Seceding in the Twenty-First Century: A Paradigm for the Ages

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“Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up, and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable—a most sacred right—a right, which we hope and believe, is to liberate the world.”

INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 1999, the people of East Timor prepared for a referendum on the country’s constitutional status in a fight for self-determination against a background of genocide, injustice, and betrayal. “[N]o place on earth was [as] defiled and abused by murderous forces, in collaboration with the ‘international community,’ as East Timor,” wrote one commentator. “We are dying as a people,” wrote the head of the Catholic Church in East Timor in a letter to the United Nations’ Secretary-General. At least one-third of East Timor’s population have died under the Indonesian occupation. Yet, in what has been described as “a showing of courage and determination, the people of East Timor turned

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3. John Pilger, Foreword to THE EAST TIMOR QUESTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM INDONESIA ix, ix (Paul Hainsworth & Stephen McCloskey eds., 2000) (stating the situation in East Timor “is one of the great and, until recently, unrecognized crimes of the twentieth century.”).


out in massive numbers to vote” on the future of the territory. 6 With such threats to a people’s fundamental rights, the question of when international law should deem a people’s declaration of independence a lawful act is critically important.

This Article will argue for a new method through which scholars, advocates, and other decision-makers can analyze the legitimacy of a population’s declaration of independence. The current approach to such an analysis—making self-determination the main focus of claims to secession—fails to consider the circumstances surrounding secession and, thereby, fails to properly balance the importance of state sovereignty with that of self-determination. 7 As an alternative, this Article develops an alternative method of analysis using a sliding scale inquiry with a novel concept: the “Political Liberty Triangle” paradigm. This new method seeks to improve the ability to assess the merits of secessionists’ claims and determine whether a group’s declaration of independence should be deemed lawful.

The Political Liberty Triangle represents a stable, independent state. It is formed by, and is focused on, the relative importance of the concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and secession. They constitute the three points of inquiry in this analysis and are considered in light of the context and particular circumstances surrounding a group’s claim to independence. This method considers the validity of the claim for independence in light of factors such as the likelihood of a territory to become economically self-sufficient, the free will of a territory’s people, and the state’s behavior toward its people.

This alternative analysis uses a sliding scale inquiry in conjunction with the Political Liberty Triangle. The sliding scale measures the legitimacy of a territory’s independence relative to the extent of that territory’s continued dependence. Some relevant factors that can shift a territory toward either dependence or independence on the scale include: human rights violations, attempts at peaceful negotiations, will of the supermajority for independence, economic self-sufficiency, and international harmony. 8 The weight given to each of these non-exhaustive fac-


8. See discussion infra Part II.B.1–5.
tors will change depending on the circumstances surrounding each claim for secession. This method applies a totality of the circumstances approach to claims of secession. Furthermore, because the considerations comprised in the Political Liberty Triangle also hinge on context-specific factors, the international community should look to the Political Liberty Triangle in light of the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding a claim to secession. Ultimately, this approach is designed to remedy the under-inclusiveness of past methodologies. By focusing on the circumstances surrounding a group’s claim to secession, the international community may answer the question that has been side-stepped for decades: When is secession legitimate?

To conceptualize the relationship between the Political Liberty Triangle and the sliding scale of independence, the latter can be seen as a tool for gauging the stability of the former. When sovereignty and self-determination are balanced in equilibrium, secession is not a legitimate act. As the scale slides farther toward independence, the triangle is implicitly buckling under disequilibrium. When the equilibrium is thrown off, the triangle crumbles and secession becomes necessary to restore the state’s political liberty triangle, although the final result is two political liberty triangles—one resurrected for the original state and one new triangle for the new state created from the seceded territory.

Part I of this Article provides some background on the traditional concepts of sovereignty and self-determination in order to explain their competing relation at opposite points of the political liberty triangle. Part II explains in greater detail the nature of the new prospective approach proposed in this Article and elaborates on the factors that should be considered in determining whether secession is legitimate. Finally, part III applies this new approach to East Timor’s and Kosovo’s past secession disputes as case studies, illustrating that while Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence was likely appropriate, a consideration of the totality of the circumstances renders it questionable whether East Timor should have been granted independence in 2002.9 Finally, this Article sets out a number of recommendations for transitioning away from the old paradigm’s focus on self-determination. These recommendations hinge on the notion that, while considerations of self-determination explain why secession might be justified, such considerations cannot alone indicate whether secession is actually justified in a particular instance. The Politi-

cal Liberty Triangle paradigm brings necessary analytical rigor to the latter inquiry.

I. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE POLITICAL LIBERTY TRIANGLE

The Political Liberty Triangle represents a stable, independent state and is conceptually formed by the notions of sovereignty, self-determination, and secession. International law norms equate self-determination and sovereignty as parallel interests. For example, the Charter of the United Nations states that one purpose of the U.N. is to respect the self-determination of peoples, and that the U.N. is based on the principle of sovereign equality of its members. Traditionally, claims of secession are based on violations of the right to self-determination within a sovereign state.

The following sections examine the relationship between sovereignty and self-determination in order to provide a more explicit understanding of the framework proposed herein. This framework is a building block of a methodology that supersedes the traditional approach to claims of secession.

A. Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

State sovereignty relates to a state’s claim to, and exercise of, authority. In terms of its continuous development, it is not an “immutable principle decreed in fixed form once and for all time,” but rather a con-

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11. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (providing that one of the purposes of the United Nations is “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”).

12. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (providing “the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” as one of the organizing principles of the United Nations and its members).


14. See DAVID P. FOSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 20 (1st ed. 2000) (“[T]he idea of state sovereignty is a claim relating to proper exercise of public authority.”).
cept “whose meaning and scope are subject to re-evaluation” by the international community. As such, although sovereignty is traditionally associated with the idea of supreme authority, today, sovereignty must instead be evaluated in terms of sovereign equality, or equality among the states.

While during the Middle Ages, sovereignty was used to signify superiority, the term did not exist as it does today. Although people in the Middle Ages had “a very strong sense of that concrete thing, hierarchy; they lacked the idea of that abstract thing, sovereignty.” Sovereignty in today’s sense emerged as a consequence of the formation of the modern state. First, the royalty acquired plenitude potestatis, or “the supreme power,” which meant that no authority was able to challenge them. That power was further strengthened when the royalty began asserting territorial autonomy of their kingdom. Second, the royalty began to use law as an instrument to further their power, contributing to the establishment of the concept of sovereignty. Relying on the Roman law maxims such as quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem (“what pleases the prince has the force of law”), and si veut le roi, si veut la loi; car tel est notre plaisir (“what the king wills, the law wills”) the law was utilized as an instrument of command.

15. Id. (“[A] claim to [sovereignty is] to be evaluated by the rest of the international community. Thus state sovereignty is not some immutable principle decreed in fixed form once and for all time, but rather an argument about state authority whose meaning and scope are constantly subject to re-evaluation.”). For a collection of articles discussing sovereignty as a social construct that developed over time, see STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999) (pointing out that “[s]ome analysts have argued that sovereignty is being eroded by one aspect of the contemporary international system, globalization”).


17. For an interesting discussion of the notion of sovereignty as developed in the Middle Ages, see, for example, Walter Ullman, The Development of the Medieval Idea of Sovereignty, 64 ENG. HIST. REV. 1 (1949) and J. W. McKenna, The Myth of Parliamentarv Sovereignty in Late-Medieval England, 94 ENG. HIST. REV. 481 (1979).


20. Id.

21. Id.

22. Id. at 59.
Accordingly, sovereignty has traditionally been associated with supreme authority and has essentially been thought of as the concept of a state’s right to exercise certain powers with respect to its territory and citizens. Sovereignty can be characterized by three concepts: internal coherence, external independence, and supremacy of law. A sovereign state is characterized by internal coherence and supremacy of law since it has the power to make law that is “supreme and ultimate.” Additionally, a sovereign state is externally independent because a sovereign power obeys no external authority outside its own territory. Accordingly, states are only bound by those rules of law to which they have agreed to be bound, such as international treaties or customary international law.

Another relevant legal principle in our discussion of sovereignty is equality of states. This principle is based on the analogy of the status of men in natural law. In the words of Emer de Vattel, a representative of the natural law school of thought, “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom.”

The Charter of the United Nations combines these two concepts of sovereignty and equality of states. The principle of sovereign equality...
espoused in Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter represents a profound change and a shift in the conceptual direction of the meaning of sovereignty. A report by the U.N. drafting subcommittee states:

The Subcommittee voted to keep the terminology, “sovereign equality,” on the assumption and understanding that it conveys the following: (1) [t]hat states are juridically equal; (2) [t]hat they enjoy the rights inherent in their full sovereignty; (3) [t]hat the personality of the state is respected, as well as its territorial integrity and political independence; (4) [t]hat the state should, under international order, comply faithfully with its international duties and obligations.

Sovereign equality was purposefully adopted as a new term to take precedence over the term “sovereignty.” Sovereignty was given the position of an attributive adjective modifying the noun equality. This was intended to highlight the new concept of sovereignty as establishing a better community discipline between individual states and mankind.

B. Self-determination

Self-determination is the ability of an individual or group to make choices free from the force of the institutional framework within which they live. The concept of self-determination is disputative in international law because it challenges core principles of the international legal system. In particular, it challenges the sovereignty and territorial integ-
ity of states and interferes with matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states.\textsuperscript{39}

Self-determination developed within the international legal system in the wake of the First World War.\textsuperscript{40} In 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, a key advocate of the right of the people to choose their own form of government,\textsuperscript{41} stated, “[P]eoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”\textsuperscript{42} President Wilson’s views of self-determination helped the concept become an accepted term of use in international relations.\textsuperscript{43}

The establishment of the United Nations advanced the development of the concept of self-determination; the U.N. Charter mentions the “principle” of self-determination twice\textsuperscript{44}—although, both references are made in the limited contexts of developing “peaceful and friendly relations among nations” and protecting the principle of “equal rights . . . of peoples.”\textsuperscript{45} However, it has been noted that the reference to “peoples” presumes a group beyond states and encompasses territories “whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”\textsuperscript{46}

After its inclusion in the U.N. Charter, self-determination quickly evolved from a principle to a right.\textsuperscript{47} The most significant document in

\textsuperscript{39} Id. ("It [(self-determination)] challenges the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity, it interferes in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states . . . .").

\textsuperscript{40} Id. at xiii. (stating that self-determination developed in an international context during the immediate wake of the First World War).

\textsuperscript{41} Self-Determination Report, supra note 13, at 3 (“Wilson distinguished between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ interpretations of self-determination; the former, referring to a people’s right to choose its own form of government without outside pressure, was of far greater concern to him.”).

\textsuperscript{42} President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Joint Session of Congress: Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances (Feb. 11, 1918).

\textsuperscript{43} McCorquodale, supra note 37, at xiv (“The long-term effect of Wilson’s views was that self-determination, despite its vague content and dubious conceptual basis, became an accepted term of use in international relations.”).

\textsuperscript{44} U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 55.

\textsuperscript{45} See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 55.


\textsuperscript{47} See Self-Determination Report, supra note 13, at 3 (“once [self-determination] was written into the Charter, it very quickly evolved from a principle to a right.”); Hannum, supra note 46, at 31.

[S]elf-determination has undoubtedly attained the status of a “right” in international law. Formal statements by governments, the adoption by consensus of numerous United Nations resolutions, and the fact that more than half of the
the promotion of the right to self-determination is the 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial People (the “1960 U.N. Declaration”), which makes it clear that all colonial territories have the right to independence. The “push for decolonization in the 1960s . . . elevated self-determination to a right and brought to full light the need to contend with [the] humanistic components” of self-determination.

However, given the trend in recent decades toward redefining self-determination to apply beyond decolonization—i.e., so as to include every group as having a right to independence—the 1960 U.N. Declaration may no longer offer sufficient guidance. For example, Kosovo and East Timor achieved independence after long and bloody struggles for self-determination. Currently, Chechnya is seeking its independence

world’s states have accepted the right of self-determination through their adherence to one or both of the United Nations covenants on human rights would seem to confirm the existence of self-determination as a norm of international law.

Hannum, supra note 46, at 31.


49. Hannum, supra note 46, at 12 (With respect to the U.N. General Assembly’s 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, “[t]he thrust of the declaration is clear: all colonial territories have the right of independence.”).


51. See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (expanding the right to self-determination to apply to people who are deprived of self-determination by oppressive foreign occupying powers).

52. See Dan Bilefsky, In a Showdown, Kosovo Declares its Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The province of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia . . . , sending tens of thousands of ethnic Albanians streaming through the streets to celebrate what they hoped was the end of a long and bloody struggle for national self-determination.”); Barbara Crossette, Annan Warns Indonesians That Inaction May Lead to Criminal Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1999, at A6 (quoting former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan saying: “the people of East Timor are being terrorized and massacred because they exercised their right of self-determination.”).
from Russia,\textsuperscript{53} and Western Sahara is in a struggle for independence against Morocco.\textsuperscript{54}

The 1960 U.N. Declaration was a product of its time, promulgated amidst a trend toward freedom and independence in a large number of colonial territories.\textsuperscript{55} It did not, however, allow for secession because the territorial integrity of existing states was assumed.\textsuperscript{56} Consequently, it does not address current problems that the international community faces with respect to secession. Today, in light of a trend toward independence for any group, it is necessary to have a conceptual framework for balancing the territorial integrity of existing states with the right to self-determination.

This shift is further evidenced in international declarations and covenants created after the 1960 U.N. Declaration. For instance, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations (the “1970 Declaration”) states, “[T]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination[,] and exploitation constitutes a major obstacle to the promotion of international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, suggesting that a state erodes its claim to sovereignty when engaging in subjugation, domination, and exploitation, the 1970 Declaration imposes limits on a state’s sovereignty when the state fails to “represent the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.”\textsuperscript{58} The International Covenant on Economic, Social and

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  \item \textsuperscript{53} See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Op-Ed, Russia Would Gain by Losing Chechnya, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999, at A35 (“The only fair and workable solution, good both for the Chechens and for the Russians, is self-determination for Chechnya.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 48, at 67 (“Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trend towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{56} See id. at 68; SELF-DETERMINATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Id. at 124.
\end{itemize}
Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") also state that "all peoples have the right of self-determination." This includes the right to "freely determine their political status," and to "freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

While scholars have written extensively on the right to self-determination—what it encompasses, and to whom it applies—no international agreement currently exists to precisely define the scope of the right and identify who may exercise the right. Furthermore, states have been slow to acknowledge the right beyond the colonial context. The reluctance of states to expand the scope of self-determination and the lack of international consensus make answering questions relating to and depending on self-determination especially difficult. Until the issue of scope and entitlement can be ascertained through international agreements or international norms, the legitimacy of secessions cannot be answered solely with self-determination.

C. Secession

Secession is "[t]he process or act of withdrawing," such as when a people withdraw from their central government. Secession is largely the result of a state’s failure to balance its right to territorial integrity with its people’s right to self-determination.

The concept of secession is inseparable from the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty, the latter concepts being parallels in international norms. The relationship between the corners of the Political Liberty Triangle becomes clear upon consideration of the following idea: when secession is intended, acceptance of one group’s claim to self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory and without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.

Id.


63. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
determination results in the denial of another group’s competing claim to territorial integrity.64

A balance is necessary between the right of the people to self-determination and the right of a state to maintain a territorial integrity in order to alleviate conflicting policy goals. If the international community favors a state’s territorial integrity over its people’s right to self-determination, the international community may potentially be complicit in limiting the freedom and liberty of that state’s people.65 Moreover, territorial integrity was not intended to preclude the right to self-determination.66 Alternatively, too broad a reading of the right to self-determination will compromise the territorial integrity of the state.67

It has been argued that secession is permissible under a number of circumstances. Namely, secession has been thought to be justified in extreme situations where “definite and substantial grievances” are present and “all other [means of resolving these grievances] have been exhausted or repudiated.”68 Among the prime considerations in evaluating a secessionist claim are the history, nature, and severity of the existing griev-

64. Hannum, supra note 46, at 41 (“Where independence is the goal, acceptance of one group’s claim to self-determination necessarily implies denial of another group’s competing claim of territorial integrity.”).

65. Brock Lyle, Blood for Oil: Secession, Self-Determination, and Superpower Silence in Cabinda, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701, 707 (2005) (pointing out that “too strict a reading of territorial integrity creates an internationally sanctioned form of fascism, a nation where the people have no freedom to disagree.”).

66. Pius L. Okoronkwo, Self-Determination and the Legality of Biafra’s Secession Under International Law, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 63, 80 (2002) (“The principle of territorial integrity, however, was not intended to preclude people within a sovereign state from exercising their right to self-determination through secession.”).

67. Lyle, supra note 65, at 707 (pointing out that “too broad a definition of self-determination makes it impossible to keep countries together.”).

68. Hannum, supra note 46, at 44–45 (citing Onyeonoro Kamanu, Secession and the Right to Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 355, 359, 361 (1974)). Hurst Hannum discusses the four principal arguments in favor of the right to secede. The first argument, the liberal democratic theory, “holds that, since the legitimacy of any government must rest upon the consent of the governed, the governed have the inalienable right to withdraw that consent whenever they wish.” Id. at 43–44. The second argument emphasizes humanitarian or human rights concerns. Id. at 44–47. The third argument identifies a list of criteria that might be used in specific cases to evaluate secessionist claims, and seeks to balance “the internal merits of the claimants’ case [for secession] against the justifiable concerns of the international community expressed in its calculation of the disruptive consequences of the situation.” Id. at 47–48. Lastly, the fourth approach, a territorially based test, considers the following criteria: the immediacy and nature of the historical grievance of the secessionist group, the extent to which the group has kept its self-determination claim alive, and the extent to which the disputed territory has been settled by members of the dominant group. See id. at 48–49.
ances. For example, scholars have argued that secession may be legally justified when gross violations of human rights, such as genocide, occur within a given state or territory. Additionally, scholars weigh the expected impact on international harmony in ascertaining the legitimacy of a claim to secession. While states may freely recognize the independence of a given population, acceptance of a group’s declaration of independence by the greater international community increases the legitimacy of the right to secession. Moreover, the promotion of international harmony requires a balancing of the right to secession and the adverse effects on the given state. Accordingly, it has been noted that “the basic question is whether separation or unification would best promote security and facilitate effective shaping and sharing of power and of all the other values for most people.”

While a right to secession does not yet exist, it is an open question whether a right legitimizing secession under certain circumstances should be recognized. Because the legitimacy of any government rests “upon the consent of the governed, the governed should have the inalienable right to withdraw that consent whenever they wish.”

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69. Id. at 48 (citing Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177, 199–201 (1991)) (discussing the territorially based test for determining a right to secede).
70. Id. at 46 (discussing the humanitarian or human rights approach to determining a right to secede).
71. Id. at 47 (discussing the third approach to judging the right to secede); see supra note 68.

Although recognition of the newly created state by the international community as a requisite component in the legality of secession remains in dispute . . . in political terms its necessity is almost universally accepted. As membership in the UN General Assembly is the preeminent signifier of international recognition of statehood, the UN can leverage substantial power insofar as it confers legitimacy on newly created states.

Id.
73. Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal 198, 210 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976); see also Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 238 (1978) (arguing that the “final decision regarding the legitimacy of a particular secessionist claim must result from the balancing of the internal merits of the claimants’ case for secession against the justifiable concerns of the international community expressed in its calculation of the disruptive consequences of the situation.”).
74. Hannum, supra note 46, at 43 (discussing the liberal democratic theory approach to determining right to secede); see supra note 68.
withdraw should arguably extend “not only to rejection of [a] particular government, but also to rejection of [an entire] state.”

II. A PARADIGM FOR THE AGES

After juxtaposing the Political Liberty Triangle approach with the traditional paradigm, the following sections explain the methodology—and, ultimately, the desirability—of the former, in order to support this Article’s call for a paradigm shift.

A. Rejection of the Traditional Paradigm of Self-Determination

While self-determination explains why a group may be entitled to secede, it does not guide the international community in determining whether an act of secession is lawful. Similar to a student of mathematics who is unable to use calculus without first understanding the fundamentals of algebra, the international community is unable to evaluate the legitimacy of a claim without the proper tools. While a student may recognize that a given problem can be solved using a particular calculus theorem, he or she will not be able to utilize the theorem without the requisite tools. Similarly, scholars may recognize that self-determination is a justification for secession, but they are unable to analyze the legitimacy of specific claims for secession because a sufficient framework does not yet exist.

If scholars—and, ultimately, members of the international legal community—possessed a more expansive analytical framework for looking at the legitimacy of secessionists’ claims, they could offer better collective judgments as to how to react. Some of the types of information most important to the decision-making process include: the occurrence of human rights violations; the occurrence of attempts at peaceful negotiation; clear expressions of the will of a supermajority to secede; indications that other rights violations are being perpetrated; and indications of whether the aggrieved population could be economically viable if secession were recognized as legitimate.

Because such information is essential to fully evaluate the question of legitimacy, the international community should no longer focus on self-determination to determine when an act of secession is lawful. Self-

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75. Hannum, supra note 46, at 43.

76. Cf. Stephen R. Covey, The 8th Habit: From Effectiveness to Greatness 117 (2004) (pointing out the calculus portion of the analogy—“you can’t do calculus until you understand algebra, and you can’t do algebra until you understand basic math”).
determination alone is not enough because it simply distinguishes legitimate claims from illegitimate claims.77

B. The Political Liberty Triangle Paradigm

The international community must begin viewing secession in light of the totality of the circumstances. The extent of a people’s dependency on a given state body hinges on all factors relevant to the competing desires for self-determination or territorial integrity. Furthermore, determinations of the legitimacy of acts of secession should be made on a case-by-case basis because the circumstances arising in each case will be unique. This is why it is important to point out that the list of potentially relevant considerations (provided above and discussed in greater detail below) is not exhaustive. The weight to be given to any one factor or circumstance is not fixed; the gravity of any type of consideration will always depend on the context and the interplay of all other relevant factors and circumstances. For example, the economic viability of a territory may be given more weight than the exhaustion of peaceable negotiations where a territory is small and its population uneducated.

To further conceptualize this approach, it is best to think of these case-specific factors as lying at the heart of the Political Liberty Triangle. Remember that as the sliding scale shifts from dependence to independence on the basis of these case-specific factors, the triangle begins to crumble.

Many scholars have already written about many of the factors that will be examined in this Article, but the forthcoming discussion aims to build and improve upon the existing scholarship. For example, it has been argued that serious human rights violations alone are sufficient to justify secession.78 However, this Article argues that this is not a facially obvious conclusion—rather, evidence of such violations is but one of many factors that should be considered, in light, of course, of the surrounding circumstances of the territory.

Unsurprisingly, most academic work dealing with secession has focused on self-determination.79 If nothing else, this Article will hopefully encourage a shift in academic discourse away from the self-determination paradigm and toward a more meaningful, in depth analysis.

78. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2004); Okoronkwo, supra note 66, at 106 (stating secession is permissible when serious human rights violations are present).
of the kind advocated here. Unfortunately, “paradigms, like traditions, die hard,”80 and a flawed paradigm can live on for centuries even after a better one is advanced.81

1. Gross, Substantial, and Extensive Human Rights Violations

Human rights are those fundamental moral rights necessary for individuals to live with liberty and dignity; moreover, they are a means to a greater social end.82 The legal system identifies and codifies rights that are considered fundamental,83 and States ensure autonomy and equality for individuals by recognizing, applying, and protecting the fundamental legal rights of individuals.84

With the advent of international law, human rights have been internationalized and are no longer solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.85 Today, states are held accountable to the international community for their human rights violations.86 When a state fails to recognize and apply fundamental rights appropriately, victimized groups may seek assistance from the international community,87 and recognition of the legitimacy of secession is always a potential remedy international actors can offer. In

80. COVEY, supra note 76, at 20.
81. Id.
82. FORSYTHE, supra note 14, at 3.
83. Id. (“[I]t is the legal system that tells us at any given point in time which rights are considered most fundamental in society. Even if human rights are thought to be inalienable . . . rights still have to be identified—that is, constructed—by human beings and codified into the legal system.”); see also Jack Donnelly, The Social Construction of International Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 71–102 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas J. Wheeler eds., 1999).
84. FORSYTHE, supra note 14, at 3 (“[i]n the classical liberal view, the good society is based on respect for the equality and autonomy of individuals, which is assured through the recognition and application of the fundamental legal rights of the person.”). For a novel and creative approach to human rights violations, see Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central Case Approach to Human Rights: Its Universal Application and the Singapore Example, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 257, 259–62 (2004) (arguing for a more meaningful measure of human rights by focusing on different deviations from a central case of human rights).
85. FORSYTHE, supra note 14, at 4–5 (“Other developments also indicated the central point that human rights was no longer a matter necessarily or always within state domestic jurisdiction. . . . Human rights had been internationalized . . . .”).
86. Id. at 4 (“In principle, states were to answer to the international community for their treatment of individuals.”).
87. See BENYAMIN NEUBERGER, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA 71 (1986) (stating a group may defend themselves by seceding from an oppressive state); Onyeonoro S. Kamanu, Secession and the Right to Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, 12 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 355, 362 (1974) (arguing that a group may defend themselves when they are subjected to human rights violations).
such circumstances, the possibility of secession is a source of protection.\textsuperscript{88}

Human rights violations may provide a compelling justification for secession.\textsuperscript{89} However, there is no general consensus as to what type or extent of violations are necessary to justify secession. For example, would it be sufficient to justify succession if there is a credible threat to the physical existence of an aggrieved population? What about extreme discrimination against a particular group such that it results in significant oppression?\textsuperscript{90} What about genocide? Surely genocide should be sufficient, right?

While genocide is illegal under customary international law,\textsuperscript{91} one single act of genocide against a population is probably insufficient to justify secession.\textsuperscript{92} In such a situation, secession may not be the proper remedy. For instance, the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, . . . human rights should be protected by the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{93} Additionally, long established

\textsuperscript{88} See Hannum, supra note 46, at 45 (stating secession is a form of self-defense while discussing the humanitarian or human rights approach to determining the appropriateness of the right to secede); see supra note 68.

\textsuperscript{89} See Buchanan, supra note 78, at 335; Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law 262–63 (2002); Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-Determination, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 1998, at 13, 16 (“There are two instances in which secession should be supported by the international community. The first occurs when massive, discriminatory human rights violations, approaching the scale of genocide, are being perpetrated. If there is no likelihood of a change in the attitude of the central government, or if the majority population supports the repression, secession may be the only effective remedy for the besieged group.”); Okoronkwo, supra note 66, at 106.

\textsuperscript{90} See Hannum, supra note 46, at 45 (reviewing the second approach to determining the right to secede which emphasizes humanitarian and human rights concerns).

\textsuperscript{91} See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 (1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones . . . genocide.”).

\textsuperscript{92} See Hannum, supra note 89, at 16 (conditioning the right to secession on the basis of “massive, discriminatory human rights violations, approaching the scale of genocide” upon “there [being] no likelihood of a change in the attitude of the central government” or “majority population support[ ] [of] the repression.”).

principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity signal that secession may not be the preferable remedy.94

When human rights violations are gross, substantial, and extensive, however, secession may become a legitimate goal for an aggrieved population. As mentioned above, international agreements, such as the 1970 Declaration,95 the ICESCR,96 and the ICCPR,97 suggest that respect for state sovereignty ought not to prevent the international community from taking action in opposition to state actors who commit serious human rights violations on behalf of their states.98

2. Attempted Peaceful Negotiated Settlements

There is a historical notion that violence rarely, if ever, produces viable and just outcomes.99 In order for a state’s Political Liberty Triangle to remain intact, a state should repudiate all forms of violence and pursue peaceful negotiated settlements. When a state uses violence and force on an aggrieved population as a method of settling problems, that state corrodes its right to sovereignty.100 Likewise, the aggrieved population should also not resort to violence as a means of achieving its goal of secession from the oppressive state.

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 signaled a movement away from violence and toward institutions that would promote peaceful settlement of disputes.101 Article 33 of the U.N. Charter states that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other

95. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, supra note 57, at 121.
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 59.
98. See discussion supra Part I.B.
100. Trebicka, supra note 13, at 260 (“In the case of Kosovo, the exercise of self-determination would certainly lead to secession, thus violating the principle of territorial integrity of the sovereign, Serbia. In this case, I argue that emerging international law should favor the right to self-determination over sovereignty claims.”).
101. See U.N Charter art. 39–51 (forbids the threat or use of force in international relations).
peaceful means of their own choice.” Furthermore, the U.N. Charter empowers the Security Council to resolve disputes that threaten international peace and security. While the U.N. Charter is only binding on member states, the international community as a whole should follow the trend toward peaceful solutions to promote global harmony.

Peaceful negotiated settlements should be the result of real bargaining by legitimate representatives of the parties after an examination of all issues that constitute the heart of the conflict. No party should be coerced or pressured into accepting an agreement, and when negotiations cannot produce a solution that is genuinely acceptable to both parties, the United Nations Security Council should assist in resolving the conflicts. The risk of intervention by the Security Council should encourage parties to reach agreements and settle their disputes in a peaceful way.

3. The Will of the Supermajority

Secession is not legitimate without the will of the people. Thus, majority support is often a very important element in weighing the legitimacy of secession. However, it is arguable that secession should be permissible whenever “reasonable demands for local self-government or minority rights have been arbitrarily rejected by a central government.” According to much existing scholarship, the apparent sentiment is that evidence of majority support among all aggrieved individuals might very well be sufficient for legitimate secession. To demand a

102. U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1.
105. KHAN, supra note 99.
simple majority, however, is not sufficient. Rather, to be deemed the “will of the people,” a claim should be a clear expression of a supermajority of the people.\(^{109}\) When a supermajority of all those who have been arbitrarily rejected by the central government express a clear will for secession, the territory may become one notch closer to independence on the sliding scale.

A supermajority is necessary, in contrast to a majority, because of how difficult it may be to gauge whether a mere majority of a population within a territory actually wishes to secede. The requirement of supermajority support is likely to guarantee that secession is the direct wish of the population within a territory. Furthermore, requiring a supermajority minimizes the risk of harm to minority groups, which must be protected when a population secedes from a state. Scholars have persuasively argued that the overall situation for minorities must not be worsened by secession.\(^{110}\) Indeed, secession should leave minorities at least no worse off than they were previously; meanwhile, secession might appear increasingly legitimate, the greater the improvements to minorities’ circumstances in the new secessionist state.\(^{111}\)

The Supreme Court of Canada, addressing a claim of secession of the Quebec province, decided that the right to self determination must “be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states.”\(^{112}\) The Court, however, noted that there are extreme circumstances where a right to secession may arise.\(^{113}\) Of particular importance, while recognizing that it may not be “an established international law standard,”\(^{114}\) the Court stated that “when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.”\(^{115}\)

Especially relevant to this analysis, the Canadian Supreme Court also discussed the relationship between the will of the majority and secession. In order for an expression of a desire to secede to be legitimate, the Court has said it would require “a clear expression by the people . . . of their

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\(^{111}\) Hannum, *supra* note 89, at 17.


\(^{113}\) Id.

\(^{114}\) Id. at ¶ 135.

\(^{115}\) Id. at ¶ 134.
will to secede.”116 The court indicated that a clear majority of the population’s vote on the question, free of ambiguity, would qualify as a clear expression.117 Accordingly, requiring the will of a supermajority to secede would provide an even clearer expression of the majority of the population.

4. Economic Viability

Within the framework set forth in this article, the ability of a territory to be self-sustaining should be a prerequisite to secession.118 Given the simple fact that a state’s future and security are so closely connected to its economic viability, it is surprising how little discussion of secession has focused on the economic viability of a territory.119 Perhaps this factor has been ignored by scholars and academics because Article 3 of the 1960 U.N. Declaration provides that “[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social[, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”120 Declarations, however, are not binding.121 Additionally, in today’s world, globalization creates new economic challenges that were not known, and could not even be fathomed, at the time

116. Id. at ¶ 87.
118. But see Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 48, at 67 (“Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”).
120. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 48 (emphasis added).
121. See Noëlle Lenoir, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal and Ethical Framework at the Global Level, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 537, 550 (1999) (“The achievement of consensus on a declaration is a short-lived victory, because declarations are not binding and there is nothing to prevent states from later revoking the commitment they made when the text was adopted.”); John J. Maresca, Remarks, Human Rights: The Helsinki Process, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 122, 122 (1990) (stating, in reference to the Helsinki Final Act declaration adopted by the Conference of security and co-operation in Europe (“CSCE”), that it “entails political and moral commitments, rather than legally binding treaty obligations.”).
of the Declaration’s enactment in 1960. If a territory cannot survive as an economically viable state, then it should not legitimately secede, as it would likely fail as a state and become a burden on the international community.

An independent state must be able to build a strong, healthy, and self-sustaining economy to survive. Until its final status is resolved, however, a territory’s prospects for future economic development will be uncertain. Businesses will be reluctant to invest in a territory where independence has gone unrecognized, and international financial institutions will be unable to offer monetary assistance.\(^{122}\)

Still, one may be able to determine a territory’s economic viability to an extent by looking at its size and assets. For instance, rich natural resources should indicate future self-sustainability. Additionally, a young population with a robust drive to succeed is more likely to contribute to a territory’s economic success. The amount of potential investment by the community, outsiders, and financial institutions will also lead to predictions about economic viability.

A great emphasis should be placed on the economic state of a territory in determining whether secession is appropriate. A territory that wishes to secede from an economically stable state should be self-sustainable and free from direction and assistance.

5. Promotion of International Harmony

A legitimate act of secession requires recognition from the international community.\(^{123}\) The formation of a state occurs, initially, as a matter of fact, and later, as a matter of international law.\(^ {124}\) In other words, the formation of a state truly occurs upon recognition by the international community as a whole.\(^ {125}\) While states are free to recognize any territory or population as an independent state, secession should not be considered

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122. *See The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Kosovo Hearing] (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (noting, in regards to Kosovo, that “[a]s long as Kosovo’s final status remained unresolved, businesses were reluctant to invest there, and international financial institutions were unable to offer the needed monetary assistance)."


125. *See Watson, supra note 123.*
a legal act without recognition by the larger international community, as this promotes international harmony. Among other factors and policy considerations, a state will ultimately weigh the legitimacy of secession as a basis for determining whether to grant recognition. When a majority of the international community recognizes a state’s independence, it is a statement of legality and legitimacy for the secessionist state.

This argument, of course, ignores the dissenting states’ wishes. At first blush, one may grapple with the idea of promoting international well-being when a portion of the international community will almost certainly object to the legality of the secessionist movement. However, each state will take into account the adverse significant affects on the state being seceded from in deciding whether to recognize the secessionist state’s independence. Accordingly, recognition from the greater of the two halves is likely to promote international harmony.

III. APPRAISING THE POLITICAL LIBERTY TRIANGLE PARADIGM

In 2002, East Timor achieved independence from Indonesia, and in 2008, Kosovo achieved its independence from Serbia. What follows is an appraisal of the methodology advocated in this Article as applied to East Timor’s and Kosovo’s previous secession claims. Using East Timor and Kosovo as case studies, the following sections will use the Political Liberty Triangle and the sliding scale of independence as tools for determining whether the conditions in East Timor and Kosovo reached the threshold of legitimate independence, and whether Indonesia’s and Ser-

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126. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 155 (“The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition.”); see also BUCHHEIT, supra note 73, at 238; Chen, supra note 73, at 210 (advocating that “[t]he recommended test in granting or rejecting a demand for self-determination is not whether a given situation is ‘colonial’ or ‘noncolonial,’ but whether granting or rejecting the demands of a group would move the situation closer to goal values of human dignity, considering in particular the aggregate value consequences on the group directly concerned and the larger communities affected.”).

127. Watson, supra note 123; see also Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination in International Law, 89 YALE L.J. 1247, 1258 (1980) (reviewing LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978)) (discussing the community interest achieved in recognizing secessionist states after weighing the potential disruption in world harmony resulting from separation).

128. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 155; see also Watson, supra note 123, at 268 (stating states will likely base their decision to support the independence of Kosovo on realist political tactics).

129. See Bilefsky, supra note 52; supra note 9.
The history behind East Timor and Kosovo is extensive and complicated. Because a complete discussion of the history of each state is beyond the scope of this Article, the analysis will focus only on the relevant factors and circumstances at the heart of the Political Liberty Triangle.

A. East Timor

On May 20, 2002, East Timor achieved its independence from Indonesia and became the first new sovereign state of the twenty-first century. Starting in the sixteenth century and continuing well into the twentieth century, East Timor was a Portuguese colony. It was not until 1975 that the Indonesian government took control of the territory when the Portuguese government departed. At that time, the United Nations denounced the Indonesian means of exerting control over East Timor and continued to recognize East Timor as a “non-self-governing territory” under Portuguese administration.


132. Abdullah, supra note 9; Akerman, supra note 9; Scarpello, supra note 9.


134. Martin, supra note 6, at 16 (“On 7 December 1975, Indonesia launched a naval, air, and land invasion of East Timor.”).


Extreme brutality and violence marked Indonesian rule over East Timor. The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor reported a minimum of 102,800 conflict-related deaths between 1974 and 1999. This estimate is further supported by a comprehensive study commissioned by the Australian Parliament, which reported at least 200,000 East Timorese died under Indonesian occupation.

On May 5, 1999, the negotiations over the final status of East Timor resulted in Indonesia and Portugal signing the Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor. The agreement allowed the United Nations to organize a popular consultation of the East Timorese through a “direct, secret, and universal ballot.” Under the agreement, if the East Timorese people rejected the autonomous framework, Indonesia would transfer its authority to the United Nations, and this would eventually lead to East Timor’s independence.

While the status of East Timor was never clear until the popular consultation, nearly 79% voted to reject autonomous status in Indonesia on August 30, 1999. The consultation resulted in mass violence, including “murders, massacres, disappearances, forced expulsion, rape, sexual harassment of women, and destruction of property” perpetrated by pro-Indonesia militias. Peace was not restored in East Timor until the U.N. Security Council authorized the creation of the International Force for East Timor (“INTERFET”) to quell the violence brought on by the

138. Pilger, supra note 3, at ix (“According to a comprehensive study commissioned by the Australian Parliament, ‘at least’ 200,000 East Timorese, a third of the population, have died under the Indonesian occupation.”); see also Martin, supra note 6, at 17 (“Estimates of the number who died as a result of the conflict, including the famine and disease that accompanied the displacement of large parts of the population, range from tens of thousands, acknowledged by Indonesia itself, to as many as 200,000.”).
140. Id. at art. 6.
143. Singh, supra note 141, at 10.
consultation, but not long after that, East Timor finally won its hard-fought battle for self-government.

Did the international community achieve the proper result by granting East Timor its independence? At first blush, this sounds plausible. The people of East Timor suffered decades of violence, brutality, and extensive human rights violations. Then, while the popular consultation evinced East Timor’s willingness to engage in peaceful negotiations, the resulting violence indicated that secession represented the will of the supermajority. Meanwhile, East Timor’s independence likely promoted international harmony. When Indonesia took control of East Timor, the United Nations’ Security Council and General Assembly adopted resolutions recognizing the legitimacy of East Timor’s struggle for independence. Since member states of the United Nations are bound by U.N. resolutions and the United Nations represents a considerable majority of independent states in the world, the U.N.’s resolute disapproval of Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor arguably represented the view of the broader international community. At the time of Indonesia’s invasion in 1975, there were 144 member states of the United Nations. According to the U.S. Department of State, there are 194 independent states in the world.

Using the sliding scale approach, however, the lawfulness of East Timor’s secession is not as clear cut. Significantly, East Timor’s economic viability was in question at the time of secession. Commentators have pointed out, “[i]t was a belief that an independent East Timor was not economically viable that provided one of its justifications for incorporation into Indonesia.” East Timor is small, with few natural resources,

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144. Id.
145. Abdullah, supra note 9; Akerman, supra note 9; Scarpello, supra note 9.
147. For representative functions of the United Nations and its members, see, for example, U.N. Charter art. 25.
150. See Roger S. Clark, The “Decolonization” of East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 2, 12 (1980); Jeremy Wagstaff, Independent East Timor Would Rely on Foreign Aid, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 1999, at A18 (“Economically, East Timor is unprepared for independence, making it likely that if it chooses to split from Indonesia, it could be dependent on foreign aid for years.”).
151. Gunn, supra note 130, at 23.
and sparsely populated. Furthermore, years of war have left most of its people uneducated. In 1999, East Timor’s was among the poorest economies in the world and its infrastructure had been neglected or destroyed over the decades during Portuguese and Indonesian rule. A territory with such deterioration in its economical abilities may not be able to accept the responsibilities of statehood in the international community.

East Timor does, however, have reasons to be optimistic. While economists have estimated that it could take 15 to 20 years before East Timor achieves levels of economic growth comparable to those of Indonesia, there is significant growth potential because the area is rich in oil and natural gas. Under the Timor Sea Treaty, which replaced the Timor Gap Treaty, East Timor is entitled to a share of the proceeds coming from petroleum found in the seabed area described in the agreement. Additionally, East Timor’s agricultural, coffee, marble-mining, coastal fishing, and tourism industries also provide potential sources of economic development.

Still, despite this potential, East Timor has yet to prove it can be economically viable. In 2008, East Timor’s success depended on interna-


153. Lindsay Sobel, Rebuilding East Timor’s Economy, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 10, 1999 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Wagstaff, supra note 150 (“Half of [the citizens of East Timor] can’t read.”).


155. Wagstaff, supra note 150 (stating years of war have left land scarred and undeveloped).

156. Id. But see Sobel, supra note 153 (noting some hopeful signs with respect to East Timor’s economy, including potential for developing its natural resources).

157. Wagstaff, supra note 150 (“economists reckon it could take 15 to 20 years for East Timor to reach the levels of Indonesia.”).

158. CHENG, supra note 130, at 171.


160. Sobel, supra note 153.

161. Erica Tay, Singapore Ranked as World’s Easiest Place to Do Business; New Zealand Slips to Second Spot in World Bank Report of 175 Economies, THE STRAITS TIMES (SING.), Sept. 7, 2006 (“Among the 175 economies studied, troubled East Timor was second from the bottom. Only the Democratic Republic of Congo fared worse.”).
tional assistance, without which the area’s future would be bleak. It is debatable whether the people of East Timor are better off in a poor economy marked by starvation, high unemployment, and a high mortality rate than they would have been as a territory dependent on an economically self-sufficient state. As such, the circumstances surrounding East Timor’s declaration of independence may not have been enough to justify East Timor’s independence when considered under the more rigorous sliding scale approach.

B. Kosovo

In 1989, the Serbian government seized control of Kosovo and retained control for nearly twenty years until the Kosovo Assembly declared independence on February 17, 2008 in Pristina. Throughout the 1990s, Kosovo was technically an independent part of Serbia, but the occupation was marked by Serbia denying the people of Kosovo the right to participate in government life and committing rampant human rights abuses including beatings, arbitrary arrests, and torture. In the late 1990s, a violent resistance emerged in Kosovo, and it was met with a vehement response by Serbian authorities. While the U.N. Security Council issued Chapter VII resolutions demanding a cease-fire and peaceful negotiations with international supervision, Serbia resisted efforts for peaceful settlements. As a result, the U.N. Security

162. Anne-marie Evans, East Timor’s Shaky Foundations Need Long-Term Support, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 2006, at 16 (“If East Timor is left to its own devices, then with the current unrest, the future doesn’t look rosy. However, both Mr. Miller and Mr. Jones are optimistic, provided an international taskforce can guide East Timor through a few more years.”).


164. Stefan Oeter, Yugoslavia, Dissolution, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1563, 1566 (2000).


166. Oeter, supra note 164, at 1566.

167. Id. at 1590.

168. Id. at 1591.


Resolution 1244 established the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to promote democratic self-government and “facilit[ing] a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status . . . .”\footnote{Id.; see also Watson, supra note 123, at 273.} The duties of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (the “UNMIK”) also included performing civilian administrative functions, promoting human rights, coordinating humanitarian relief and the reconstruction of infrastructure, maintaining civil law and order, and assuring the safe return of refugees.\footnote{S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 171; see also Watson, supra note 123, at 273.}

The U.N. appointed former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to Kosovo to assist in determining Kosovo’s future status.\footnote{See Special Envoy to Kosovo, Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168 (Mar. 26, 2007).} In March 2007, Ahtisaari released the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,\footnote{The Secretary-General, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement].} which called for “[i]ndependence with international supervision.”\footnote{Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status, supra note 174.} Serbia refused to accept the plan, and additional Russian resistance led to the plan’s demise, as the Security Council ultimately failed to adopt it.\footnote{John Dugard & David Rač, The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Secession, in SECESSION, INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 94, 130 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006). See also Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, Kosovo and the Future of Balkan Security, NATO Doc. 155 CDS 08 E bis (May 27, 2008) (prepared by Vitalino Canas), available at http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1480.} With frustration at its peak among the people of Kosovo, the members of the Kosovo Assembly took it upon themselves to officially announce the territory’s independence.\footnote{Spolar, supra note 153; see also Bilefsky, supra note 52; Watson, supra note 123, at 274.}

tently upheld Serbia’s right to territorial integrity. It may have been this failure to balance Serbia’s interest in territorial integrity with Kosovo’s right to self-determination that led to Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

Furthermore, other relevant factors moved the sliding scale balance in favor of independence. From the time Serbia seized control of Kosovo, there was a clear expression of the supermajority’s preference. In a 1991 referendum held in Kosovo, the population overwhelmingly voted for independence from Serbia. There were also attempts at peaceful negotiations as well; Resolution 1160 and the Ahtisaari Plan serve as examples of attempts at peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Currently, 62 out of 192 United Nations member states formally recognize Kosovo. While it may at first seem that the international community has failed to recognize Kosovo’s independence, this statistic is deceptive. The 62 countries that recognize Kosovo’s independence make up 71.7% of the world’s total nominal GDP. Furthermore, 3 out of 5 U.N. Security Council Permanent Member States, 24 out of 28 NATO Member States, and 22 out of 27 European Union Member States recognize Kosovo. Arguably, international harmony is promoted by Kosovo’s independence because a large and influential percentage of the international community does in fact recognize Kosovo’s independence.

Plagued by high unemployment, a need for major infrastructure, and limited economic growth, Kosovo currently faces immense challenges for economic development. Kosovo must focus on building a strong, healthy, and self-sustaining economy for itself if it wishes to survive as an independent state. Fortunately, Kosovo has extensive assets, such as “rich mineral resources, a young and resilient population, and a robust

181. See Oeter, supra note 164, at 1590–91; Kosovo Chronology, supra note 131.
183. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, supra note 175.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Kosovo Hearing, supra note 122, at 1 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (Rep. Berman stated upon his return from his visit to Kosovo that he “was struck by the immense need for economic development.”).
drive to succeed.” Additionally, with the announcement of Kosovo’s final status, business will likely be less reluctant to invest there and international financial institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, will be able to offer monetary assistance. Kosovo’s economy also improved with the arrival of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission (“UNMIK”) in Kosovo. Within a year of UNMIK’s arrival, Kosovo’s economy was described as “remarkably vibrant” by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Bernard Kouchner. Kosovo’s private enterprises surpassed 1998 pre-war production and employment levels, construction was deemed “booming,” and “winter wheat planting was at 80% of the historical average.” Ironically, this progress was attributed to several unusually bold administrative decisions made by Special Representative Kouchner, which arguably exceeded his mandate as set forth in Resolution 1244. Although much of this progress was hindered by the ongoing struggle over Kosovo’s final status, it does suggest that bold decisions by the leaders of Kosovo may lead to economic viability.

The challenges facing Kosovo will take years to overcome. For Kosovo to succeed, it must learn from other states that have gone through an economic transformation. The experience of post-Communist states in the 1990s may prove a helpful guide for Kosovo’s democratic transformation. For example, a democratic transformation requires a modernized

188. Id. at 2; see also Economic Initiative for Kosovo, Top 10 Reasons to Invest in Kosovo, available at http://www.eciks.org/english/publications/investing_in_kosovo/content/media/topten_web.pdf.
189. See Kosovo Hearing, supra note 122, at 21 (statement of the Hon. Daniel Fried, Asst. Sec’y, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic Sustainability and Final Status for Kosovo, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 259, 261 (2004) (stating that uncertainty over Kosovo’s final status is partly responsible for Kosovo’s slow economic progress); Nick Andrews & Bob Davis, Kosovo Wins Acceptance to IMF, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A8 (“Joining the IMF could give Kosovo important access to additional economic aid and reassure potential investors, the Kosovar government says. The government plans three major privatizations this year—a power-station project; the airport serving Pristina, the capital; and postal and telecoms company PTK—and it hopes to attract foreign investors. A U.S. official said the IMF imprimatur would make it easier for Kosovo to find government and private financing.”).
191. Id.
192. Id.
banking system including credit, financial regulators, and an insurance system. Furthermore, as the experience of post-communist countries shows, a flat tax reduces corruption, which in turn will increase the flow of money and investment into Kosovo. With bold decision-making and adherence to proven models, Kosovo may become a self-sustaining economy in the long term.

All in all, while the legitimacy of Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not clear-cut, it was certainly not an open-and-shut case if analyzed in light of the totality of the circumstances. While it is true that its people suffered grave human rights abuses under the Serbian regime, Kosovo resorted to violent resistance rather than peaceful settlement of its disputes. However, Kosovo’s expression of supermajority will for independence was present as early as 1992 during the referendum for independence. While bleak, the economic viability of Kosovo as an independent state is not out of the question. The transition period to full independent statehood will be difficult, but the circumstances surrounding its secession suggest that it has the potential and ability to become self-sufficient. Finally, while only 62 out of 192 U.N. Member States formally recognize Kosovo’s independence, those Members do represent 70.94% of the world’s total nominal GDP.

These circumstances surrounding Kosovo’s declaration may have indeed shifted the sliding scale of independence far enough that Serbia’s then-existing Political Liberty Triangle could no longer sustain itself and collapsed. As a result, Kosovo formed its own Political Liberty Triangle and Serbia’s Political Liberty Triangle repairs itself without Kosovo.

C. Reconciling East Timor with Kosovo

How does one reconcile independence for Kosovo under the Political Liberty Triangle paradigm, but not for East Timor? Both territories suffered from subjugation, exploitation, and domination. Gross, systematic, and extensive human rights violations marked both territories. There was also evidence of attempts at peaceful negotiations, violent resistance, and expressions by both supermajorities of their wills to secede. The economic instability present in East Timor at the time it seceded can also be seen in Kosovo at the time it seceded, and international harmony was promoted in both cases.

195. Id.
196. Id.
However, under the Political Liberty Triangle paradigm, Kosovo shifted on the sliding scale of independence to a much greater extent than East Timor largely because Kosovo was a “unique situation.”197 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 established the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in 1999 in Kosovo to promote democratic self-government and “facilit[e] a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”198 The situation in Kosovo involved an unprecedented level of participation by the United Nations and NATO not present in East Timor’s circumstances.199 Additionally, since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has had independent status even while under the control of Serbia—meanwhile, East Timor never possessed independent status. As such, Kosovo’s independence was the natural progression of Yugoslavia’s breakup, as all people in the former Yugoslavia were given their right to self-determination.200

The circumstances surrounding secession in Kosovo and East Timor were important considerations that factored into an examination of the heart of the Political Liberty Triangle and may have justified secession for Kosovo, but not East Timor. Ultimately, all circumstances surrounding a state’s claim to secession are appropriate to analyze under the Political Liberty Triangle paradigm.

Returning for a moment to East Timor—one might question what alternative solutions to independence were available. While East Timor’s independence in 2002 is illegitimate under the Political Liberty Triangle, independence may in fact have shifted toward legitimacy within years had East Timor sought further peaceful negotiations and more U.N. involvement and continued to develop its economy. The purpose of the Political Liberty Triangle paradigm is to allow for secession only in unique situations, and the overarching aim of this new approach is to maintain a balance between sovereignty and self-determination. If lacking insistence on the necessity of that balance, any paradigm would be flawed.

197. Id. at 27.
CONCLUSION

The power of an accurate paradigm is that it explains, and then it guides. Presently, the international community’s paradigm focuses on self-determination to determine the lawfulness of a claim to secession. This outdated approach explains why secession might be justified, but it does not explain how that conclusion is ultimately to be reached. The failure of this approach (with respect to its lack of guidance) may be attributed to the lack of any international norm that defines self-determination.

Alternatively, as this article has demonstrated through case studies of East Timor and Kosovo, the Political Liberty Triangle and the sliding scale of independence provide analytical guidance. This approach can be used to explain why a group will seek secession in the name of self-determination. More importantly, however, it has the potential of guiding scholars, advocates, and other decision-makers to a proper conclusion whenever the legitimacy of a claim to secession is in dispute.

Unfortunately, like old habits, paradigms die hard. Without an accurate paradigm, the confusion and complex issues that have evolved in regard to the doctrine of secession will not fade. It helps to think of a paradigm as a map. If a scholar’s “map” is inaccurate, the scholar will remain lost regardless of how long and hard the scholar searches for his or her destination. However, with an accurate map, scholars can reach their desired destinations with sufficiently rigorous and proper reasoning and analysis. The Political Liberty Triangle is the best heuristic “map” for answering the question: When is secession lawful?

201. COVEY, supra note 76, at 20.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 19.