchange listing rules has thus far not been realized.

When the SEC tested the limits of its authority in dictating corporate governance standards for stock exchange listing requirements, it succeeded with respect to requirements for audit committees, but failed with respect to the one-share, one-vote controversy. As a result, stock ex-

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102. Id. at 172.
103. Id.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78k1(a)(2). This provision was added to the Exchange Act in 1975.
change listing standards operate as a bridge between state and federal law with respect to corporate governance, but their legal status is uncertain.

III. THE SEC'S AUTHORITY OVER STOCK EXCHANGE RULEMAKING

A. Statutory Provisions

Until 1975, exchange listing standards were clearly the subject of private or contract law between an exchange and its listed companies. However, in 1975, Congress laid the foundation for the establishment of a national market system in amendments to the Exchange Act. Without mandating specific components of the national market system or even defining the term, Congress vested the SEC with broad flexible authority to design, implement, and regulate the trading markets. Further, important new powers over stock exchanges and the NASD were given to the SEC. Sections 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act gave the SEC a new power to approve, disapprove, abrogate, add to, or delete from rules adopted by exchanges.\footnote{111} Any amendments to any exchange rules mandated by the SEC remain rules of the exchange and do not become SEC rules.\footnote{112} Nevertheless, the SEC's authority under section 19(c) is limited to actions in "furtherance of the purposes" of the Exchange Act.\footnote{113}

In addition to the generalized power over exchange rulemaking contained in section 19, the SEC has authority to establish criteria for "qualified securities." Although this authority is not facially limited by the statute, it is limited implicitly by the objectives of the national market system because of section 19(c). One of these principles is that the securities qualified to be included in the national market system should depend primarily on their trading characteristics, rather than where they happen to be traded. The Senate Report accompanying the 1975 amendments, for example, noted that "many securities do not have the characteristics—e.g., trading volume, price, and number of stockholders—which would justify auction-type trading."\footnote{114} Also, the Exchange Act was amended in 1975 to provide that it is in the "public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure ... fair competition ... among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets." Thus, in giving the SEC authority to define "qualified securities" it would appear that Congress intended the SEC to equalize listing standards of competing marketplaces, if this were necessary to achieve the statutory purposes of the Exchange Act.

B. Audit Committee Requirements

As early as 1940, the SEC recommended that corporations form audit committees composed of independent directors. The SEC did not have an opportunity to force such a requirement on public companies, however, until the 1970s. In connection with widespread scandals concerning questionable or illegal payments by many public corporations to domestic and foreign government officials, the SEC discovered inadequate or improper corporate books and records that concealed the existence of these payments. This was very disturbing since the integrity of corporate books and records is essential to the entire reporting system administered by the SEC. Among other things, the SEC pointed to the importance of audit committees in uncovering falsification of corporate records and the use of "slush" funds and endorsed audit committees as appropriate models of corporate conduct. Following its investigation into the sensitive payments scandal, the SEC urged strengthening the independence and vitality of corporate boards of directors, and suggested, in a letter from SEC Chairman Roderick Hills to William M. Batten, then Chairman of the NYSE, that the NYSE "could take the lead in this area by appropriately revising its listing requirements, thus providing a practical means effecting . . . important objectives without increasing direct governmental regulation."

The NYSE thereafter developed such a proposal. On March 9, 1977, the SEC then approved the NYSE rule requiring all listed domestic companies to establish by June 30, 1978, and maintain thereafter, an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from any relationship that "would interfere with the exercise of independent judgement as a committee member." Further, a majority of the audit committee was required to be composed of directors who were not formerly officers of the company or one of its subsidiaries. Thereafter, the AMEX and Nasdaq imposed similar requirements on their listed companies, but required only that a majority of the audit committee members be independent.

The voluntariness of the NYSE's adoption of this rule was debatable. So was the extent of the SEC's power to compel the NYSE to change its

117. See id. at 55-56.
120. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 41, § 303.00 Audit Committee (1983).
121. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 3.05, cmt. a (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
CORPORATE LISTING REQUIREMENTS

Although the SEC might have invoked its power to modify exchange listing requirements, since it is questionable that the SEC could compel issuers to form audit committees, it could have been argued that the SEC's power to mandate listing requirements to this effect was not in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. Such an analysis would have been in keeping with the Court's demarcation between federal and state power in *Santa Fe*. On the other hand, the SEC has fairly broad powers to define auditor independence. Further, the SEC has the power to mandate disclosure about corporate governance matters, and about this same time it exercised its authority by requiring a description of the structure of certain board committees, including the audit committee.

Over the next two decades, the mantra that a board of directors should be composed of persons independent of management was spread around the world by regulators and institutional investors. A steady stream of reports and recommendations by blue ribbon committees and distinguished business and legal bodies praised the value of independent directors in giving capitalism credibility. In 1998, in response to an expressed concern by the SEC about the adequacy of the oversight of the audit process by independent directors, the heads of the NYSE and the NASD appointed a Blue Ribbon Committee that issued a report on this
subject a year later. The Committee recommended a more stringent definition of "independence" for audit committee members than exchange rules contained, that listed companies with a market capitalization above $200 million have an audit committee composed solely of independent directors, and that audit committee members be financially literate. Following these recommendations, the NYSE, NASD, AMEX, and SEC came out with rules to implement the Blue Ribbon Report.

The NYSE listing standards therefore now provide that each listed company must have a qualified audit committee that meets certain standards. The audit committee must have a formal written charter specifying the scope of the committee’s responsibilities and how they are implemented, including the accountability of the outside auditor to the board and audit committee and that the committee satisfies itself that the outside auditor is independent. In addition, the audit committee must have at least three directors who have no relationship to the company that may interfere with their independence, and each member must be financially literate; one member must have accounting or related financial management expertise. The new AMEX and NASD rules are essentially the same, but have slightly different definitions of “independence” and financial literacy.

129. Id. at 3-4.
132. Under the NYSE Rule, the independence and financial literacy of audit committee members is interpreted by the company’s board in its business judgement. Therefore, directors who have some kind of business relationship to the company “may serve on the audit committee only if the company’s board determines in its business judgment that the relationship does not interfere with the director’s exercise of independent judgment.” It is clear, however, that directors who are principals of companies with a material business interest with the issuer would not usually be considered independent. NYSE Audit Committee Rules, supra note 130, at 71,533. In contrast, the NASD’s and AMEX’s definitions do not rely on the opinion of the company’s board and prohibit certain persons from obtaining independence status and require audit committee members to display certain skills. Audit committee members must be able to “read and understand fundamental financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement.” NASD Audit Committee Rules, supra note 130, at 71,525; AMEX Audit Committee Rules, supra note 130, at 71,519.
In this more recent round of rulemaking on audit committees there were almost no voices raised questioning the SEC's authority to pressure exchanges into revising their listing requirements, even though the D.C. Circuit Court had in the interim between 1977 and 1999 struck down the SEC's efforts to impose a one-share, one-vote standard on exchanges, as will be explained below. Whether this was because of general agreement on the advisability of the tightened standard, or the exchange's seeming voluntary initiatives with regard to improving its audit committee requirements, is unclear. As a practical matter, the SEC has enormous leverage over exchanges and so they are unlikely to resist SEC "suggestions" that are not controversial or perceived by an exchange to be contrary to its interests.

C. THE ONE-SHARE, ONE-VOTE LISTING REQUIREMENT

An important shareholder protection listing standard that was in effect at the NYSE from 1926 until the late 1980s was the principle that all shares of common stock of a listed company should have one vote. During the hostile takeover boom of the 1980s, however, some companies engaged in defensive recapitalizations whereby company insiders obtained shares with greater voting rights than public shareholders. Some well known AMEX listed companies, for example Wang, had a weighted capitalization of ten to one in favor of insiders and, as explained in Part II above, such unequal voting shares were permitted by the AMEX and Nasdaq. The NYSE proved unable to resist this competition, especially after General Motors Corporation ("GM") issued a class of lesser-weighted voting shares in connection with its acquisition of Electronic Data Systems, Inc. ("EDS"). Further, although the SEC attempted to impose a voting rights standard on all exchanges, its authority to do so was negated by the D.C. Circuit Court.

During the 1920s, dual class issuances were motivated by the desire to raise additional equity capital and simultaneously retain control in the hands of a founding family or entrepreneurial group. These shares were ordinarily called "bankers' shares" and resulted in a phenomenon called "bankers' control," where voting rights were held exclusively by one class of stock. Professor William Z. Ripley, heralded public outcry against these dual class structures, stating that "they form one of the major problems which lie on the border line between corporation law and financial practice."
Again in the 1980s, dual class capital structures became popular. However, this resurgence was not due to the same motivators as in the 1920s. Dual class voting structures of the 1980s were developed in response to management's fear of hostile takeovers to ensure that voting control remained with management and corporate insiders. By creating dual classes of common stock, management and corporate insiders could maintain a controlling interest in the firm without having to contribute substantial amounts of equity. Although an effective defense to corporate takeovers, the separation of ownership and voting control were seen as adverse to the interests of common stockholders and therefore, the issue of voting rights became very controversial.  

As explained in Part II, among the most influential stock exchanges, the NYSE set the most restrictive standards regarding voting rights, with an absolute restriction on any infringement on shareholder voting rights, while the NASD placed no restrictions on the creation of dual classes of common stock and the AMEX had limited restrictions. As early as the 1920s, the NYSE was skeptical of listing nonvoting common stock. Disparate voting rights were seen as adverse to notions of investor protection because those who had contributed the most capital generally were given the least amount of voting rights. The roots of the NYSE's policy were planted in a 1926 announcement regarding the listing of Dodge Brothers, Inc., which had held a disproportionate amount of non-voting common stock in relation to its voting common stock. There was much public outcry and the NYSE responded by stating: "Without at this time attempting to formulate a definite policy, attention should be drawn to the fact that in the future the committee, in considering applications for the listing of securities, will give careful thought to the matter of voting control."  

The NYSE enforced its rule for more than a half a century thereafter. But in 1984, when GM acquired EDS, it refused to comply with the NYSE rule and threatened to list with competitor exchanges AMEX or Nasdaq. Because of the importance of GM as a listed company, the NYSE ignored its rule and did not delist GM. Two motivating factors for the NYSE were: to counter threatened competition from other exchanges, and to provide corporate managers with a new takeover defense, which issuers wanted during the 1980s. With the continued listing of GM, the path was now clear for other companies with similar...
intentions. In June 1984, the NYSE announced a moratorium on delisting based on dual class capitalizations, and by 1988 more than 50 issuers were in violation of the one-share, one-vote rule.\(^{143}\)

In connection with its 1984 moratorium, the NYSE established a Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Standards (the "Subcommittee") in order to re-evaluate the exchange’s voting policies. Believing that strict adherence to its one-share, one-vote policy would cause the NYSE to lose listings to its competitor exchanges,\(^ {144}\) the Subcommittee explained that the NYSE was obliged to relax its rule because of competition from other exchanges and also in order to prevent a "race to the bottom." Finally, in 1986, the NYSE officially modified its "longstanding rule mandating a one-share, one-vote for all common stocks listed on the NYSE."\(^ {145}\) Several factors influenced the NYSE to reconsider the rule:

the growing competition for listings with the AMEX and NASD, the desire of NYSE-listed companies to adopt disparate voting rights plans as takeover defenses, the belief that corporate issues should have flexibility in raising capital and adopting corporate structures, and the belief that regulatory changes, such as improvements in corporate disclosure, had made the shareholder protection provided by the one-share, one-vote rule less important.\(^ {146}\)

The NYSE abandonment of its one-share, one-vote rule illustrates the political organization of the exchanges and the limits of exchange regulation.\(^ {147}\) Competition among the exchanges was the primary cause leading to revision of the rule. The NYSE folded after feeling pressured by listed corporations to abandon its policy. Only if competing exchanges were willing to adopt and enforce such a rule could the NYSE have upheld its policy. During 1985 Congressional Hearings on one-share, one-vote, the Exchange testified that “the national competitive environment may very well preclude the Exchange from unilaterally retaining one share, one vote.”\(^ {148}\) Some also state that the NYSE’s policy had endured primarily for political reasons, and therefore the NYSE was easily susceptible to outside pressures.\(^ {149}\) Indeed, the NYSE’s abandonment of the one-share, one-vote rule has been used as a critique of exchange regulation, raising questions about the exchanges’ credibility in enforcing investor


\(^{144}\) NYSE Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Standards, Initial Report—Dual Capitalization (Jan. 3, 1985).

\(^{145}\) Disenfranchisement Rule, supra note 143, at 26,376.

\(^{146}\) \textit{Id.} at 26,377.

\(^{147}\) Pritchard, \textit{supra} note 30, at 1001.


\(^{149}\) Seligman, \textit{supra} note 24, at 700.
After attempts to persuade the exchanges to adopt a uniform voting rights rule failed, in 1988 the SEC adopted its own rule to the Exchange Act prohibiting listed companies from changing the voting rights of common stockholders. Recognizing that the abandonment of the NYSE rule would have far reaching consequences, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 that required the exchanges to bar the listing of a domestic corporation's securities if that company acted disparately to reduce the per share voting rights of existing stockholders. The rule prohibited an issuer from issuing securities, or taking other corporate action, which would either nullify, restrict, or disparately reduce the per share voting rights of common stockholders. Nevertheless, disparate voting rights were permitted if they served a *bona fide* business purpose. The rule was intended to achieve several contradictory goals: ensure management accountability; limit hostile tender offer situations and adverse changes in corporate control; maintain the rights of public shareholders; limit competition among SROs; and preserve the integrity of U.S. securities markets.

However, in 1990, in *Business Roundtable v. SEC*, the D.C. Court of Appeals abrogated Rule 19c-4 on the grounds that the rule directly controlled the substantive allocation of powers among classes of shareholders and therefore was in excess of the SEC's authority under section 19 of the Exchange Act. In the court's view, the rule was not in furtherance of any purpose of the Exchange Act, and could not be justified under the proxy rules, the SEC's plenary power over exchanges, including its power to approve or add to exchange rules, or its powers to facilitate the establishment of a national market system and designate securities qualified for trading in such a system. This is because permitting the SEC to adopt corporate governance standards through the back door by mandating uniform listing standards would disrupt state jurisdiction over corporate governance and shareholder voting rights. Although an exchange could adopt a voting rights listing standard, such a standard was not a rule under the authority of the Exchange Act. This was not viewed as the exercise of governmental power regulating an issuer.

The *Business Roundtable* case did not put an end to the voting rights rule story. After much negotiation with the SEC, the NYSE and Nasdaq adopted a uniform rule that was essentially a modified version of former SEC Rule 19c-4. The policy prohibited any restriction or disparate reduc-

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153. *Id.*
154. *Id.* at 26,380.
156. *Id.* at 407.
157. *Id.* at 412-13.
158. *Id.* at 414.
tion in the voting rights of the common stock of public shareholders through any corporate action. In view of changes in the marketplace, the NYSE emphasized the "flexibility" of the new policy: "The Exchange's interpretations under the Policy will be flexible, recognizing that both the capital markets and the circumstances and needs of listed companies change over time." The rule was intended to eliminate a race to the bottom in shareholder voting rights. It was the NYSE's stated aim to permit those corporate actions previously permitted under Rule 19c-4. As such, the policy does permit disparate voting rights and the listing of non-voting common stock as long the stockholders are afforded certain safeguards, which seek to align (as much as possible) the rights of non-voting shareholders with voting shareholders. Minimum voting rights are also required for preferred stockholders.

Several commentators have suggested that the primary motivator for the NYSE's decision to maintain a voting rights rule was a "concern with public opinion." However, the NYSE has emphatically stated that its policy is based upon a desire to "encourage high standards of corporate democracy." It would appear that in the case of the voting rights rule, as in the case of exchange rules concerning audit committees, the SEC accomplished what the D.C. Circuit Court said it could not do—establish a federal voting rights standard through the back door of exchange listing standards. Yet, the legal basis for such initiatives is unclear and the tenuous nature of the SEC's power in the corporate governance area weakens the ability of exchanges to establish and enforce listing standards that issuers find objectionable.

IV. THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OF LISTING STANDARDS

A. Stock Exchange Demutualization

When the Exchange Act was passed in 1934 and when it was amended in 1975 to establish a framework for SEC regulation of exchanges, stock exchanges all operated in the form of non-profit mutual or membership organizations under state law. To the extent market power was not curtailed by competition or regulation, mutual governance gave specialist or
market maker members of an exchange control of the price, quality, and range of services produced by the exchange. Exchange profits were returned to broker and dealer members in the form of lower access fees or trading profits. Further, exchanges have long operated as self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") with members contributing their time to governance and self-regulation to make exchanges more effective and more profitable. Self-regulation gave exchanges more credibility as quasi-public institutions and also protected their monopoly type powers.

Among these monopoly type powers was the trading of securities in issuers that determined to list on the exchange. Although as far back as the Multiple Trading Case in 1941, the SEC attempted to prevent exchanges from exercising a monopoly in the trading of an issuer's securities, the NYSE's off-board trading rule, Rules 390 and Rule 500 effectively prevented serious competition among exchanges in dually listed stocks. The first significant attack on the monopolization of trading in the stock of a listed issuer was Exchange Act Rule 19c-3, which permitted exchange members to trade off-board as agent for customers, except in agency crosses, and abolished off-board trading restrictions as to stocks listed after April 26, 1979. In recent years, competition to exchange trading monopolies has come from electronic communications networks ("ECNs") or alternative trading markets ("ATSs").

In addition to having to compete with new markets, the world's exchanges are demutualizing, and this is leading to new challenges. The first exchange to demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993, followed by the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1996, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Borsa Italiana in 1997, and the Australian Stock Exchange in 1998. By the end of 2000, many more exchanges will have joined this group, including the Paris Bourse, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq. The NYSE had announced plans to demutualize in 1999, but as yet has not taken steps to do so. So far only the Stockholm and Australian Stock Exchanges have gone public and listed on their own
When the federal securities laws were passed, stock exchanges were required to register with the SEC. The SEC thus obtained oversight authority over stock exchanges, but the stock exchanges continued to have rulemaking and regulatory authority with respect to their members, their trading markets, and their listed companies. Although the efficacy of self-regulation was called into question by stock market abuses reported in the 1963 SEC Special Study, that study concluded that self-regulation should be maintained and strengthened. Nevertheless, in 1964 the SEC obtained greater direct authority over the continuous disclosures made by public companies. Previously, the SEC was given power to regulate financial disclosure by issuers making initial public offerings, but after 1964 the SEC also was given responsibility for regulating annual and periodic reports.

The 1975 Act further strengthened the SEC's oversight role over the stock exchanges and NASD by, among other things, giving the SEC the power to initiate and approve SRO rulemaking, thus expanding the SEC's role in SRO enforcement and discipline by allowing the SEC to play an active role in structuring the market. For the first time, the statute set forth requirements with respect to the composition of exchange and association boards of directors. The 1975 Act sought to preserve and reinforce the concept of industry self-regulation with SEC oversight. However, by directing the SEC to facilitate the creation of a national market system, injecting competition as a statutory goal and giving the SEC greater authority over SRO rulemaking, disciplinary activities and other matters, the SEC became able to exert more leverage over exchange self-regulation and corporate governance than in the past. In addition to the imposition of audit committee and voting rights listing standards described above, a good example of this leverage is the forced reorganization of the NASD in 1996.

173. Id. pt. 5, at 502.
176. See Exchange Act, §§ 12(g), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g), 78n(a).
178. Id., §§ 19(c), (d), (g).
179. See id., § 11A.
181. The NASD was completely reorganized in the aftermath of a Department of Justice and SEC investigation into anti-competitive practices by OTC market makers. See In the Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 62 S.E.C. 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996). The SEC criticized the NASD for its regulatory deficiencies in failing to uncover these practices or discipline its members, and found that the NASD was unduly influenced by Nasdaq market making.
The 1996 NASD reorganization resulted in the creation of a parent holding company and two operating subsidiaries—Nasdaq and NASD Regulation, Inc. ("NASDR"). All three boards are constituency boards that are required to have a majority of non-industry members. NASD governance is again in a state of flux because of a restructuring that will result in the sale of 78% of Nasdaq to issuers and NASD members and will lead to the registration of Nasdaq as a stock exchange with the SEC.

Among the purposes of the demutualization of Nasdaq are to permit the NASD to focus more intently on its original mission: of being a membership-focused organization; to streamline corporate governance; and to create a financially stronger Nasdaq better able to address competitive challenges and invest in new technology. The Nasdaq board will be restructured prior to its registration as an exchange. Currently, all 10 members of the Nasdaq board sit on the NASD board. It is contemplated that the Nasdaq board will be increased by four members who will not serve on the NASD board, two of whom will be industry members and two of whom will be non-industry members.

One of the more contentious questions under discussion concerning exchange demutualization is the future of self-regulation. There are several issues that have been raised. First, some have argued that there would be conflicts of interests between shareholders and members in a demutualized exchange environment that would diminish the ability of exchanges to engage in effective self-regulation. A potentially more serious conflict is the regulation of an ATS market by the NYSE or NASD. Second, securities firms are concerned about the costs of multiple SROs, especially if several ATSs become exchanges and begin to engage in self-regulation. Therefore, some industry members are arguing in favor of a single SRO...
for exchanges and member firms.\textsuperscript{186}

Exchanges engage in self-regulation in four areas: listed company governance and disclosure; surveillance and discipline of their markets and specialists, floor brokers and market makers; member firm financial and operational compliance; and fair and equitable treatment of customers. Of particular relevance to the future of listing standards is what conflicts will be encountered if and when Nasdaq or the NYSE become public companies.

In that situation, it would seem anomalous for them to negotiate listing agreements with themselves and then supervise continuing compliance with such agreements. For this reason, when the Stockholm and Australian Stock Exchanges went public, government regulators were assigned the task of overseeing exchange disclosure to shareholders.\textsuperscript{187} On the other hand, the NYSE and Nasdaq will continue to have a motivation to market their exchanges as lists of quality issuers. Further, once exchanges demutualize, they can become embroiled in takeover battles.\textsuperscript{188} It is precisely in such situations that corporate governance listing standards come into play. If a demutualized exchange becomes a target in a hostile takeover would it be able to enforce listing standards that prevent the erection of defenses to such an unwelcome bid? As Dean Joel Seligman has observed with regard to the effect of competition on the willingness of exchanges to enforce rigorous listing standards:

Given the determined efforts of the New York Stock Exchange in the 1963-1975 period to retain fixed commission rates and to oppose rescission of Exchange rules that limit competition in the trading of securities listed on the Exchange, as well as its recent championing of disparate common stock voting rights, there seems no plausible basis for assuming that the Exchange would be more prepared to enforce disclosure rules opposed by listed corporations than it had been before 1934. However enlightened the intentions of the Exchange’s leadership, retention of its membership (or listings) inevitably will require it to reflect members’ and listed firms’ economic interests.\textsuperscript{189}

Even without regard to demutualization, because of the legal limbo into which exchange listing requirements were thrust by the \textit{Business Roundtable} case, it has been suggested that stock exchange corporate


\textsuperscript{187}. See Roberta S. Karmel, \textit{Stock Exchange Demutualization in Sweden and Australia}, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1999, at 3. In the United States, however, the SEC already has this authority.


\textsuperscript{189}. \textit{LOSS \\& SELIGMAN}, \textit{supra} note 46, vol. I, 222.
governance standards be dismantled. On the other hand, at least one commentator has argued that the benefits of increased capital mobility would be better realized through regulatory decentralization than greater centralization. Under a decentralized model, exchanges should be the primary writers and enforcers of rules relating to disclosure by listed companies, standards of conduct for member broker-dealers and for market structure. Whether this model would work for demutualized exchanges is a good question. By what authority could a for-profit public company regulate other companies?

B. THE NEW SOCIAL PROTESTERS

1. The Political Protesters

At times of social protest against business, corporate governance becomes a political issue. The corporate governance debates of the late 1970s were an aftermath of the anti-government, anti-business ferment of the Nixon years. The post-Watergate period at the SEC gave rise to the sensitive payments program and Hearings on Corporate Governance. The SEC threatened to adopt sweeping new disclosure regulations designed to compel corporate boards to select independent directors and otherwise rein in corporate managers.

Although the SEC then backed off from some of its more controversial proposals, and corporate governance reform was not an SEC priority during the Reagan and Bush administrations, institutional investors began to make their views felt with regard to corporate governance issues. Because of the SEC's questionable authority in this area, pressure to reform corporate governance generally was exerted through changes in the proxy rules, Internal Revenue Service regulation of executive compensation, changes in SEC disclosure rules, and changes in stock exchange listing requirements.

Harbingers of a new anti-business activism may be spotted now. An international movement protesting globalization has emerged to question multinational corporate activity and the operations of the World Bank and similar international organizations. This backlash against globalization does not have a coherent program and is comprised of disparate anti-capitalist radical groups that have a common loathing of the established economic order. Some groups emphasize labor issues, others environmental issues, and others focus on human rights and the alleviation of poverty.

190. Michael, supra note 3, at 1461.
191. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997); Pritchard, supra note 30; Romano, supra note 93, at 2399.
195. Id.
The street protesters at the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank conferences have counterparts among legal academic scholars. A comprehensive proposal to reform the SEC's proxy disclosure rules with regard to labor, environmental, and other social and political goals appeared in a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review. Other scholars have written about other aspects of this inchoate movement against international business. According to Professor Cynthia Williams, while the SEC was probably correct that broader social disclosure was not material to investors based on the typical 1970s investor, today there is reason to believe a substantial and growing subset of investors consider social disclosure material. Today, both the economic investor as well as the social investor could benefit from increased social disclosure by public companies. "[T]he trend is toward greater investor interest in social investing. And because people in the social investor sector of the market are using socially significant information to make investment decisions, that information is clearly material to them, irrespective of its economic implications." Nevertheless, "social investors withdrawing their capital from certain companies will not raise those companies' cost of capital, and thus will have little short-term financial impact on the companies." While pressure on stock exchanges to reform their listing standards has not occurred, if the SEC is pressured to react to these new protesters, the SEC could turn to the exchanges, as it did with audit committee reform, and request changes in listing standards. When it is recognized that some of the biggest and loudest institutional investors are government pension funds, this type of political reaction to serious corporate criticism is not as far fetched as it might seem.

Further, big corporations have been persuaded to adopt voluntary codes of conduct embodying some of the objectives of today’s activists. The business world has recently established the new Global Sullivan Principles—global core labor standards modeled after those made for South Africa during the 1970s. Similar environmental standards have been proposed by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”) called the “Valdez Principles” and some corporations have adopted these standards aimed at preserving the environment. In 1995, President Clinton established his own set of voluntary ethical standards for multinationals known as the “Model Business Principles,” which encourage businesses to adopt voluntary codes of corporate conduct.

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198. Williams, supra note 196, at 1288-89.
199. Id. at 1294.
200. For a discussion of the effect of globalization of labor markets, see Henry H. Drummonds, Transnational Small and Emerging Business in a World of Nikes and
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") is pushing for the adoption of international corporate governance guidelines. As more corporations become transnational, they may adopt some of the European social welfare philosophies. In Germany, for example, corporations are required by law to operate the company for the common good. In the United States, union and government employee pension funds that are large institutional investors tend to be particularly interested in social responsibility and corporate governance issues.

It is likely that the SEC would channel pressures for corporate reform into shareholder proposals under the proxy rules, rather than trying to mandate new corporate governance structures. This benign solution might not satisfy the activists, however. Further, changing academic scholarship about the theory of the firm could have an impact upon the SEC and stock exchanges.

2. New Theories of the Firm

The contractarian model theory of the firm, deriving from law and economics scholarship, has been a dominant model in recent years. Many traditional scholars continue to reject this model and some scholars have been fashioning new theories, perhaps best described as a stakeholder model.

Under contractarian principles, a view of stock exchange listing requirements as matters of private contract law between an exchange and

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an issuer makes sense. Under traditional theories, the SEC's approach to social protest as limited to its statutory mandate of investor and shareholder protection fits comfortably. Further, a view of stock exchange listing standards as investor protection devices under the umbrella of the Exchange Act is not a stretch. But how will stock exchange listing standards fit into a stakeholder model of the firm? Under this model, shareholders are not the only corporate constituencies. Labor, customers, and communities also matter.

Another new theory of the firm undermining the traditional shareholder primacy model is the team production model.206 Under this theory directors act as mediators to determine how profits should be allocated between shareholders and other stakeholders. Under this model, director independence is very important and therefore corporate governance listing standards encouraging director independence are critical. Listing standards encouraging good corporate citizenship or social responsibility could also be important because the political nature of the corporation is recognized by this theory.207

Does this mean an exchange could establish as a listing standard that only corporations adhering to CERES' Valdez principles can list? In the current political climate such a scenario seems unlikely, but times change. If Professor Williams is correct in her assertions, then a blue chip company could become one that is environmentally sensitive, as well as one with a large market capitalization. Such an emphasis on qualitative, rather than quantitative, listing standards would bring the NYSE full circle back to its original 1869 concerns about a listed company's general reputation in the business community.

V. CONCLUSION

The use of listing standards by exchanges to achieve a competitive edge has produced varying results over time. From 1869 until the mid 1980s the NYSE tried to differentiate itself from the AMEX and Nasdaq by having higher listing standards and advertising a blue chip issuer list. Until the mid 1960s the AMEX attracted listings by having virtually no listing standards. In the 1980s the AMEX led the race to undermine the voting rights of shareholders in order to list Wang and other issuers. In order to achieve its goal of a blue chip exemption for its listed companies Nasdaq maintained and improved its listing standards during this same period. Yet, all of the exchanges petitioned the SEC for relaxed listing standards for foreign issuers because they saw strict corporate governance standards for foreign companies as a barrier to obtaining listings.

When the federal securities laws were passed in the early 1930s federal law supplanted many exchange listing standards, but the limits of SEC authority over corporate governance standards was demonstrated in the

207. Id. at 323.
one-share, one-vote controversy. However, in the case of audit committees, the SEC was able to pressure the exchanges to enhance corporate governance listing standards.

In a future marketplace of demutualized for-profit exchanges it is difficult to predict whether listing standards will be used as a differentiating marketing device for selling higher quality trading products, or whether listing standards will be abandoned in a competitive race to list issuers. It is likely that the ability of exchanges to adhere to and enforce listing standards that become unpopular with listed companies will be more difficult for exchanges that are themselves listed companies. Whether the SEC would be able to compel exchanges to maintain and improve such listing standards is entirely a matter of politics. Very little tinkering with section 19(c) of the Exchange Act would be required for Congress to overturn the result of the Business Roundtable case. Also, the case could be distinguished or overruled in subsequent cases.

Other private section solutions are also possible. The securities industry has employed self-regulation in a wide variety of ways to avoid direct government regulation. It can be anticipated that even if stock exchanges become unable to effectively raise and police the corporate governance standards of their listed companies, some self-regulatory solutions to resulting problems will be proposed as preferable to direct SEC regulation of corporate governance.
Comments