Nonmartial Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation

Marsha Garrison
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I. Introduction

Fifty years ago, nonmarital cohabitation was rare. Today, it is common. This article analyzes the sources and results of increasing nonmarital cohabitation as well as family law's response to this behavioral shift. Surveying the case law, I find that, although the California Supreme Court's widely cited decision in Marvin v. Marvin appeared to inaugurate a new era of expanding law and rights for nonmarital cohabitants, courts and legislatures—both within California and outside of it—have in fact responded to Marvin quite cautiously. Surveying the research data on cohabitation, I conclude that this cautious approach is justified and that a more dramatic legal response to nonmarital cohabitation is at this point unwarranted.

II. The Cohabitation Revolution

In 1958, members of the American Bar Association’s new Section of Family Law were not expecting their membership dues to provide them with new opportunities to master the law of cohabitation—there was no law of cohabitation. Prostitution was regulated by the criminal code. Common-law marriage was regulated by marriage law, and at this time about a third of the states recognized a cohabiting couple as a married couple if they had held themselves out as married and the evidence showed that promises to be married had been exchanged.2

In between these two extremes, legal regulation of cohabitation was

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sparse. Indeed, it could be boiled down to two sentences: Cohabitation created no rights or obligations. Cohabitants could not agree to create rights or obligations based on their intimate relationship.\(^3\)

The bar on relationship-based contracts between cohabitants did not bar other sorts of deals, however; cohabitants in most states could enter into any arrangement that was open to noncohabitants. Thus, one cohabitant might enter into a valid and binding business partnership with the other.\(^4\) Cohabitants could also enter into legally binding contracts for nonsexual services severable from their relationship.\(^5\)

In addition to these contract alternatives, a disappointed cohabitant could often rely on one or another equitable doctrine for relief. The purchase money resulting trust frequently protected the cohabitant who had paid money toward the purchase of property when title was taken in the name of his or her partner.\(^6\) Quantum meruit provided a means of obtaining payment for services rendered for which the expected payment had not been made.\(^7\) Constructive trust provided "a flexible remedy imposed in a wide variety of situations to prevent unjust enrichment."\(^8\) These vari-


4. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Zorrilla, 354 P.2d 260 (Ariz. 1960) (enforcing contract to care for rental properties in exchange for a portion of the rents); Bridges v. Bridges, 270 P.2d 69 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that an agreement to pool earnings and share joint accumulations was enforceable even though performance was contemporaneous with meretricious relations); Zytka v. Dmochowski, 18 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. 1938) (finding that former cohabitant was entitled to an accounting); see also RICHARD A. LORD, 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:23 (4th ed. 2008) ("The fact that past cohabitation is the motive for a promise will not invalidate it.").

5. See, e.g., Chenowth v. McDowell, 226 P.3d 535 (Ariz. 1924); Henderson v. Spratlen, 98 P. 14 (Colo. 1908); Kurtz v. Frank, 76 Ind. 594 (1881); Emmerson v. Botkin, 109 P.531 (Okla. 1910); Stewart v. Waterman, 123 A.524 (Vt. 1924); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 589 (1932).

6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 7–9; Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313 (Alaska 1964) (holding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the amount she had contributed toward the purchase price); Hall v. Hall, 219 P.2d 808 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (quieting title in favor of plaintiff who had transferred title to property to cohabitant because of restriction on a prisoner owning property).

7. "[C]ourts use quantum meruit to compensate a person for services rendered in the absence of a contract... [The doctrine] lacks readily ascertainable rules for the determination of the proper amount of compensation. The technique used to determine recovery varies according to the circumstances of each case." Jeffrey L. Oakes, Comment, Article 2298, the Codification of the Principle Forbidding Unjust Enrichment, and the Elimination of Quantum Meruit as a Basis for Recovery in Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 873, 874–75 (1996). See generally Judy Becker Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 399 (1992) (surveying history and usage of quantum meruit doctrine). For pre-1958 cases endorsing the use of quantum meruit principles in cases involving unmarried cohabitants, see Draper, supra note 3.

8. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 585 (6th
ous forms of equitable relief ensured that, in many cases, one cohabitant who had been cheated by the other could obtain recovery for some or all of his losses.

Although family law sanctioned business contracts and provided equitable remedies for cohabitants, it did not provide for relationship-based relief. The principle that cohabitation in itself—a "meretricious relationship" as the courts put it during this time period—created no legal rights or obligations flowed from several different public-policy concerns. First, courts viewed nonmarital cohabitation as socially undesirable, and they wanted to discourage such arrangements. Second, relational contracts between cohabitants were widely viewed as thinly veiled prostitution contracts. Third, because the parties' arrangement was private and litigation occurred only when their relationship had broken down, solid evidence of their understanding was often lacking. Finally, open cohabitation was rare, and those who engaged in the practice were generally very poor, very bohemian, or both; existing equitable remedies seemed adequate to handle the legal problems such cohabitants brought to court.

The last point deserves special emphasis. In 1958, cohabitation outside of marriage was widely viewed as shameful, and middle-class Americans thus cohabited very rarely. It is likely that the vast majority of the new Family Law Section members literally did not know anyone who did cohabit or had cohabited outside of marriage. The movies and television offered no glimpses of such relational possibilities, and the Census Bureau did not even bother counting cohabiting couples. What almost no one foresaw in 1958 was the rapidity with which the stigma traditionally attached to nonmarital cohabitation would vanish. The culturally cataclysmic 1960s were about to begin and, by the time the decade ended, youthful attitudes toward cohabitation had already shifted dramatically.

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10. See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, Toward a New Home Socioeconomics of Union Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 126, 127 (Linda J. Waite ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE TIES THAT BIND] ("[S]ince the 1970s, cohabitation outside of marriage, which had previously been confined to the poor, has become increasingly..."
Among the remarkable cultural shifts of the 1960s was a new attitude toward premarital sex. To be more precise, the 1960s witnessed a profound shift in attitudes toward female premarital sex. Before the 1960s, a young man could "sow a few wild oats" without fear of serious social censure. Of course, he risked venereal disease if he patronized a prostitute. And he risked a shotgun wedding if he impregnated a girl from a respectable family. But if the young man got away with it—whatever the "it" might be—he typically suffered no reputational harm. For young women, on the other hand, premarital sex posed extraordinary risks. The first and largest of these risks was pregnancy. The best outcome that pregnancy could produce was a shotgun wedding. A furtive stay at a home for unwed mothers or an illegal, and perhaps dangerous, abortion represented the only alternatives to that wedding. Even if pregnancy was averted, the young woman who engaged in premarital sex risked serious reputational loss. "Nice" girls did not; "fast" girls who did faced gossip, snickers, and damaged marriage prospects.  

During the 1960s, technology and social change combined to change these traditional norms. The new birth control pill offered young women, for the first time, near certain protection from pregnancy that was both within their own control and divorced from the sexual act itself; in order to obtain the safety that the pill offered, a young woman did not even have to admit, to herself or her partner, that she had planned to engage in intercourse. The women's movement offered this same young woman the chance to imagine gaining what had always been male prerogatives, including the possibility of premarital sex without reputational loss. And the social upheaval that accompanied the civil rights movement and Vietnam War produced a new world in which the vision of sex without reputational harm became a reality. In 1958, nice girls did not engage common and acceptable among the general population. It has emerged as an important part of the union formation process, often preceding first marriages and sometimes substituting for them.


in premarital sex. In 1968, many young women, particularly college-age women, no longer wanted to be nice girls. And by 1978, the divide between nice and naughty girls had simply disappeared.\(^\text{13}\)

With premarital sex came open premarital cohabitation. What began as a countercultural innovation associated with hippies and antiwar activists became, with remarkable rapidity, an accepted part of youth culture. The new norms for the young also rapidly spread into older age cohorts; by 1988, the parents of young cohabitants were often choosing to cohabit themselves.\(^\text{14}\)

The numbers tell the story here. Between 1970 and 2000, the number of U.S. unmarried-cohabitant households rose almost ten-fold, from 523,000 to 4,880,000.\(^\text{15}\) The number of individuals who have ever cohabited has also risen sharply; among women born between 1950 and 1954, women who came of age in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 24% cohabited before marriage; among women born between 1965 and 1969, 55% cohabited before marriage.\(^\text{16}\) Nor is there any sign that the trend in favor of premarital cohabitation has yet abated.

In recent years, the ranks of cohabitants have been further swelled by older couples who have already been married.\(^\text{17}\) Some of these older cohabitants have already been divorced and thus feel hesitant about a new marital commitment; some, making use of cohabitation's new respectability, have chosen cohabitation over marriage for more pragmatic reasons.

The net result is that cohabitation is now a multifaceted and multi-generational phenomenon. It includes young men and women who are sharing living space with a dating partner in order to save money, more committed couples who are testing the strength of their relationship, engaged couples who are planning to marry, committed couples who view their relationship as marital but have chosen to avoid marriage for practical reasons such as the potential loss of alimony or a surviving-spouse entitlement, and many couples whose motives are mixed or who disagree about the nature of their relationship.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{13}\) See Thornton, supra note 12, at 884 tbl.4 (reporting that in 1965, 69% of surveyed women and 65% of surveyed men under thirty said that premarital sex was "always" or "almost always" wrong while, in 1972, only 24% of women and 21% of men did so).

\(^{14}\) See infra note 18.


\(^{16}\) See Kelly Raley, Recent Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation, in The Ties That Bind, supra note 10, at 19, 23 tbl.2.1.

\(^{17}\) See Susan L. Brown et al., Cohabitation Among Older Adults: A National Portrait, 61 J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. S71 (2006) (reporting that more than one million older adults, representing 4% of unmarried individuals, currently cohabit and that about 90% of these older cohabitants were previously married).

\(^{18}\) See Susan L. Brown, Union Transitions Among Cohabiters: The Significance of
The extraordinary rise of cohabitation is not unique to the United States. Equivalent developments have taken place in all common-law countries and across the civil-law nations of northern and central Europe.\textsuperscript{19} With cohabitation has come an enormous increase in nonmarital birth. In 1940, 3.8\% of U.S. births were nonmarital; in 2002, 33.8\% of U.S. births were.\textsuperscript{20} In some Scandinavian nations, nonmarital births now outweigh marital births.\textsuperscript{21}

III. The Legal Response: A Bang or a Whimper?

A. Marvin and Its Reception

Once cohabitation moved from the fringes to the center of society, it was less obvious that law should play the same role in regulating cohabitational relationships. Thus, in the watershed Marvin case, the California Supreme Court urged that “the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modern society and the social acceptance of them” required courts to forgo the application of traditional legal standards “based on alleged moral considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many”.\textsuperscript{22}

[T]he nonenforceability of agreements expressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that such conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To equate the nonmarital relationship of today to such a subject matter is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different practice . . . .

\textsuperscript{19} See Kiernan, supra note 18; Kathleen Kiernan, Unmarried Cohabitation and Parenthood: Here to Stay? European Perspectives, in \textit{The Future of the Family} 66 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter \textit{The Future of the Family}].


\textsuperscript{21} See \textit{Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The Challenge of Family System Changes for Research and Policy, in \textit{The Future of the Family}, supra note 19, at 1, 8 fig.1.3 (showing increases in European nonmarital birth rates between 1960 and 2000).}

\textsuperscript{22} Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121–22 (Cal. 1976).
We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship should be removed.\textsuperscript{23}

Relying on the new social acceptability of cohabitation, the \textit{Marvin} majority not only approved the enforcement of explicit relational contracts between cohabitants, but also authorized trial courts to “inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.”\textsuperscript{24} In addition to recovery based on express and implied contracts, the court also approved continued reliance on equitable remedies—quantum meruit, constructive trust, resulting trust—that had provided relief to cohabitants in the pre-\textit{Marvin} era, and it left open the possibility of “additional equitable remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate. . . .”\textsuperscript{25} In sum, \textit{Marvin} promised to dramatically expand the range of rights and remedies available to cohabiting couples. The decision also suggested that a major shift in the legal status of cohabitation was underway.

The extended national press coverage and academic commentary that the \textit{Marvin} case received, both before and after the California Supreme Court’s decision, furthered the impression that \textit{Marvin} had ushered in a new era for cohabitants. And \textit{Marvin} has undeniably assumed the stature of a path-breaking opinion.

\textit{Marvin} has been cited in approximately 200 other court decisions, about half of which came from the California courts, and approximately 300 law review articles. It is still a fixture of family law classes, appearing as a principal case in each of the eleven casebooks currently on the market. The term “palimony” has entered general usage, particularly in the context of entertainers, sports figures, and wealthy entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{26}

There is no question that \textit{Marvin} altered the way both courts and the public think about cohabitant rights and remedies.

\textbf{B. The Aftermath of Marvin}

Today, \textit{Marvin} represents, at least in the United States, the dominant approach to cohabitant claims. Appellate courts in at least twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have now approved some relational contract

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{23} Id. at 122.
\bibitem{24} Id.
\bibitem{25} Id. at 122 n.25.
\end{thebibliography}
claims between cohabitants,\textsuperscript{27} although a few of these jurisdictions have disapproved of recovery based on an implied contract.\textsuperscript{28} Only five states have disapproved of all forms of relief based on a cohabiting relationship.\textsuperscript{29} Perhaps surprisingly, however, \textit{Marvin}'s bold language has not produced results markedly different from those permissible under pre-\textit{Marvin} case law. As Professor Ann Lacquer Estin put it, "[w]ith all its celebrity, the \textit{Marvin} decision stands more as a cultural icon than as a legal watershed."\textsuperscript{30}

Consider the aftermath of the \textit{Marvin} decision itself. On remand, the trial court held a three-month trial, at the end of which it found that "no express contract was negotiated between the parties" and that "the conduct of the parties . . . does not reveal any implementation of any contract nor . . . give rise to an implied contract."\textsuperscript{31} The court went on to conclude that there was no "mutual effort" that might support a recovery and that, "in good conscience," no equitable remedies—resulting trust, constructive trust, or quantum meruit—were applicable. In the court's view, the plaintiff's relationship with wealthy, successful Lee Marvin had been helpful to her, not hurtful. Despite its finding that there was unjust enrichment and no contract, express or implied, the court nonetheless awarded the plaintiff $104,000 in alimony "so that she may have the economic means to reeducate herself and to learn new, employable skills or to refur-


\textsuperscript{28} See \textit{Minn. Stat.} § 513.075 (2008); \textit{Tex. Fam. Code Ann.} § 1.108 (Vernon 2007); \textit{Morone}, 413 N.E.2d at 1155; \textit{Tapley}, 449 A.2d at 1219.


\textsuperscript{30} Estin, \textit{supra} note 26, at 1383.

bish those utilized, for example, during her most recent employment and so that she may return from her status as companion of a motion picture star to a separate, independent but perhaps more prosaic existence. But this award—one that was not sanctioned by the contract approach outlined in Marvin—was promptly struck down on appeal. Michele Triola "Marvin" walked away from the landmark decision that she had won in the California Supreme Court with nothing.

Cohabitants who followed Michele Marvin into California courtrooms learned that her failure to turn what looked like a favorable decision into a solid cash recovery was not entirely due to the specifics of Michele’s case. While we have no solid evidence of how many Marvin plaintiffs have won in the courtroom or accepted a favorable settlement, California appellate decisions show that the Marvin requirements have been strictly construed and that an award is by no means easy to obtain. Nor did the California courts use Marvin as a springboard for fashioning new cohabitant rights and obligations.

Indeed, since Marvin, the California Supreme Court has revisited the legal problems posed by cohabitation only rarely. I could find only two decisions in which a supreme court majority cited Marvin for a proposition related to its substantive holding: in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., the court held that the claims of a discharged employee for breach of an implied-contract promise to discharge only for good cause survived the statute of frauds, and in Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, the court held that California’s civil rights act barred discrimination against registered domestic partners by denying them benefits or services extended to spouses. Dissenting members of the court have cited Marvin in decisions denying cohabitants the right to maintain a claim for loss of consortium, finding that cohabitants are not protected against housing discrimination by California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, and holding that a cohabitant who quit her job to follow her boyfriend did not have good cause and thus was not entitled to unemployment insurance.

32. Id.
35. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
36. 115 P.3d 1212 (Cal. 2005).
when she had not shown an imminent marriage or a marriage-related obligation.\textsuperscript{39}

California appellate courts have cited \textit{Marvin} more frequently, but they too have only rarely expanded on \textit{Marvin}'s central holding. In \textit{Cochran v. Cochran},\textsuperscript{40} the appellate court held that a viable \textit{Marvin} claim does not require full-time cohabitation. But in \textit{Taylor v. Fields}\textsuperscript{41} and \textit{Bergen v. Wood},\textsuperscript{42} appellate courts disallowed \textit{Marvin} claims when there had been no cohabitation. California courts have held that a post-mortem \textit{Marvin} action does not violate a no-contest clause in the decedent cohabitant's will, at least as long as the will does not specifically disallow such an action.\textsuperscript{43} But they have also held that when title to real property is at issue, the \textit{Marvin} plaintiff must establish her claim to the property by clear and convincing evidence.\textsuperscript{44} They have held that \textit{Marvin} claims are civil actions based on contract law\textsuperscript{45} and dismissed \textit{Marvin} lawsuits that violate the statute of limitations for contract claims.\textsuperscript{46} They have disallowed the award of temporary alimony to a \textit{Marvin} plaintiff\textsuperscript{47} and declined to permit cohabitants not registered under California's Domestic Partnership Law to make use of its dissolution procedures or rely on the putative spouse doctrine.\textsuperscript{48} They have held that the marital communication privilege is inapplicable to cohabitants.\textsuperscript{49}

California courts have also been fairly cautious in interpreting \textit{Marvin}'s continued ban on prostitution agreements. They have disallowed contracts that clearly involved the exchange of valuable consideration for sex.\textsuperscript{50} Although they have concluded that agreements to have a child together and to perform services as a bodyguard, secretary, and real estate

\begin{enumerate}
\item 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Ct. App. 2001).
\item 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986).
\item 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75 (Ct. App. 1993).
\item See \textit{Estate of Black}, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663, 669 (Ct. App. 1984).
\item See \textit{Tannehill v. Finch}, 232 Cal. Rptr. 749, 751 (Ct. App. 1986).
\item See \textit{Schafer v. Superior Court}, 225 Cal. Rptr 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1986).
\item See \textit{Kurokawa v. Blum}, 245 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1988); \textit{Estate of Fincher}, 174 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Ct. App. 1981); see also \textit{Nelson v. Nevel}, 201 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that plaintiff's contract claim was time barred but permitting her to amend complaint to include constructive trust claims subject to four-year statute of limitations);\textsuperscript{47}
\item See \textit{Friedman v. Friedman}, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 1993).
\item See \textit{People v. Delph}, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426 (Ct. App. 1979).
\item See \textit{Estate of Brandl v. Mall}, No. B192529, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4955, at *1–2, 8–9 (June 21, 2007) (holding that alleged holographic will providing that "I leave everything to [appellant] if she fucks and sucks me 1 million times before I die" was based on an illegal condition precedent and thus invalid); see also \textit{Goines v. Wilkes}, No. B191720, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2857 (Apr. 9, 2007) (limiting recovery to $600 dental bill based on promissory estoppel).\textsuperscript{48}}
counselor did not represent impermissible sex-for-pay contracts, they have found that an agreement to be a lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion, and cook was an invalid sex-for-hire contract.

Finally, like the Marvin trial court, California courts have treated the evidentiary requirements implied in Marvin very seriously. Although there are reported appellate decisions upholding judgments in favor of Marvin plaintiffs, there are more decisions affirming judgments against Marvin plaintiffs where the trial court found insufficient evidence of a cohabitation agreement or unjust enrichment. There are also cases in which the appellate court overturned a trial court judgment based on insufficient evidence of a cohabitation agreement or unjust enrichment. Courts outside of California have also tended to take a cautious approach to claims based on cohabitation. Although the majority of U.S. jurisdictions have followed Marvin, only one high court, in Washington, has gone beyond Marvin's contract model to permit recovery based on the fact of cohabitation, without any showing of unjust enrichment or an agreement. Courts in other states have also been wary of expanding the

52. See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981).
53. See Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Ct. App. 1986) (upholding equal property division award in case of twelve-year cohabitation when parties held themselves out as married, had three children, acquired substantial real property, and the evidence supported the trial court's finding of an implied contract to share equally all property acquired during the course of their relationship); In re Marriage of Barter, No. B142934, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 884 (Dec. 10, 2001) (upholding divorce court's award of property acquired before marriage to husband based on his contributions of separate property).
55. See Fontes v. McCarty, No. E039755, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11392 (Dec. 19, 2006) (reversing judgment in favor of plaintiff when trial court found that defendant's agreement to convey interest in house to plaintiff was procured through undue influence); Taylor v. Polackwich, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 (Ct. App. 1983) (affirming judgment insofar as it denied plaintiff girlfriend an ownership interest in defendant boyfriend's house because there had been no evidence to support a constructive trust claim; reversing judgment that ordered defendant to allow plaintiff to live in his house for a four-year period, to pay plaintiff a rehabilitative award, and to pay plaintiff for moving costs; and holding that the rehabilitative award could not stand because plaintiff did not have a legal or equitable basis for such relief).
56. See supra note 27.
57. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995). An intermediate appellate court in Oregon has also held that judges have "equitable powers" to reach a "fair result" at the end
legal status of cohabitants: they have almost invariably followed the California Supreme Court in declining to extend to cohabitants rights available to married couples; virtually none, for example, have extended the right to obtain loss of consortium damages to cohabitants when a partner is injured or authorized cohabitants to obtain other public benefits available to married couples.

Equally notable is the dearth of case law dealing with cohabitant claims. One has to be cautious in toting up the number of states that today follow Marvin for the simple reason that there are still high courts that have not squarely considered the issue, and these invariably are not states with small populations. In Virginia, for example, the twelfth most populous state and home to more than 7.5 million people, there is not a single reported decision that cites Marvin, and I could find no reported cases in which Virginia courts have considered the viability of a contract between unmarried cohabitants without citing Marvin. In neighboring Maryland, the high court has cited Marvin only once, in a decision dealing with an attorney disciplinary proceeding appeal. One of the charges against the attorney in question was that he had advertised representation in cases involving "palimony" — a type of action, the grievance committee argued, "that Maryland law had never recognized..." The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the Attorney Grievance Commission's argument, citing its earlier decision involving a will-contract claim — a case that was neither brought nor decided on a Marvin theory — two decisions made in 1937 and 1940, and an intermediate appellate decision relying on this early case law to enforce an oral promise to repay various business services and loans with 1,000 shares of stock — an agreement that would...
have been enforceable in Maryland in the 1930s.\footnote{See Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 121 (Md. 1982).} Even in states that have accepted some variant of the Marvin doctrine, reported case law is typically sparse. Consider New York, the third largest state in the nation.\footnote{See Wikipedia, supra note 60.} The New York Court of Appeals ruled on the issues raised in Marvin in 1980 in the case of Morone v. Morone;\footnote{413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980).} the court announced that express, but not implied, relational contracts between cohabitants were enforceable. In the twenty-eight years since Morone was decided, New York courts have cited the decision for its substantive holding only twenty-seven times,\footnote{Based on Shepardizing Morone using headnote 1. (Morone has only two headnotes.)} and several of the citing cases do not even deal with claims between cohabitants.\footnote{See, e.g., PDK Labs, Inc. v. Krape, 716 N.Y.S.2d 323 (App. Div. 2000); Ratteni v. Cerreta, 728 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 2001); People ex rel. Conyers v. Dalsheim, 540 N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div. 1989); NCJ Cleaners, L.L.C. v. ALM Media, Inc., 844 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. 2007); Roth v. United Fed. of Teachers, 787 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 2004).} By contrast, New York courts have cited the Court of Appeals’s 1985 decision in O’Brien v. O’Brien,\footnote{489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).} determining that a professional degree or license is marital property subject to distribution at divorce, for its substantive holding 249 times over twenty-three years.\footnote{Based on Shepardizing O’Brien using headnotes 1–12.} Yet only a very small portion of divorce actions involve professional degrees of separate assets while, under Morone, an agreement is essential in all cohabitation claims.\footnote{Cases that go to trial are more likely to involve professional degrees and separate property than are settled cases, but even among this relatively wealthy group, when I reviewed judicial decision-making under New York’s Equitable Distribution law over the first ten years that the statute was in effect (1984–1993), only 12% of my sample of all reported decisions in which the property award could be determined (n=383) involved a professional degree or license. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 530 tbl.A3 (1996).}

Of course, we do not know how many claims between cohabitants are settled or tried without an opinion. But the very limited appellate case law certainly suggests that Marvin did not open any floodgates. In sum, Marvin did not inaugurate a new era of expanding rights for cohabitants; courts in virtually all states have refused to go beyond the legal principles enunciated in Marvin and many have stopped short of Marvin’s boundaries. Courts appear to have maintained fairly strict evidentiary standards; “[t]he case law of cohabitation makes it clear that courts will not order compensation for services performed by one partner that can be characterized as part of the ordinary give and take of a shared life.”\footnote{Estin, supra note 26, at 1400.} And cohabitants themselves do not seem to have read Marvin as a signal that some
financial recovery should invariably, or even typically, follow the dissolution of a cohabitational relationship.

C. The Reasons for the Results

Cohabitant claims for financial relief have not flooded the courts for a variety of reasons. One important factor is that cohabitation in the United States is typically brief and transitional: approximately 60% of all U.S. cohabitants and 70% of those in a first, premarital cohabitation marry within five years. More tellingly, only about 10% of cohabitants who do not marry are still together five years later. Indeed, the median duration of cohabitation in the United States now appears to be less than 1.5 years, a period that is not, at this point, increasing.

A second reason that Marvin has not spurred more litigation is that cohabitants tend to be younger and poorer than married couples. Despite smaller proportions of youthful cohabitants in recent years, the median age of cohabitants is still considerably lower than that of marriage partners. At least among men, cohabitants have less education and lower socioeconomic prospects than their married counterparts. As a result of these demographic differences, cohabitants frequently do not have valuable resources to fight about.

74. See M.D. Bramlett & W.D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United States 22, 22 tbl.9 (2002). However, the likelihood that cohabitation will lead to marriage appears to be declining. See Larry L. Bumpass, The Changing Significance of Marriage in the United States, in The Changing Family in Comparative Perspective: Asia and the United States 63, 71 (Karen O. Mason et al. eds., 1998).

75. See Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3 (2000) (summarizing research); see also Bramlett & Mosher, supra note 74, at 22, 22 tbl.15 (reporting that 49% of first premarital cohabitations are disrupted within five years).

76. See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 18, at 1223 tbl.2.

77. See Cherlin, supra note 10, at 135 (summarizing evidence).

78. See Lynne M. Casper & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Continuity and Change in the American Family 44–45 (2002) (stating that in 1978, 35% of cohabiting women and 38.5% of cohabiting men were age thirty-five or older, and those numbers increased in 1998 to 44% of cohabiting women and 48% of cohabiting men); Bramlett & Mosher, supra note 74, at 17–18 tbl.21.

79. See Casper & Bianchi, supra note 78, at 11 tbl.C (noting that of women age twenty to twenty-four, 11% were cohabiting, and 27% were married; among women age thirty-five to forty-four, less than 5% were cohabiting, and 68% were married).

80. See id. at 52–53 tbl.2.3 (showing that Caucasian and African-American married men had significantly higher levels of college education and income than cohabiting men, and Hispanic married men had higher income levels but not higher levels of college education); Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 53, 66 tbl.1 (1995); see also Larry Bumpass & H.H. Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 32 (2000); Smock, supra note 75, at 4.
Third, the evidence suggests that cohabitants do not typically adopt sharing behaviors of the sort that Marvin envisions. Cohabitants are less likely than married couples to support their partners. They are much more likely to split expenses instead of pooling their resources. They are more likely than married couples to value independence. And, at least in the United States, cohabitation seems to arise from practical considerations far more often than from a relational commitment or agreement. For example, in a recent, small survey of New York City cohabitants, respondents overwhelmingly reported finances, convenience, and housing needs as the reasons for their decisions to cohabit; in a larger midwestern survey, none of the cohabitant interviewees indicated that cohabitation represented a commitment to the relationship. As one cohabitant put it, the decision to cohabit meant that:

I wasn’t ready . . . to get like, I mean, that close to somebody and I mean I lived with her but we still had our freedom we still let each other do what we wanted to do so I had my space and she had her space.

Even the arrival of a child does not appear to alter the feeling that cohabitation connotes independence rather than sharing. The U.S. Fragile Family Study, which sponsored indepth interviews of a nationally representative group of unmarried parents, found that “most of these cohabiting pairs espouse a strong individualistic ethic . . . in which personal happiness and fulfillment hold the highest value.”

Of course, some cohabiting relationships do involve commitment and sharing. Surveying the data, demographers have enumerated six or seven different cohabitation “types,” ranging from a substitute for being single—that type that seems most prevalent in the United States—to a stage in the marriage process, to informal marriage. But at least in the United

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82. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 840–43 (reviewing evidence); Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 307–15 (same).
83. See Garrison, Is Consent Necessary?, supra note 81, at 841–43 (summarizing evidence); Garrison, Marriage Matters, supra note 81, at 310–11 (same).
87. See Heuveline & Timberlake, supra note 18, at 1216–18; Kiernan, supra note 18; see
States, cohabitation that creates expectations of financial interdependence and continued sharing seems to be relatively rare.

IV. Looking Ahead: Is a Legal Revolution Warranted?

At the time Marvin was decided, the approach adopted by the California Supreme Court represented a more expansive approach to cohabitation-based claims than courts—both in the United States and abroad—had previously adopted. Today, in an international context, Marvin offers a fairly conservative legal model. Courts and legislatures in a number of other developed nations have developed a “conscriptive” approach that bases cohabitant obligation on status instead of contract.88 The conscriptive model imposes on the cohabiting couple that has chosen to avoid marriage some or all of the obligations the couple would have incurred had they chosen to marry. Various Canadian provinces, for example, now impose a support obligation on cohabitants who have lived together for periods ranging from one to three years.89 All Australian states have adopted legislation that extends marital property rights to cohabitants who have a common child or have lived together for at least two years.90 And New Zealand has extended all of the rights and obligations of marriage to couples who have been “de facto partners” for three years.91

In the United States, the conscriptive model has thus far met with little success. Although some states have adopted registration schemes that per-

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88. I have used the term “conscriptive” to emphasize the fact that the obligations imposed by laws of this type are both compulsory and involuntary. The Canadian Law Reform Commission has referred to such laws as ascriptive, emphasizing the fact that they impute marital status to the unmarried. See LAW COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), http://tabletology.com/docs/beyond_conjugal.pdf.

89. See Nicholas Bala, Controversy Over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 41, 45–49 (2003) (describing provincial support rules). The only exception is Quebec. See id. at 48–49. A cohabitant right to share property accrued during the relationship appears to be available only to couples in the Northwest Territories. See Family Law Act, S.N.W.T. 1997, ch. 18, § 1.


mit some cohabitants to opt into status-based rights and obligations, only
the state of Washington has adopted a cohabitant obligation model in
which rights arise simply from the fact of cohabitation.\textsuperscript{92} The American
Law Institute (ALI) has urged that states should shift course and abandon
Marvin's contractual approach in favor of the conscriptive alternative.\textsuperscript{93}
The ALI's position "reflects a judgment that it is usually just to apply to
[cohabitants] . . . the property and support rules applicable to divorcing
spouses, that individualized inquiries are usually impractical or unduly
burdensome, and that it therefore makes more sense to require parties to
contract out of these property and support rules than to contract into
them."\textsuperscript{94}

However, as I have explained in much greater detail elsewhere, all the
evidence we have suggests that the ALI is wrong. It supports continuation
of a cautious, contract-based approach instead of a conscriptive model.\textsuperscript{95}
First, as the typically short duration and relatively rare sharing expecta-
tions suggest, cohabitation and marriage are simply not equivalent states.
The ALI offers no evidence to support its claim of equivalence, and there
is none: the research data unequivocally show that, in the United States,
cohabitation and marriage typically produce different behaviors and have
different social meanings.\textsuperscript{96}

Second, conscriptive schemes either create serious risks of misclassifi-
cation or present daunting fact-finding challenges. Those schemes that
rely on individualized fact-finding recreate and exaggerate the fact-find-
ing problems that have led most states to abandon the common-law-
maintenance doctrine; the other, probably more numerous, schemes that rely
on the duration of cohabitation or the birth of a common child as a trigger
for rights and obligations resolve most of these fact-finding difficulties but
reduce individual autonomy and risk the imposition of obligations on indi-
viduals who lack marital understandings or—worse—who have affirma-
tively chosen to avoid marital obligations by remaining single.\textsuperscript{97}

Third, the research evidence shows that marriage is associated with a
range of health, wealth, and happiness benefits for both adult partners and
their children, benefits that might be lost if increasing numbers of couples

\textsuperscript{93} See \textit{Am. Law Inst.}, \textit{Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations} §§ 6.01 et seq. (2002).
\textsuperscript{94} Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
\textsuperscript{95} See Garrison, \textit{Is Consent Necessary?}, supra note 81, at 848–54 (reviewing evidence);
Garrison, \textit{Marriage Matters}, supra note 81, at 315–18 (same).
\textsuperscript{96} See Garrison, \textit{Is Consent Necessary?}, supra note 81, at 839–48 (reviewing evidence);
\textsuperscript{97} See Garrison, \textit{Is Consent Necessary?}, supra note 81, at 848–64 (reviewing evidence);
Garrison, \textit{Marriage Matters}, supra note 81, at 315–27 (same).
spend more time in cohabiting relationships and bear children within them. Researcher after researcher has reported that married individuals typically live longer, happier, and healthier lives than the unmarried.\textsuperscript{98} Married men and women do better economically than their unmarried counterparts; they have a higher savings rate and thus accrue greater wealth than the unmarried.\textsuperscript{99}

The marital advantage also provides substantial benefits to a couple’s children. Children born to cohabiting parents are two to four times more likely to experience their parents’ separation than are children born to married parents.\textsuperscript{100} Because of the greater stability that marriage provides, marital children are exposed to many fewer financial,\textsuperscript{101} physical,\textsuperscript{102} and


\textsuperscript{99} See \textit{id.} at 495–96.

\textsuperscript{100} See, e.g., Cynthia Osborne et al., \textit{Instability in Fragile Families: The Role of Race-Ethnicity, Economics, and Relationship Quality} 12–13 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 2004-17FF, 2004) (finding in nationally representative study that, even after controlling for the “mother’s characteristics, parents' fertility history, the couple’s economic characteristics, and relationship quality, . . . [p]arents who are cohabiting at their child’s birth still have over twice the odds of separation as compared to parents who are married . . . .”); Wendy Manning et al., \textit{The Relative Stability of Cohabiting and Marital Unions for Children}, 23 \textit{POP. RES. & POL’Y REV.} 135 (2004) (finding that U.S. White, Black, and Hispanic children born to cohabiting parents experience greater levels of instability than children born to married parents and that White and Hispanic children whose cohabiting parents marry do not experience the same levels of family stability as those born to married parents); Wendy Manning & Ronald E. Bulanda, \textit{Cohabitation and Family Trajectories}, in \textit{HANDBOOK OF MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN FAMILY RESEARCH} 199 (Sandra Hofferth & Lynne Casper eds., 2006) (reporting that, by age fourteen, three-fifths of children who lived with two cohabiting biological parents experienced family change in contrast to only one-third of children who lived with two married biological parents); R. Kelly Raley & Elizabeth Wildsmith, \textit{Cohabitation and Children’s Family Instability}, 66 \textit{J. MARRIAGE & FAM.} 210 (2004); see also Kiernan, \textit{supra} note 18, at 84 fig.3.6 (showing European marriage and cohabitation dissolution rates by country).

\textsuperscript{101} See \textit{CASPER & BIANCHI, supra} note 78, at 111–12 fig.4.3 (reporting, in 1998, 6.9% poverty rate for married-parent households and 38.7% rate for single-mother households). Noncustodial divorced and never-married parents are also less likely to pass wealth on to their adult children. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., et al., \textit{The Effect of Divorce on Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence}, 32 \textit{DEMOGRAPHY} 319 (1995); Nadine F. Marks, \textit{Midlife Marital Status Differences in Social Support Relationships with Adult Children and Psychological Well-Being}, 16 \textit{J. FAM. ISSUES} 5 (1995).

\textsuperscript{102} Rates of physical and sexual abuse are significantly higher when children live with an adult stepparent or cohabitant. See Michael N. Stiffman et al., \textit{Household Composition and Risk of Fatal Child Maltreatment}, 109 \textit{PEDIATRICS} 615 (2002) (reporting that children residing in households with an unrelated adult were eight times more likely to die of maltreatment than children in households with two biological parents and that risk of maltreatment death was not increased for children living with a sole biological parent); Robin Fretwell Wilson, \textit{Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of de Facto Parents}, in \textit{RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION} 90 (Robin H. Wilson ed., 2006) (reviewing evidence).
educational risks; these lower risks are associated with higher levels of well-being. There is also evidence that the advantages conferred by marital childbearing and rearing transcend the specific benefits associated with residential and economic stability. For example, married fathers appear to be more involved and spend more time with their children than unmarried fathers; if parental separation occurs, these fathers see their children more often and pay child support more regularly. The advantages of marriage appear to extend into a child's adulthood and even to his or her children. Researchers have documented a strong link between growing up in a single-parent household and adult income, health, and emotional stability.

A number of studies have also found that both men and women who experience a single-parent household as children are more likely, as adults, to experience marital discord and to divorce or separate.


The benefits of marriage are not, of course, invariable. So-called “selection effects” explain away a significant portion of the marital advantage. Remarriage does not confer the same advantages as a first marriage. Moreover, for both adults and children, the marital advantage is concentrated in low-conflict relationships. Researchers have found that the continuation of a high-conflict marriage is negatively associated with health and happiness; indeed, longitudinal surveys show that “parents’ marital unhappiness and discord have a broad negative impact on virtually every dimension of offspring well-being.”

However, despite these important caveats, the evidence strongly suggests that the marital advantage is real and that it persists across national, cultural, and socioeconomic boundaries. Even in Scandinavia, which has the longest experience with cohabitation as a mainstream family form, demographers continue to find that marital childbearing is associated with much greater childhood stability, smaller risks to youth and adult well-

108. See Garrison, supra note 98, at 498–99 (reviewing research).
109. See id. at 498 (reviewing research).
111. AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 107, at 219.
112. See, e.g., Donna K. Ginther & Madeline Zavodny, Is the Male Marriage Premium Due to Selection? The Effect of Shotgun Weddings on the Return to Marriage, 14 J. Pop. ECON. 313 (2001) (finding that “at most 10% of the estimated marriage premium [in men’s wages] is due to selection”); H.K. Kim & P.C. McHenry, The Relationship Between Marriage and Psychological Well-Being—A Longitudinal Analysis, 23 J. Fam. Issues 885 (2002) (stating that data that “confirmed the strong effects of marital status on psychological well-being, supporting the protection perspective,” indicated that “the transition to cohabiting did not have the same beneficial effects as marriage for psychological well-being” and produced “weak and inconsistent” evidence of selection effects); Sigle-Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 103, at 126–30, 130 (analyzing selection effects and finding that they “do not account for all the differences in children, families, and subsequent outcomes”); Pamela J. Smock et al., The Effect of Marriage and Divorce on Women’s Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 794, 809 (1999) (stating that “the economic benefits of marriage are large, even above and beyond the characteristics of those who marry”).
113. See An-Magritt Jensen & Sten-Erik Clausen, Children and Family Dissolution in Norway: The Impact of Consensual Unions, 10 CHILDHOOD 65 (2003) (finding that children of Norwegian cohabiting parents run a much higher risk of dissolution compared to children in marital unions and that “this risk is not diminishing as cohabitation becomes more widespread”); Kiernan, supra note 18, at 84 fig.3.6 (showing that 6% of Swedish marital unions and 25% of nonmarital unions dissolve within five years after the birth of a first child).
being, and lower rates of divorce and nonmarital childbearing. There is also evidence that, even after controlling for observable characteristics like education, academic test scores, and premarital pregnancy, marriage contributes significantly to living standards, “not only relative to single parents living alone but also compared to parents in cohabiting relationships and single parents living with other adult relatives.” As family sociologist Paul Amato has put it, “the evidence consistently indicates that children with two happily and securely married parents have a statistical advantage over children raised in other family groups.” And “because we all have an interest in the well-being of children, it is reasonable for social institutions (such as the state) to attempt to increase the proportion of children raised by married parents with satisfying and stable marriages.”

114. See Kyrre Breivik & Dan Olweus, Children of Divorce in a Scandinavian Welfare State: Are They Less Affected than US Children?, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 61 (2006) (based on study of more than 4,000 twelve- to fifteen-year-old children in Norway, concluding that the negative associations between parental divorce and various adverse child outcomes were “generally very similar in Norway and the United States in spite of the great differences in family policy and welfare benefits for single mothers”); Jan O. Jonsson & Michael Gahler, Family Dissolution, Family Reconstitution, and Children’s Educational Careers: Recent Evidence for Sweden, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 277, 287 (1997) (finding that, even after controlling for all independent variables, children of divorced and separated parents and children living in reconstituted families have low school-continuation propensities compared to children living with both biological parents); Helen Hansagi et al., Parental Divorce: Psychosocial Well-Being, Mental Health and Mortality During Youth and Young Adulthood: A Longitudinal Study of Swedish Conscripts, 10 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 335 (2000) (reporting that in a group of Swedish conscripts, several indicators of low levels of well-being and mental illness, including alcoholism, were significantly correlated with parental divorce even after adjustment for antecedents and other factors); Ingunn Storksen et al., Marriages and Psychological Distress Among Adult Offspring of Divorce: A Norwegian Study, 48 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCH. 467 (2007) (based on study of more than 8,000 adolescents, concluding that parental divorce was associated with significantly higher mean levels and larger variances in adolescent problems and that, in general, these effects persisted after controlling for demographic factors); Gunilla Ringback Weitoft et al., Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in Children Living with Single Parents in Sweden: A Population-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289 (2003) (reporting, based on analysis of almost a million cases and controlling for factors such as socioeconomic status and parental mental health, that Swedish children in single-parent households showed significantly increased risks of “all adverse outcomes analyzed, including psychiatric disease, suicide or suicide attempt, injury, and addiction”); see also Taru H. Makikyro et al., Hospital-Treated Psychiatric Disorders in Adults with a Single-Parent and Two-Parent Family Background: A 28-Year Follow-Up of the 1966 Northern Finland Cohort, 37 FAM. PROCESS 335 (1998).


118. Id. at 962–63.
In addition to their other disadvantages, conscriptive schemes conflict with social policies favoring formal marriage and marital childbearing by suggesting that public support for marriage is declining. This is undesirable because "bandwagon" effects often play an important role in determining public opinion, and public opinion, over time, plays an important role in determining private attitudes and behavior.\textsuperscript{119} A set of British experiments demonstrates just how large this bandwagon effect can be. The researchers gave two sets of research subjects, all unaware of the research experiment, information about public attitudes toward abortion. One group was told that public attitudes were becoming more permissive, the other that public attitudes were becoming more disapproving. The personal views of individuals in both groups on tightening restrictions on abortion were then solicited; 12\% more of the group told that attitudes were becoming more permissive expressed opposition to tightening restrictions.\textsuperscript{120} In other words, a perception about public opinion appears to have swayed the opinions of more than 10\% of the research subjects. And "[e]ach new person on [an]... upward bandwagon induces additional people to climb on."\textsuperscript{121} Of course, the fact that individuals expect their own position to be a minority view does not necessarily make them abandon that position. But most of us can be swayed by our expectations about the views of others, with the result that a major shift in public attitudes can complete its course with remarkable speed.

Consider the rapid shift in attitudes toward premarital sex noted in Part I: in 1965, 69\% of surveyed women and 65\% of surveyed men under age thirty said that premarital sex was "always" or "almost always" wrong; in 1972, only 24\% of women and 21\% of men did so.\textsuperscript{122} A similar, although somewhat less dramatic shift in attitudes toward marriage and divorce took place during the same time period: in the early 1960s, 80\% of the public agreed that "a couple should stay together" for the sake of the children; by the 1980s, agreement with this statement had dropped to 50\%.\textsuperscript{123} As these examples demonstrate, if individuals believe that public opinion about formal marriage is increasingly dismissive, individuals without


\textsuperscript{121} Kuran, \textit{supra} note 119, at 71.

\textsuperscript{122} See Thornton, \textit{supra} note 12, at 884 tbl.4.

strongly held views on the subject may well become more dismissive themselves. Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that the low marriage rate in Quebec—a rate that is about half that of the other Canadian provinces—has been induced, in part, by such a bandwagon effect.

The cautious approach to cohabitant claims and status that American courts have thus far taken therefore appears to be not only warranted, but desirable. Given the public and private advantages associated with formal marriage, the variety of cohabiting relationships and attendant difficulty of drafting standards that separate relationships involving expectations of sharing from the majority that do not give rise to such expectations, and the risk of creating bandwagon effects that might reduce public support for formal marriage and marital childbearing, there is every reason for courts and legislatures to remain cautious.


125. See Garrison, supra note 98, at 512–16 (summarizing evidence).