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NORMATIVE MODELING FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL)

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) was created by the General Assembly in 1966 and given a mandate to “to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade.”1 In contrast to the emphasis placed on public law in the works of institutions such as the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), UNCITRAL’s focus is on private international law, defined as “the laws applicable to private parties in international transactions.”2 After approximately two decades of small accomplishments and little recognition, however, UNCITRAL has emerged as an increasingly significant player in shaping the law and politics of international trade.3 Its work product—model laws, legislative guides, contractual and arbitration rules, and conventions—is increasingly influential in

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2. Id.

shaping the law of global commerce. Moreover, UNCITRAL engages in sustained cooperation with other public and private international organizations involved in shaping the legal frameworks of national and global commerce and investment.

The aims of this Article are threefold: to present an overview of UNCITRAL and its role, explain how and why it has increased its presence in shaping international economic law, and explore how UNCITRAL’s work and structure can help advance an understanding of the legal construction of the global political economy. The Article argues that UNCITRAL, as an institution, is best understood as a “site” for normative modeling through which legal norms, principles, and standards for the global political economy are articulated. At stake in UNCITRAL’s work is influence over the definition of normative standards that shape legal rules throughout the global economy, definitions over which actors with political, economic, and professional stakes compete intensely to control. These actors include states, corporate and industry representatives, legal experts and professionals, and other public and private international organizations. Without significant institutional resources of its own, UNCITRAL acts only when it is mobilized or “enrolled” by these actors.

Two features of UNCITRAL’s practice—the variety of forms through which it articulates legal norms and the unique political structures through which it works—make it increasingly attractive to resource-rich actors attempting to mold the law that governs contemporary international commerce. These features also enable UNCITRAL to draw simultaneously on political and technical standards of legitimacy for its work, further increasing its value for these actors. Increasingly, however, claims about the legitimacy of UNCITRAL’s work as global standards of law have come under internal and external critiques. The dynamics of


5. See id.

6. A normative model may be defined as “a prescriptive model which evaluates alternative solutions to answer the question, ‘what is going on?’ and suggests what ought to be done or how things should work according to an assumption or standard.” BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/normative-model.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).

7. Steve Charnovitz, The Relevance of Non-State Actors to International Law, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 543, 544–48 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005) (advancing the notion that many international organizations function as arenas for action rather than actors themselves).

8. See discussion infra Part IV.
these claims and criticisms provide insight into larger questions regarding the substance and control over the legal rules governing global commerce.

I. NORMATIVE MODELING IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

In their magisterial work on the regulation of the global economy, Braithwaite and Drahos note that the constitution of business regulation on the global level is a complex process involving various agents, mechanisms, and locations.9 The key agents in this process are major states, large corporate organizations, certain international institutions, key business organizations, and legal and business professionals acting in organizations or as individual “policy entrepreneurs.”10 With rare exceptions, these actors share the ability to mobilize significant resources to engage mechanisms to advance their priorities and to catalyze projects for structuring the global political economy.11 The most important of these mechanisms include military and economic coercion, reciprocal adjustment, systems of reward, and modeling.12 The central pattern is one in which various agents employ a number of mechanisms that interact with one another to shape the “contest of principles” governing the scope and direction of specific areas of regulation.13 These contests play out in a variety of locations, or “sites,” where regulations are defined and enforced.14 These locations span the transnational, international, state, regional, and local level and can be of a public, private, or hybrid character. Given the variety and shifting nature of sites of regulatory practice, the most effective actors are ones that are able to “forum shift” among these sites, galvanizing support and advancing a common regulatory project.15

11. See generally Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 9, at 27–28, 475–06.
12. See id. at 532–49.
14. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights 69–70 (2006) (referring to “global cities” as key sites for innovation in the global economy. More generally, a “site” can refer to any institutional context for rule or law-making, interpretation, and enforcement.).
Normative modeling, in which actors attempt to define principles, standards, and rules that guide regulatory practices, plays a particularly important role in shaping global business law and regulation, one that is often unrecognized. Such modeling is identified as an “important” mechanism of globalization in every field of business regulation as analyzed by Braithwaite and Drahos—a status few other mechanisms can claim. But special care is needed in discussing normative modeling, as discussions of this process often begin with flawed assumptions. Here, it is necessary to clarify three important starting points for this discussion.

First, the process or mechanism of normative modeling should be understood as one that takes place simultaneously with, and often as part of, an attempt to use other mechanisms of regulatory globalization. Thus, coercive power and/or strategies of economic reward are often embodied in attempts at normative modeling, and advocates of particular normative models often try to engage actors with coercive or reward-based resources to help advance their agendas for shaping dominant models in a given area of regulation. As Braithwaite and Drahos put it, “modeling is patterned according to configurations of power.” In order to capture this interaction, they draw on the concept of “enrollment,” which refers to the ways actors using different mechanisms are continually looking to mobilize each other to pursue projects of mutual interest.

The second point is that normative modeling is usually driven by transnational coalitions, linking state power, private interests, and specif-
ic (in this case legal) expertise. 23 Scholars often emphasize, with good reason, the role of formal public institutions and organizations as the main vehicles through which norms are articulated, enforced, and legitimized. 24 But norms develop and consolidate in a variety of sites, as normative entrepreneurs 25 continually search for vehicles onto which they can attach their preferred models, principles, and rules. Thus, in the area of international economic law, norms can be modeled and diffused through standard contracts, 26 common practices in markets and industries, 27 the work of law firms and bar associations, 28 court decisions, 29 and legal scholarship, 30 as well as through the activities of public institutions at the national and international levels. 31 Normative entrepreneurs, who may be located in public, private, or expert positions, work continually to engage various mechanisms to enroll a variety of actors and sites into specific modeling projects. 32


25. See Kingdon, supra note 10. The role of normative (and/or policy) entrepreneurs is discussed in detail in Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 9, at 18–26.


32. Although the focus of this Article is on the work of one public institution, UNCITRAL’s role in normative modeling cannot be fully understood unless it is placed in the context of these and other settings in which norms are developed and diffused. Indeed, it is the manner in which UNCITRAL’s products and processes fit in with these dynamics of normative modeling in private international law that made it an increasingly influential site in the development of commercial law.
The final starting point is the recognition of the role of legitimacy in the fate of normative modeling projects for the global economy. In his classic and still widely influential essay, Mark Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” While actors and coalitions invest in legal norms to advance their power and interests, the success of specific legal rules, standards, codes, and principles depends on their ability to claim some kind of legitimacy independent of these actors’ motivations.

In the context of global economic governance, legal rules and regimes are usually justified in two ways. One approach is political, emphasizing the scope of affected interests incorporated into the processes by which models are developed and adopted. In this approach, legal regimes are considered legitimate to the extent that they are acceptable to the agents most impacted by their operation and the extent to which they conform to widely accepted principles of regulation. The other approach is a technical one, in which regimes are judged by the sophistication of their drafting, their likelihood of attaining the regulatory ends desired, and the involvement of leading experts in their development. In the context of private international law, for example, legal regimes are often justified by their proven ability to facilitate the mobility of capital and encourage investment that produces increases in wealth. This Ar-

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34. For a systematic analysis of this relationship, and of the role of international legal discourse in constituting and shaping legitimacy claims, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (1989).
35. This Article employs the distinction between “political” and “technical” legitimacy claims because it conforms to the language used by the participants in UNCITRAL’s work, and serves best to illuminate the forms in which emerging challenges to the legitimacy of this work have been articulated and advanced. But see Suchman, supra note 33, at 577–84 (distinguishing between “pragmatic,” “moral,” and “cognitive” forms of legitimacy claims).
36. This notion is equivalent to Majone’s classic definition and discussion of “procedural legitimacy.” See Giandomenico Majone, Regulatory Legitimacy, in Regulating Europe 291–94 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 294 (although Majone categorizes this dimension as “substantive legitimacy”).
39. See, e.g., Harold S. Burman, The Commercial Challenge in Modernizing Secured Transactions Law, 8 UNIF. L. REV. 347 (2003) (Burman is Assistant Legal Advisor for Private International Law in the U.S. Department of State, and has been the U.S. repre-
article postulates that UNCITRAL’s work has proven itself amenable to both kinds of legitimacy claims, and this has been a key factor in its growing influence and the willingness of resource-rich actors to invest in its work.

Legitimacy claims, however, are fluid and always subject to contestation and change.40 As understandings of legitimacy evolve, claims that were once unchallenged come under pressure from old and new actors as well as the institutions that utilize them.41 Two kinds of processes that generate these challenges are especially relevant to the case of UNCITRAL. First, initially shared understandings of the way an institution works can be shattered as the evolution of the institution gradually transforms its patterns of operation and/or its work product begins to move in directions unanticipated by and unacceptable to key actors. Second, the growing interactions between different sites in the field of global business regulation and the degree to which any particular site conforms to a given understanding of what makes the rule-making legitimate can generate challenges to these accepted understandings.42 Both kinds of processes are currently at work in the context of UNCITRAL, raising key questions regarding the larger process of the constitution of legal regimes for global commerce.

40. See Suchman, supra note 33.
41. Id. at 585–99 (recognizing these dynamics and identifying the challenge of “legitimacy management” as central to the success of any organization). In effect, this Article suggests that UNCITRAL is now engaged in just such management.
42. See David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles, Mining, Communities and the World Bank 292–93 (2007). This is often referred to as a situation of “interlegality,” which Szablowski defines as “the overlapping or ‘intertwined’ action of different legal orders upon a single social situation.” Id. For the centrality of this phenomenon in the literature on transnational legal pluralism, see Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (2010) (describing and analyzing various law-making regimes in the transnational arena).
II. UNCITRAL: HISTORY AND WORK

A. The Origins of UNCITRAL

The impetus behind the creation of UNCITRAL, in 1966, must be put into two different contexts: the history of private law harmonization since the 1890s, and the changing political economy of international trade in the mid-1960s. The project to “harmonize” or “unify” private international commercial law emerged in the 1890s, as a by-product of the intensifying economic interchanges of that period, sometimes called the “first wave” of globalization. It was a project driven by legal academics, jurists, and politicians almost exclusively from the world of Continental European “civil law” states. The idea behind this project was the contention that diversity of legal rules and procedures in such fundamental areas as contracts, property, and jurisdiction acts as a hindrance to deeper economic interaction across the states. It was argued that by “harmonizing” or “unifying” law in these key areas, economic integration would be facilitated, which in turn would lead to more peaceful relationships between states.

The immediate impact of this project was limited, but it did leave both an institutional and programmatic legacy. The institutional legacy was the formation of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1893 and of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. The formation of UNCITRAL was a direct result of the need to address the practical problems that emerged from the first wave of globalization, particularly in the context of international trade and investment. UNCITRAL was established in 1966 to facilitate the harmonization and unification of private international law, with a focus on the major areas of international commerce, namely, contracts, commercial transactions, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

The following discussion, which is part of a larger research project by the Author on the politics of private international law, draws on the study of UNCITRAL documents, interviews with participants, observation of UNCITRAL Working Groups, and on a small but growing body of scholarly work which is presented in subsequent notes. Interviews with UNCITRAL Officials and participants were, in most cases, conducted on the agreement that the individuals would not be named, but that their position could be indicated in ways that did not compromise the confidentiality of the views expressed. This Article follows that practice.

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45. CUTLER, supra note 44, at 207–11.

46. Id.

47. Note that “harmonization” of law means adjusting the rules of different legal systems so that they follow the same substantive principles in specific areas, even if they remain distinctive in some features; “unification” means that different states agree to adopt exactly similar rules in specific areas of law, usually through international conventions. See David. W. Leebron, Lying Down With Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FAIR TRADE? 41 (Jagdish Baghwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).

Law (“UNIDROIT”) in 1926, which created stable fora through which experts and government officials could sustain the project over time and extend the scope and depth of their own networks of interested parties. Both institutions remain active today and indeed are involved in increasingly substantial cooperation with each other and with UNCITRAL. Perhaps more importantly, the discourse and institutions created in this period generated a stable core of personnel and ideas that sustained the project of harmonization/unification, and established the basic framework for thinking about the value, purposes, and strategies for such projects.

The second part of the context of UNCITRAL’s formation was the changing politics and economics of the post-World War II global system. On the one hand, by the mid-1960s, the quickly increasing number of newly independent “developing” states began to take an active presence in multilateral discussions of issues surrounding the structure of the international economy. Much of this activity focused on the United Nations (“UN”) system, which offered access and voice unavailable to these states in other contexts. In the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”), and especially the UN Commission on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), developing states began pushing an aggressive program demanding aid and investment from developed states and criticizing key structural elements of the international economic order. At the same time, the United States began to engage deeply in these debates at the multilateral level, perceiving this as a necessary aspect of the Cold War era competition for influence among the newly independent states. The US and its allies, however, faced structural impediments with...
the existing UN agencies. The one state/one vote rule, the dominance of critical perspectives in UNCTAD, and the general politicization of the debates in most UN fora limited US influence and led to a search for alternative institutional arenas in which to advance its interests in promoting a generally capitalist, market-oriented development agenda.\(^{55}\)

UNCITRAL was created in response to this dilemma, though its emergence was rather circuitous.\(^{56}\) The starting point was the adoption, in 1958 by a United Nations diplomatic conference, of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”).\(^{57}\) The New York Convention marked the first time that the US government, and key elements of the US legal community, played an active role in advancing the reformation and harmonization of elements of private commercial law as a tool for furthering global economic integration.\(^{58}\) The quick adoption and initial success of the New York Treaty led the US and key European and Latin American states to explore the notion of creating a formal institution to incorporate the harmonization/unification project within the UN system.\(^{59}\)

In 1965, the Secretary General commissioned a study of the need for and potential of a UN Commission to advance this project,\(^{60}\) led by Clive Schmitthoff—the leading British authority on the law of international trade—and including legal experts from developed and developing states.\(^{61}\) The resulting “Schmitthoff Report”\(^{62}\) formed the basis for a con-

\(^{55}\) See CUTLER, supra note 44; see also Interview with U.S. Officials active in UNCITRAL’s work, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Sept. 21 Interview].

\(^{56}\) See generally CUTLER, supra note 44 (providing an overview of this process).


\(^{59}\) See CUTLER, supra note 44.

\(^{60}\) For example, the harmonization and unification of the law of international trade.


sensus that led to the creation of UNCITRAL by the General Assembly in December, 1966. At its foundation, UNCITRAL was given the responsibility to oversee the further development of the New York Convention and to explore other areas where legal harmonization seemed possible. The first Chair of the Commission was John Honnold, an American legal expert with significant connections to the harmonization/unification expert community.

The consensus leading to UNCITRAL was the product of a unique confluence of interests that led a number of actors to invest resources in the creation of a new organization. For key non-European states—the US, some developing states, and even the Soviet bloc—UNCITRAL provided a forum for advance commercial law reform projects outside of the West European-dominated fora of the Hague and UNIDROIT. For the US and its allies in some key developing states in particular, UNCITRAL offered a forum in which they could pursue market-oriented legal change outside of the heavily “ politicized” and confrontational UNCTAD environment. For the legal experts committed to the harmonization project, UNCITRAL most likely presented an opportunity to revive their fortunes by attaching their work to the wider legitimacy of the UN system. In effect, UNCITRAL was the result of a decision by the US and key developed and developing states that the project of private law harmonization/unification could be used to advance their development projects, but only if pursued in a new, more inclusive, and differently structured organizational context. UNCITRAL’s creation, then, amounted to the creation of a new forum to allow the pursuit of a forum-shifting strategy.


64. Id.

65. This alliance between key states and a cohesive international network of legal experts has been central to all of UNCITRAL’s subsequent work. More generally, the harmonization project can be seen (in Sassen’s terms) as a residual “ capability” created for one set of purposes but then mobilized for the creation of a different type of regime. See Sassen, supra note 14, at 37–38.


67. See id.; see also Spero & Hart, supra note 53.

68. See Cutler, supra note 44; see also Spero & Hart, supra note 53.

B. Forms of Work

How does UNCITRAL “do” normative modeling? UNCITRAL’s current understanding of its mission mixes the mandate to “harmonize” and “unify” law with an emphasis on the development and understanding of commercial law that embodies “best practice” standards for the promotion of trade and investment across national borders in the context of divergent legal traditions.70 As the organization’s “Frequently Asked Questions” (“FAQ”) page asserts:

“Harmonization” and “unification” of the law of international trade refers to the process through which the law facilitating international commerce is created and adopted. International commerce may be hindered by factors such as the lack of a predictable governing law or out-of-date laws unsuited to commercial practice. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law identifies such problems and then carefully crafts solutions which are acceptable to States having different legal systems and levels of economic and social development.71

UNCITRAL’s goal is to become one of the leading, authoritative international bodies in this area and to advance standards that are widely accepted by states and private agents in the global economy.72 In order to accomplish these goals, UNCITRAL generates four different types of work products:73

1. The generation of a multilateral treaty (known as a “Convention”), which is adopted by the Commission and then put out for ratification by states. By signing and then approving such a Convention, a state commits to changing aspects of domestic law to conform to a common international approach; it can do this by applying the exact same provisions (unification) or by adopting rules that embody a general set of principles (harmonization).


71. See UNCITRAL FAQ, supra note 1.

72. See id.; see also UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1–3.

73. UNCITRAL breaks down its work into a greater number of categories and organizes them differently. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4. This Article highlights these four types of work products because they are the most important forms in which UNCITRAL articulates legal norms and they have the most impact on international commercial law.
2. The promulgation of a “Model Law” that states can adopt or use to reform specific elements of commercial law within their jurisdictions, such as insolvency or sales contracts. These models tend to reflect a general consensus on the key principles and structures that should govern an area of commercial law across legal systems and can be more or less flexible.

3. The development of a “Legislative Guide” to aid states in the development or reform of a particular area of commercial law. These are less specific and structured than Model Laws; they are developed either to aid in the interpretation of a model law or to address an area where it proves too difficult to resolve the distinctions between national legal systems into a common structure. In addition, Legislative Guides are at times used by other international and regional institutions (especially lending banks and agencies) as part of the conditions for aid to specific states.

4. The “Model Rules” for use by private commercial actors in the design of contracts, in those areas where states allow businesses autonomy to construct their own rules of action.74

This variety of strategies allows UNCITRAL the flexibility to approach particular areas of law in ways most likely to gain support from member states and private actors and thus secure the legitimacy and authority of the institution.

These tools and strategies emerged over time through a process of trial and error. In its first few years of existence, UNCITRAL focused primarily on organizing itself, defining key directions for work, and identifying important constituencies that would support that work.75 It was only in the mid-1970s that it began to generate a series of work products that addressed substantial issues in international commercial law.76 The two most important and successful of these were the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) (1980)77 and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976).78

74. See generally id. A fifth approach is the development of “Legal Guides” to clarify the issues presented in attempts to harmonize or “modernize” particular areas of law. While important as part of the effort to develop common understandings of legal questions, these Guides are usually part of the process of working towards the development of one of the other four instruments.

75. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52, at 481–88.

76. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (citing the most important of these products).


The CISG provides a common model for contracts involving commerce across national jurisdictions. It has been ratified by seventy-four states, varying from key developed economies to a variety of developing economies across the world. The CISG addresses the classic “conflicts of law” problem in international commerce, which has been at the heart of the harmonization movement from its beginnings. A number of subsequent Conventions, in such areas as international payments and the transport of goods by sea, address similar problems. The negotiations of such multilateral Conventions, which aim to harmonize law directly through a binding treaty, illustrate UNCITRAL’s use of the traditional method of the harmonization movement.

The Arbitration Rules are designed as a means for private parties to incorporate into contracts the designation of arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism of choice. They are now one of the most commonly used arrangements in international commercial arbitration. This work was a natural outcome of UNCITRAL’s role as the guardian of the New York Convention, but also amounted to a new strategy for shaping commercial law. Instead of focusing on changing state-promulgated rules, the Arbitration Rules attempt to shape commercial law by influencing legal practice “on the ground” through the promulgation of rules private parties are free to incorporate into their contracts, but that are ultimately enforced by states through the New York Convention. The success of the Arbitration Rules demonstrated the potential for such a strategy and bolstered UNCITRAL’s authority in the area of commercial arbitration.

79. See CISG, supra note 77.
81. CUTLER, supra note 44, at 207–25.
82. See William K. Slate II et al., UNCITRAL: Its Workings in International Arbitration and a New Model Conciliation Law, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 73, 78–82 (2004). Other important commercial arbitration rules include those of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the rules promulgated by specialized institutions such as the London Court of Arbitration (“LCIA”), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and the American Arbitration Association. Id. The UNCITRAL Rules have also become, along with the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) of the World Bank, one of the two major frameworks for investor-state dispute arbitration. See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
83. Slate et al., supra note 82, at 82–88, 106.
84. UNCITRAL has recently issued a revised version of the Arbitration Rules, designed to incorporate developments in the intervening decades. See G.A. Res. 31/98, supra note 78 (as revised in 2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-e.pdf. It should be noted that UNCITRAL itself does not conduct or supervise arbitra-
C. From Harmonization to “Modernization” of Law

After the completion of the CISG and the Arbitration Rules, the Secretariat and select members identified other areas of commercial law—such as property, insolvency, and credit—that were within UNCITRAL’s ambit to address. After some initial consideration in the late 1970s, however, UNCITRAL concluded that the political and technical challenges of addressing such issues were too great. However, UNCITRAL concluded that the political and technical challenges of addressing such issues were too great. But this context changed in the 1980s and 1990s, allowing UNCITRAL to significantly broaden the scope of its work and thus its importance as an institution. While UNCITRAL participants seem surprised and even bemused by this development, in retrospect it can be hypothesized that changing patterns of the global political economy created this opening. The spread of broadly neo-liberal, market-opening norms and projects, the growing focus on national institutions and rules as “non-tariff” barriers in trade politics, a growing concern with the “rule of law,” and the impact of all of these in shifting development strategies helped to put a whole range of issues of national commercial law on the agenda of international institutions and induced states to engage (albeit hesitantly) in projects aimed at establishing global legal standards. Importantly, the deepening integration of markets, production, and investment flows “on the ground” seemed to make more pressing the action to coordinate legal and policy responses to the regulatory and crisis-management challenges that they presented.

This proved a crucial turning point for UNCITRAL. In the early 1990s, key actors in the initiative to deepen global economic integration and

85. See Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 321–22 (referring to the results of UNCITRAL’s discussion of the issue in the late 1970s: “The completed report, however, suggested that the divergence among legal systems was then too great to permit unification in the area . . . As a result, UNCITRAL concluded that unification was not at that time feasible, and postponed its work in the area of security law.”); see also Spiros V. Bazinas, UNCITRAL’s Work in the Field of Secured Transactions, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 211, 211–18 (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds., 1998).
86. Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 322.
87. Regarding the issue of secured transactions in particular, see Burman, supra note 39 (“In the mid-1990s, the accepted wisdom in the field had placed several areas in the ‘impossible’ list, consigned to the dustbin because of deep differences in legal traditions, the uses of commercial law, and legislative and cultural differences in changing long-standing law. Secured finance was near the top of that list.”).
89. See Wiener, supra note 31, at 17–18; see also Leebron, supra note 47.
create new frameworks to secure this project—in particular, a coalition led by the US, sectors of the financial and investment communities, and legal professionals engaged in the reform of commercial law—were looking for new opportunities and sites through which they could advance their work. The initial success of UNCITRAL’s limited agenda, they believed, justified investing resources to incorporate it into efforts at commercial law reform that went well beyond the traditional areas and strategies of legal harmonization. By the late 1990s, UNCITRAL’s work had expanded to include such areas as insolvency, electronic commerce, secured transactions, government procurement, and the role of private financing in infrastructure projects.

The form and self-understanding of UNCITRAL’s work changed as well. In light of the reach and complexity of the legal work UNCITRAL now undertook, it needed to shift its focus away from the bulky and often difficult to negotiate Conventions, and take advantage of the alternative and more recently developed tools of model laws and legislative guides to help shape the direction of national law reform. These could be offered as standards of legal best-practices, circulating among key actors to hopefully shape legal reform efforts in more indirect but effective ways than formal Conventions. By the late 1990s, the use of model laws and legislative guides became the preferred mode of operation for UNCITRAL in such key areas as Insolvency and Secured Transactions law.

More generally, UNCITRAL’s understanding of its mission was transformed into one of promoting modernization and reform of commercial law in all of its aspects. Indeed, the theme of UNCITRAL’s fortieth anniversary Congress in 2007 was “Modern Law for Global Com-

90. See sources cited infra note 91 and accompanying text. This interpretation is confirmed by an interview with a UNCITRAL official. Interview with UNCITRAL Official, in Vienna, Austria (Sept. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 6 Interview].


92. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4.


94. On the evolution of these strategies in the context of insolvency law, see Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52.
merce." As this title and the proceedings indicated, UNCITRAL currently sees its mission extending well beyond, and taking a different shape than, the classic program of legal harmonization/unification. What do “modernization” and “reform” mean in this context? While never clearly explained in official documents, participants share the understanding that the current role of UNCITRAL is to develop and diffuse principles and rules of commercial law that are most appropriate to the promotion and deepening of global economic integration as it has taken form since the late 1970s. This “mission” is supported by the belief that there are certain particularly effective and “efficient” commercial legal


96. This interpretation is based on observations and reports of the Congressional proceedings. See Nicholas Michel, Under-Sec’y-Gen. for Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel, Opening Address at Modern Law for Global Commerce: Congress to Celebrate the 40th Annual Session of UNCITRAL (July 9, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/USG_Michel.pdf.

97. E-mail correspondence between author and UNCITRAL Official (Dec. 21, 2005) (on file with author); see also id. Particularly important are Jernej Sekolec’s comments, at the time the Secretary of UNCITRAL. See Jernej Sekolec, Commentary, Congressional Roundtable on Process and Methods of International Rule-Making, (July 9, 2007) (on file with author).

98. Throughout UNCITRAL’s deliberations and personal interviews with participants and officials, the idea of “efficiency” has been used in a number of related but distinct ways. The most common usage is to suggest that legal rules and frameworks are most efficient if they are most successful at attracting investment to a given national economy. This is often explained in a manner drawn from the literature on the competition of legal regimes, with the added note that the efficiency of a legal regime is equivalent to its competitiveness in attracting the support of actors in financial markets. The presence of private investment, in this approach, indicates that investors believe in the superiority of the legal regime for protection of investor rights (this claim was often used by supporters of U.S. legal models who claimed that these proved most efficient at generating capital for private investment, at least prior to the current economic crisis). At other times, though, the claim of efficiency is articulated more broadly as the likelihood that a given legal regime will promote economic growth in a given economy, though it seems to be understood that the generation of private investment is central to that growth. A third and usually minor theme in the discussion of efficiency emphasizes reducing the costs and complexity of a legal regime, which would then encourage and facilitate greater private economic activity. The ultimate hope and claim is that UNCITRAL can use its broad representation and mobilization of expertise to identify the most efficient—and thus “advanced”—legal models and present them in a form attractive to those aiming at legal reform.
structures that will better allow all states, especially developing states, to participate effectively in the global economy. By creating useful models and guides that embody these structures with the legitimacy of international support, the hope is that UNCITRAL can play a key role in shaping a positive evolution in the world’s commercial law systems.

An example of this kind of process is UNCITRAL’s work on Insolvency law. Faced with the increasing challenge of insolvencies that involve corporations with assets in a number of states, in 1997 UNCITRAL developed a “Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.” This development aimed at helping states harmonize legal frameworks to smooth the work of addressing these complex issues. As insolvency became an increasingly central issue for advanced and developing states, and a key aspect of commercial law reform efforts, UNCITRAL then took on the more daunting task of developing a “modern” framework for the whole spectrum of insolvency law. Despite the deep differences between legal orders, this task succeeded in the promulgation of a Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, in 2004. This Guide has been a significant success, and is frequently used as a reference and model by national, regional (the EU), and international (IMF, World Bank) actors as they develop more robust and “modern” insolvency structures.

III. EXPLAINING UNCITRAL’S SUCCESS

On the basis of this type of work, UNCITRAL has emerged as the leading public international institution for the development and diffusion of norms in private commercial law. Although the Hague Conference and UNIDROIT remain active—and all three have begun to work more cooperatively in recent years—UNCITRAL has become the most influential of the group, able to mobilize more support and to shape the

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99. See Burman, supra note 39.
100. See Buxbaum, supra note 39.
103. See Halliday, supra note 70; Halliday & Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law, supra note 102.
agenda for international commercial law reform.\textsuperscript{105} How can this success be explained? As previously suggested, UNCITRAL is best conceptualized as a “site” rather than an organization, which can be mobilized by different public and private actors working in and through its structure. The key question, then, is why resource-rich actors, such as states, private businesses, other international institutions, and professional networks, have chosen to invest resources in UNCITRAL.\textsuperscript{106}

There are two key parts to the answer. The first derives from the structure of the world of private international commercial legal practice, in which UNCITRAL’s strategy for developing normative models and principles to be diffused in varied and subtle ways proves particularly effective. The second part of the answer is the particular structure and working methods of UNCITRAL, which distinguish it from most other international organizations in ways that can both empower resource-rich actors and allow them to reach agreements that may not be possible in other contexts.

\textbf{A. Where and How Does UNCITRAL Fit in Private International Law?}

The world of private international commercial law is plural, multi-layered, and dynamic.\textsuperscript{107} It is shaped by two key principles: the existence of multiple and often overlapping legal regimes covering particular areas of commercial practice; and significant contractual autonomy for private

\textsuperscript{105} These claims are supported by interviews with a variety of participants in international commercial law reform and harmonization efforts. This argument should be put in context. First, it is a judgment of the relative impact of UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference as the three public institutions devoted primarily to private commercial law reform at the international level. It is not meant to compare UNCITRAL’s import with that of private bodies that work on commercial law—i.e., the ICC, or the other public international organizations, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), the World Bank, the Basle Committee—which can powerfully shape private commercial law even though this is not their primary task. Second, it is a judgment focusing on the development of norms, not the success of their implementation in particular contexts.

\textsuperscript{106} See Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 9, at 52–62 (using a similar approach in formulating the question of why resource-rich actors, such as states, private businesses, other international institutions, and professional networks, chose to invest resources in particular law making projects and institutions).

actors aiming to shape the law that governs their relationships. The evolution of international commercial law is driven by a dynamic process in which actors, and especially networks of actors, in the field—states, corporations, professionals, firms and associations—constantly compete to shape the substance of law across a variety of law-making and law-applying sites. National codes, standard industry practices, contractual innovations developed by law firms, and interpretive traditions can be adopted or discarded by commercial agents in the pursuit of business priorities. As a result, different agents and institutions work continually to try to shape the choices of private and public actors, whether to increase their own profit, prestige, and influence on conceptions of proper legal practice (private corporations, law firms, arbitral institutions, bar associations, legal experts), secure the cohesion and stability of commercial practice (industry associations), or to order commercial practice in ways that advance national and global priorities (states). The most successful agents or networks are able to work simultaneously in a number of fora to shape the direction of commercial legal practice according to their own goals and priorities.

How does UNCITRAL fit into this context? The key is UNCITRAL’s move away from a focus on standard harmonization treaties and toward the development of flexible formats in which its work is developed and presented. The “technologies” of model laws, legislative guides, and model rules are much more fluid and flexible than those of formal conventions. It is easier for resource-rich actors to get their preferences embodied in such statements of global legal standards than in formal treaties, and they can then use these products to shape the behavior of public and private actors in a variety of nuanced ways. As a result,
UNCITRAL’s work product is more useful for actors or networks that need normative “tools” that can be advanced in different forms and, to different degrees, in the varying contexts in which legal norms are developed and enforced. For instance, supporters of the Model Law and Legislative Guide on Insolvency can advance them through a variety of strategies, which include, inter alia, convincing commercial actors and industry associations to lobby their home states to reform the law, encouraging international and regional lending institutions to incorporate these standards as conditions on lending capital to states, training legal professionals from developing states to advocate legal reform consistent with these principles, and advancing these norms via the various informal international financial policy-making bodies. In the same regard, UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions is emerging as a reference for national and international institutions promoting the reform of credit and property law in emerging market states and, thus, serves as a vehicle through which supporters can enroll these institutions. Because these are not formal treaties, their audience is not limited to states, nor must they be adopted in toto to exert significant influence on the development of commercial law. They are thus more useful for agents attempting to structure legal practice in the fluid fields of private international law, allowing them to widely and subtly spread a set of common standards and principles.

As presented above, UNCITRAL’s work is evidence that the Commission is an increasingly valuable and important institution or site through which resource-rich actors can invest in the shaping of international commercial law. Its products constitute respected and influential statements of existing global standards and principles of commercial law and provide a crucial vehicle for all actors in this area, while UNCITRAL’s flexibility provides key tools or technologies for navigating the fluid and varied area of commercial law. The value and impact of UNCITRAL’s work comes as much from its functionality, as from its formal promulgation, and the innovative use of legal norm technologies make its products much more useful to actors who possess the resources to advance their adoption in the variety of private and public international law contexts.

mentalisms in Global Lawmaking]; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 93, at 72.


117. See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, supra note 114; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 93, at 72.
B. The Structure and Political Dynamics of UNCITRAL

UNCITRAL’s success is also due to its structure as a site of normative development, which has a number of unique features. These features facilitate the “enrollment” of the institution by agents of legal modeling and enhance the perceived legitimacy of its work. The basic features of UNCITRAL are straightforward. It is organized as a general commission that sets broad policy directions, a set of Working Groups that carry out much of the institution’s work, and a Secretariat that supports this work and links it with the broad policy goals of the commission. Its membership is elected by the UN General Assembly and is distributed across five regional groupings: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America/Caribbean, Western Europe and Other. Since 2004, sixty states have been members of the Commission, though for most of its history, UNCITRAL had only thirty-six permanent members. Each year, the entire Commission meets in a plenary session, which rotates between the UN headquarters in Vienna and New York. The Commission is served by a relatively small secretariat of legal experts/officers, which is part of the UN Office of Legal Affairs but has been based in Vienna since 1979.

Each Working Group is assigned a specific area of work—which changes when the Commission identifies new priorities—and is open to representatives from all member states. Moreover, each Group chooses a

118. See discussion infra Parts III.B–IV and accompanying notes.
119. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 3–7; UNCITRAL FAQ, supra note 1.
120. See sources cited supra note 119; see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 3–9.
123. UNCITRAL, Member States History, supra note 122.
124. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4.
125. As of August, 2010, there were fourteen permanent legal officers, including a division director of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, who serves as Secretary of UNCITRAL. E-mail correspondence between author and Sprios Bazinas, Senior Legal Officer, UNCITRAL Secretariat (Aug. 24, 2010) (on file with author).
Chair from participating delegations, and is assigned a legal officer from the Secretariat as its secretary. The Working Groups operate on the basis of “consensus” rather than voting, in which the Chair determines when a particular proposal or understanding embodies the preponderance of opinion among the state delegations. 127 The dynamics of the Working Groups are crucial to shaping UNCITRAL’s work and they are characterized by the following features: 128

1. While all member states are eligible to participate in each Group, only a relatively small set of states do so actively. Active states tend to be the same across the Groups, of which the US, France, Canada, and Germany, are usually the most prominent, although this list is not complete and there can be significant variations across Groups. The membership of the delegations chosen to participate in the Working Groups varies. The most active delegations involve representatives directly from the government ministries whose responsibilities include private international law generally and UNCITRAL in particular, and often include legal experts from academia and/or private practice, while the less active and influential are comprised of members of the state’s UN mission.

2. Various non-state actors are able to participate in the work of the Groups and often do so actively, though they do not have voting authority. Indeed, in some Groups, these actors are as well-prepared and active participants as the major state delegations. There are generally two kinds of non-state actors. The first are organizations of professionals with a broad concern for commercial law or expertise in a specific area of law—for example, the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the American Bar Association. 129 The second type of non-state actor are organizations of private business actors who play a central role in the areas of commerce likely to be affected by the proposals of the Group—such as the Commercial Finance Association.

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127. While voting is possible, it is avoided for fear of clarifying and hardening differences between members, and thus hindering the ability to make progress on the work of the Group. As one might guess, the determination of the “consensus” of a Group can be the source of much controversy, and has indeed become the focus of a current debate, which will be discussed in more detail below. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4.


590  **BROOK. J. INT’L L.**  [Vol. 36:2

("CFA")\textsuperscript{130} with the work on secured transactions and the International Federation of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals ("INSOL")\textsuperscript{131} with the work on insolvency. The participation of these actors goes beyond involvement in actual discussions. They actively consult with state delegations in the development of proposals, sponsor and participate in conferences dedicated to advancing and shaping the work of each Group,\textsuperscript{132} and are regularly solicited for expert advice by the legal experts of the Secretariat, to whom they often submit draft proposals for the Groups to consider.\textsuperscript{133}

3. Other significant regional and international organizations—whether they are part of the UN System\textsuperscript{134} or outsiders\textsuperscript{135}—are also able to attend discussions and are at times active in the behind the scenes work on key projects.\textsuperscript{136}

As a result, while the decisions of each Working Group (and UNCITRAL generally) are in the hands of state delegations, the actual work of each Group often takes the form of a relatively smooth interaction between state and non-state actors working on common problems. In light of the efforts made to include a variety of public and private actors, it is important to note the lack of transparency that attends much of UNCITRAL’s work. There is a paradox here. On the one hand, UNCITRAL is a public institution that is open to the participation of all UN members and that regularly publicly publishes reports and press re-


\textsuperscript{132} For a listing of the most important of these conferences or colloquia, see **UNCITRAL Colloquia**, U.N. **COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW**, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).

\textsuperscript{133} As noted in the discussion, infra, individual experts often serve on the delegations of member states. See source cited supra note 128.

\textsuperscript{134} Such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").

\textsuperscript{135} Such as the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Organization of American States.

\textsuperscript{136} For example, when the question of the use of intellectual property as security for lending emerged during the development of the Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions by UNCITRAL’s Working Group VI, the Commission began sustained discussions with WIPO officials for expert advice and to ensure that the proposals of the two groups moved in the same direction. For an account of this cooperation, see G.A. Res. A/CN.9, ¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG/VI/WP.39/Add.3 (July 20, 2009).
leases on its work (both in print and on its website). And, unlike other private international law-making institutions such as UNIDROIT and the Hague Conference, non-governmental organizations are actively encouraged to participate in UNCITRAL’s deliberations.137 On the other hand, a variety of subtle and not always intentional strategies work to limit its exposure beyond the small world of Working Group participants and direct constituencies. Access to the Working Groups’ meetings by Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) or observers is limited by the Secretariat to organizations considered to have relevant legal expertise in the specific area of work; in practice, this means organizations of expert practitioners and affected businesses.138 Members of these Groups, both states and non-state actors, rarely publicize the work of UNCITRAL beyond the same scope of actors believed to have a substantial interest and support for its work. There is little if any attempt to inform or involve in the work of the Groups potentially interested organizations outside of the world of commerce or commercial law—in such areas as consumer protection, sustainable development, labor, or human rights. As a result, for all practical purposes, UNCITRAL works behind a curtain of opacity.

What is the benefit of UNCITRAL’s sometimes opaque working structure? It provides a uniquely accommodating context in which resource-rich actors and networks can advance legal reform projects and work out stable understandings of legal principles with limited oversight. While the Commission is able to set and correct the overall direction of the Groups’ work, it leaves much of the detail and specific direction in the hands of the latter, and there has been little conflict between the Commission and UNCITRAL’s Working Groups.139 As a result, networks of interested and resourceful actors can use the Working Groups as a forum within which to elaborate, evaluate, and advance projects of legal norm definition and thus advance their own goals of legal reform. According to participants, UNCITRAL’s most successful work—in the areas of arb-

137. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 4. On the approach of the other private international law institutions, see Hague Conference, supra note 48; see also UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4.


139. In rare cases, such as the issue of investor-state arbitration discussed below, a Working Group will ask the Commission for specific guidance. In this case, the Group accepted and acted on the subsequent guidance with little debate (though the guidance followed the preferences indicated by the Group itself). See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of its Fiftieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/669 (Mar. 9, 2009).
tration, insolvency, and contractual engineering—is the product of such consensual negotiation among public and private experts.\footnote{140}{Interview with Senior UNCITRAL Officials, in Vienna, Austria (Sept. 6–7, 2005); Interview with Members of State and Observer Delegations to Meeting of Working Group VI, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Jan. 25–26, 2005); Interview with Members of Observer Delegations to UNCITRAL 40th Anniversary Congress, in Vienna, Austria (July 9–10, 2007).}

Moreover, the working methods of the institution contribute to bolstering the legitimacy claims made for its products.\footnote{141}{Kelly, supra note 3.} From this perspective, the active role of legal specialists and commercial actors is needed to make the work relevant, and their participation in the Working Groups is a further guarantee of the quality and usefulness of UNCITRAL’s legal products. Evidence from such areas as insolvency and arbitration indicate that this argument is indeed a significant one in shaping the reception of UNCITRAL’s work.\footnote{142}{See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 93; Halliday, supra note 70; Slate et al., supra note 82 (discussing the arbitration aspect with respect to UNCITRAL’s work).} It is this unique structure, then, that provides the other central reason that resource-rich actors have invested in UNCITRAL as a tool of commercial legal construction and change since the 1980s.

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\textbf{C. Questions of Power and Legitimacy}
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UNCITRAL’s increased prominence raises questions about the impact of power relationships in shaping its work and the extent to which these relationships underlie claims of its legitimacy. UNCITRAL participants and officials offer two arguments to support the value and legitimacy of the institution’s structure and the resulting legal products. On the one hand, supporters cite the broad spectrum of states involved in the organization, representing all major legal traditions and levels of economic development, and the consensus-based working method as signs of political legitimacy.\footnote{143}{Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90.} They claim that these characteristics ensure that UNCITRAL’s legal products represent not the specific issues or agendas of certain states, but the considered judgment of the international community.\footnote{144}{Id.} The result, they suggest, is that UNCITRAL’s work can claim unique weight and status as normative models in the international system.\footnote{145}{Id.} On the other hand, supporters emphasize the unique ways in which UNCITRAL incorporates expert knowledge into its deliberations;
this allows its products to carry the stamp of advanced, impartial, technical expertise, rather than the limits of pure political compromise. 

In both ways, claims about the working methods of UNCITRAL are crucial to narratives of its legitimacy. But there remains both a tension as well as an interdependence between the narratives of political balance and professional expertise.

What holds these narratives together? It is the notion that UNCITRAL’s structure and methods work effectively to negate the influence of unequal political power on its products. The combination of broad representation and a rule of consensus, as the first narrative suggests, means that one or a few powerful actors cannot impose their norms on the institution and its work. As a result, the second narrative explains, states are constrained to find legal principles, models, and norms that follow the most “advanced” legal thinking and practice in the world of international commerce. Of course, there are always elements of conflict and contention in the process of developing legal products, but the combination of political balance and the input of expertise accord solutions that are acceptable to all states. Moreover, the combined narrative potentially suggests that the political balance ensured by the working methods pushes legal experts and state delegations to advance commercial law in ways that make technical solutions workable within a variety of legal traditions and systems. UNCITRAL’s work in insolvency and secured transactions law has, in fact, attempted to do just this, consciously producing principles or models that can be adjusted to different legal contexts. Together, these narratives support the value of UNCITRAL

146. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 93, at 13; Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90; Sept. 21 Interview, supra note 55.
147. See Burman, supra note 39.
148. For a discussion of the products of UNCITRAL’s work, see UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1.

These instruments are negotiated through an international process involving a variety of participants, including member States of UNCITRAL, which represent different legal traditions and levels of economic development; non-member States; intergovernmental organizations; and non-governmental organizations. Thus, these texts are widely acceptable as offering solutions appropriate to different legal traditions and to countries at different stages of economic development.


Id.
as a context for problem solving, rather than a forum for the mobilization of power.\textsuperscript{150}

How well do these narratives fit the actual work and impact of UNCITRAL over the past two decades? As noted earlier, UNCITRAL’s work in this period centered on the promotion of the broad neo-liberal agenda of market opening and regulation that has dominated the global political economy since the 1980s. Many of UNCITRAL’s crucial constituencies widely support this agenda,\textsuperscript{151} but that is not to suggest that the agenda is simply the outcome of consensual agreement on the most “modern” or “advanced” legal thinking. As a site of normative modeling mobilized by transnational coalitions, during this period, UNCITRAL’s work has been led by a generally cohesive coalition dedicated to advancing US-based, or common law models, of law as the preferred standards for the global economy.\textsuperscript{152} Across a variety of areas of commercial law, this transnational coalition has dominated the agenda-setting of the Working Groups and taken the initiative in advancing normative models for “modern” commercial law. The following factors, shaping the global political economy more generally, facilitated the success of this project within UNCITRAL:

1. Beginning in the 1980s, the construction of the global commercial order was overwhelmingly driven by US corporations and markets, which brought with them US models of legal practice as the preferred

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\textsuperscript{150} As such, this narrative suggests that UNCITRAL’s work promotes the ideal of the “rule of law” rather than arbitrary power, and draws on the centrality of this norm in contemporary international relations. For an excellent review of the history and ambiguities of the “rule of law” concept and ideal, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, \textit{On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 1}, 1–6 (2004). \textit{But cf. The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal} (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (criticizing the link between the “rule of law” and international economic development projects).

\textsuperscript{151} These include key business and professional associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), the American Bar Association (“ABA”), the International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency, and Bankruptcy Professionals (“INSOL”), the Commercial Finance Association (“CFA”), and the International Bar Association (“IBA”), as well as major public international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”), and, of course, the major states involved in shaping UNCITRAL’s work, particularly the U.S. See generally Cohen, \textit{Constructing Power Through Law}, supra note 15; Cohen, \textit{The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law}, supra note 104; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, \textit{Harmonization and Modernization}, supra note 52; Block-Lieb & Halliday, \textit{Legitimation and Global Lawmaking}, supra note 93; Halliday, Pacewicz, & Block-Lieb, \textit{supra} note 128.

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way of doing business. As a result, the key legal dynamic during this period was the spreading influence of these US-based normative models across the sites of commercial law.\footnote{See Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 9, at 539–46.} The direction of UNCITRAL’s work, inevitably, reflected this trend.

2. During the same period, the US state was able to draw on its economic and geopolitical resources to exercise “structural power” over the global economic order.\footnote{Susan Strange, States and Markets 1, 236–37 (2d ed., 1988) (illustrating the concept of structural power in this context); Susan Strange, The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony, 41 Int’l Org. 551, 553–57 (1987); see also Sassen, supra note 14 (presenting a more contemporary examination of the same phenomenon).} Participating in the global economy meant adjusting to this power. The participants in UNCITRAL were constrained to do so in the same manner as all the major international economic institutions.\footnote{See Halliday & Carruthers, Globalizing Law, supra note 91.}

3. In the world of commercial legal expertise, this same era was one in which US legal ideas and models—especially those associated with the “law and economics” movement—diffused quickly throughout legal expert networks around the world.\footnote{See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus 1, 1–5 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/spencer_waller/3/ (discussing the law and economics movement, spreading from the U.S. to “other legal jurisdictions so that an increasing number of countries are creating, analyzing, and enforcing law with an eye toward its economic consequences . . . .”)).} This was partly the result of the need for expertise in US law (and, thus, the structural power noted above), the growth of global law firms based in the US, and also because of active efforts of the US legal community to spread its models through legal reform work. As a result, the trend of opinion among commercial legal experts represented in the work of UNCITRAL became heavily biased towards US models.\footnote{Cohen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law, supra note 104, at 75–76; see also Macdonald, supra note 30.}

The interesting twist, in light of this political economy, is that the dominance of US-based actors and models in UNCITRAL is not complete, and UNCITRAL’s influence and legitimacy depend on maintaining some check on any one dominant power.\footnote{See Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, supra note 114.} In certain areas of work the US-led coalitions encountered opposition from advocates of competing models of legal principles and practice, representing different national traditions and interests or Continental civil law concepts and practices more gener-
ally. As a result, many of UNCITRAL’s more important legal products, such as its work in insolvency and secured transactions, embody compromises that attempt to identify fundamental legal principles that can be adapted to different legal traditions.

It is in this context that the claims to legitimacy surrounding UNCITRAL’s working methods take on their importance. By allowing all resource-rich actors to participate, requiring the reaching of consensus, and avoiding much transparency, these methods facilitate the process of compromise and give all participants an interest in advancing the resulting products of each Working Group. This judgment is affirmed by participants and observers alike. The working structure of UNCITRAL, it seems, has accommodated US leadership while forcing the kinds of compromises that allow its products to be accepted as statements of a broader international normative consensus on commercial law. Combined with its innovations in the technologies of normative modeling, UNCITRAL has emerged as an institution whose work is supported by a wide scope of resource-rich actors and is, thus, of significant prestige and influence in shaping the commercial legal norms of the contemporary global economy.

IV. EMERGING CONFLICTS AND THE FUTURE OF UNCITRAL

Over the past four years, UNCITRAL’s success has generated an emerging critical dialogue regarding its work, from inside and outside of the organization. This dialogue takes form and focus in two critiques centered on UNCITRAL’s working methods: one arising from debates internal to the institution and one offered by external actors demanding

159. See, e.g., Cohen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law, supra note 104 (discussing secured transactions law in the context of competing legal principles, in opposition to US-based models).

160. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52 (discussing UNCITRAL’s work in the field of insolvency law); see also Halliday & Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law, supra note 102, at 1185-86; Cohen, Constructing Power Through Law, supra note 15 (discussing UNCITRAL’s work in the field of secured transactions law).

161. See Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90; see also Sept. 21 Interview, supra note 55; see generally Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 93; Kelly, supra note 3.

162. This dynamic is similar to the tension between “authority” and “legitimacy” that Koppell identifies as central to all global governance organizations. See KOPPELL, supra note 107, at 31–67 (exploring how the need for legitimacy leads many powerful actors (especially states) to accept outcomes that diverge to a degree from their immediate preferences).
inclusion into its work. These critiques, in turn, embody and illustrate the two forms of emergent challenges to the institution’s legitimacy narratives, discussed above. These challenges originate internally with active agents dissatisfied with the procedural and substantive direction in which UNCITRAL has moved and from outside the institution, resulting from the unintended use of UNCITRAL’s work product by agents outside of the traditional world of private commercial law. The responses of UNCITRAL and its key actors illustrate an attempt at what Suchman calls “legitimacy management,” and their direction and relative successes will determine the future of the institution.

The internal critique concerns the influence of non-state actors—particularly legal professionals and organized interests—on the work of the Groups and the Secretariat. In May, 2007, the French government circulated a memo (the “French memo”) suggesting that these actors exercise too much influence over the deliberations of the Groups, steering their work in directions counter to the goals of many participating states as well as exerting too much influence over the work of the Secretariat. The French memo highlights two aspects of this influence. First, it suggests that the ways in which the “consensus” procedure is used in the Working Groups often gives too much weight to the views of non-state actors, as chairs and participants tend to give the views of these actors the same weight as those of states. Second, the French memo criticizes what it believes is an over-reliance on non-state experts and interests in shaping work themes, drafting proposals, and otherwise dominating the “behind the scenes” work of the Secretariat. It also attacks the perceived use of experts and non-state actors in these ways by some states to advance their agendas.

The French memo raises two kinds of issues regarding the manner in which UNCITRAL operates. On the one hand, it amounts to a not-too-subtle swipe at the working methods of the US and some of its allies, who work closely with non-state actors to define the agenda, shape alter-

163. See discussion infra Part IV.
164. See supra text and accompanying notes 36–41.
165. See discussion infra Part IV.
166. Suchman, supra note 33, at 594.
167. See id.
169. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
170. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 10–15 (detailing France’s challenge of UNCITRAL’s work methods, specifically with respect to “UNCITRAL’s general lack of procedures for its ‘legislative’ process” as well as concerns regarding “consensus and participation.”).
natives, and mobilize support for their own legal agendas. On the other hand, the French document takes issue with the broader implications of the relationships between states, private actors, and experts that define the operation of the institution. According to this position, the lack of clear boundaries between public and private actors threatens the legitimacy of UNCITRAL’s work by both weakening the control of sovereign states over UNCITRAL’s work—the only actors able to claim any authority to make rules that govern the actions of citizens and institutions—and creating the appearance of the manipulation of UNCITRAL, under the guise of impartial international law-making, to impose rules that benefit only interested parties.\(^ \text{171} \)

The solution suggested by the French government is to establish clearer boundaries between the role of states and non-state actors through changing or clarifying the rules governing consensus, limiting the participation of non-state actors in public deliberations, and exerting more supervision over the role of non-state actors in the development of agenda items and substantive proposals.\(^ \text{172} \) This approach has been resisted by the US and its allies, who believe that UNCITRAL’s current working methods best facilitate the organization’s ability to work smoothly and to generate products likely to be supported by key public and private agents.\(^ \text{173} \) At this point, discussion continues regarding ways of clarifying UNCITRAL’s operating rules without fundamentally changing its actual work.

The external critique of UNCITRAL is currently not much more than a set of murmurs, but it pushes in a different direction.\(^ \text{174} \) This argument centers on the absence of any significant “civil society” presence in the work of UNCITRAL, which is at odds with much of the current work of the UN and indeed of some of the other major institutions involved in shaping the rules of international trade and investment.\(^ \text{175} \) In this debate,

\(^{171}\) See UNCITRAL, France’s Observations, supra note 168, ¶¶ 6–7.
\(^{172}\) Id. ¶¶ 5–8.
\(^{174}\) See, e.g., Cohen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law, supra note 104 (providing an example from the field of secured transactions law).
\(^{175}\) Consider, for example, the manner in which the World Bank has increasingly opened up its deliberations to consultations with various NGOs and the growing dialogue between the WTO and the NGO community. See Szabolowski, supra note 42; see, e.g., John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Reframing the Issue: The WTO Coalition on Intellectual Property and Public Health, 2001, in Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA 85, 85–114 (2006).
the Center for International Environmental Law ("CIEL") and the International Institute for Sustainable Development ("IISD"), both NGOs based in Geneva and Canada respectively, are two of the most vocal critics. Offering their critiques in the context of the ongoing work of Working Group II, to revise and update the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, their argument centers on the increasing use of the rules in investor-state arbitrations, particularly in the context of bi-lateral investment treaties that usually specify arbitration as the preferred means for dispute resolution. In this case, the adoption of UNCITRAL products in an increasingly controversial area of public international law—where the dynamics of political conflict and organizational participation are quite different than in private commercial law—has opened up UNCITRAL’s rules and processes to unanticipated challenges.

While not disputing the appropriateness of the current process for promulgating purely “private” arbitration rules, the CIEL/IISD position argues that the use of UNCITRAL rules in disputes to which states are parties means that these rules have significant impacts on the use of state power and authority, and thus on various groups in a state—such as consumers, workers, taxpayers, and public institutions—whose interests are directly affected by public policy decisions. But key features of these rules that may be appropriate for purely private commercial arbitrations—the general lack of transparency in arbitration processes, the limits on who can be involved in arbitration, the lack of publicity of decisions—are not appropriate when states and the public and sectoral interests affected by their policy choices are involved. This position suggests not only that some modification of the rules themselves is required, but also that the process of rule-making requires the involvement of organi-

176. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW. & INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (CIEL), REVISING THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS STATE ARBITRATIONS (Feb. 2007) [hereinafter REVISING THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES].
178. See REVISING THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 176, at 4 (“Arbitrations brought by an investor against a State under the terms of a treaty . . . differ significantly from commercial arbitrations involving only private parties because the former implicate the public interest in ways the latter do not.”).
zations that can represent the interests of the various publics whose fate is implicated in the results of public investor-state arbitrations.\textsuperscript{179}

This initiative takes a different direction than that of the French government. Rather than attempting to reassert state control over the work of UNCITRAL, the CIEL/IISD position argues that a legitimate process for international law-making must include the representatives of the diverse groups of interests and publics affected by the process and a broader set of experts and expertise.\textsuperscript{180} By implicitly rejecting the ability of states alone to provide this representation, it suggests an alternative approach to securing legitimacy for international institutions in the context of the evolving relationships between the public, private, and expert power and authority in the global context.

The fate of this initiative, though, remains uncertain. CIEL/IISD initially advanced this argument in 2007, in the context of a request for observer status at the then upcoming sessions of Working Group II.\textsuperscript{181} Despite their status as registered NGOs by ECOSOC, which required approval of their participation under UN rules, UNCITRAL initially rejected this request on the basis that neither group had “relevant” expertise in the area of arbitration law.\textsuperscript{182} After convincing the UNCITRAL secretariat to reverse this decision, CIEL and IISD attended the February, 2008 session of the Working Group, where they presented a proposal to include special rules for transparency in investor-state arbitrations in the revised UNCITRAL rules. While garnering the support of the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights,\textsuperscript{183} the proposal led to substantial debate over its appropriateness. The Group eventually decided not to pursue the issue and instead submitted it to the Commission.

\textsuperscript{179} Id. In this context, the CIEL/IISD position notes the manner in which the ICSID Arbitration Rules specifically address this issue, provide for more public information and access for investor-state arbitrations, and use these as a model for suggested reforms in the UNCITRAL rules. For further analysis of the ICSID Rules, see sources cited supra notes 176–177; see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).

\textsuperscript{180} Revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rule, supra note 176, at 9–14.

\textsuperscript{181} Id.; Telephone Interview with IISD Representative at the February 2008 Working Group Meeting (Oct. 29, 2007); Interview with State and Observer Delegation Members at the February 2008 Working Group Meetings (Feb. 5–7, 2008); see also Letter to Nicholas Michel, Under-Sec’y-Gen. for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of the U.N., CIEL-IISD (Jan. 30, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Nicholas Michel].

\textsuperscript{182} See Letter to Nicholas Michel, supra note 181.

meeting that summer for resolution. With the support of key states, particularly Canada, the Commission instructed the Working Group to return to the issue once it had completed revising the “purely commercial” aspects of the arbitration rules.

Both the internal and external critiques pose fundamental challenges to the work of UNCITRAL. From different directions, both positions threaten to upend a delicate balance between the power and influence of states, key international business interests and associations, and expert communities that have been essential to the operation and success of the institution in its current form. To return to terminology introduced earlier, UNCITRAL has become an important “site” of commercial law-making for the global economy because of the ways in which it has been mobilized by a set of complex public-private-expert networks to advance a particular agenda for commercial law. This does not mean that the ultimate authority over UNCITRAL is not in the hands of the member states, but that its success in advancing an agenda for legal reform has depended upon states working with and through such networks. A reassertion of state-centrality, as the French proposal demands, could damage these relationships and probably weaken the effectiveness and impact of the institution as an advocate for the kind of commercial legal reform it has pursued over three decades. In such circumstances, it is likely that key states that have supported this agenda will reduce their investment in UNCITRAL, as would the business and expert networks on which these states have depended for their success.

A move towards more transparency and the involvement of a wider range of NGOs and interests, as the CIEL/IISD suggests, would also change the dynamics of the institution, but in a somewhat different, perhaps more fundamental, direction. By breaking open the relative opacity and “below the radar” status of UNCITRAL, it would make it less amenable for relatively closed networks of power and expertise to use it as a site for developing law with minimal public oversight. In essence, it would reshape the institution in a model more common among international institutions in the UN system, which would likely make it both

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185. See id.
186. See discussion supra Part III.
187. UNCITRAL, France’s Observations, supra note 168, ¶¶ 6–7.
188. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, U.S. Response, supra note 173. A senior official in the U.S. delegation to UNCITRAL suggested in an interview, on the condition of anonymity, that the U.S. might shift its resources away from the institution and work in other law-making capacities if the French proposal (or a similar proposal) succeeded.
more transparent and less “effective” in generating norms and rules for international commercial law. Once again, it is likely that such a development would lead key actors to shift resources into other fora in the pursuit of their agendas. Ultimately, UNCITRAL’s fate will depend upon its ability to productively manage and incorporate these legitimacy challenges.

CONCLUSION

UNCITRAL’s success in shaping the world of commercial law over the past three decades is an important, if neglected, story for the study of how international institutions shape the legal frameworks for global commerce. UNCITRAL’s ability to insert itself innovatively in the world of commercial law-making, to re-create itself as a forum in which the most “modern” and “advanced” norms for commercial law are defined, and the persuasiveness with which it has justified its working methods as the product of a combination of political consensus and technical “expert” authority are all essential aspects of its emergence as a key vehicle for normative modeling in global economic governance. Together, these factors have created conditions in which most powerful actors in the area of international commercial law have decided to invest significant resources in shaping UNCITRAL’s work and sustaining the authority of the institution and its work product. As a result, UNCITRAL is now an important player in shaping the practices of transnational commercial law in such fields as arbitration, insolvency, investment, and secured transactions.

UNCITRAL’s work has been held together by a shared (but not always uncontested) commitment to developing new or “modernized” legal norms that promote greater market and financial integration in the global economy as well as the desire of most actors to preserve the flexibility and opaqueness of its working arrangements. To be sure, this cohesion is now coming under some strain, as are all the institutions working in the field of global economic governance, and the outcome of these challenges are uncertain. But it is worthwhile to emphasize two lessons to be learned, or questions that are posed, by UNCITRAL’s success:

189. See Karns & Mingst, supra note 88, at 95–145 (describing the UN system); see also Thomas G. Weiss et al., The United Nations and Changing World Politics 173–228 (2d ed., 1994); Koppel, supra note 107 (arguing that more procedural transparency and “due process” can hinder the effectiveness of international institutions).

190. See generally discussion supra Parts I–III.

191. See id.; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, supra note 114.
1. UNCITRAL has successfully constructed an account of its legitimacy that preserves a unique balance between political consensus and technical legal expertise. Underlying this account, though, is the assumption that the matters of private international commercial law are of little relevance to constituencies beyond states, international organizations, affected industries, and technical legal experts. Or, if there is a broader impact, it is the role of states to incorporate these in their decisions on the substance of UNCITRAL’s work. This has enabled the institution to limit participation in its deliberations in ways that are unavailable to many institutions of public international law. But commercial law can and does have significant impact on a variety of civil society constituencies—for example, communities, workers, and social movements—that have had little voice in its operations. As the developments surrounding investor-state arbitration indicate, the growing impact of UNCITRAL’s work may be forcing it deal more directly with these constituencies. The ways this will impact UNCITRAL’s structure, operation, work product, and ultimately, its claims to legitimacy, will prove a key test of its ability to continue to adapt to a changing global political context.

2. The structure of private international law-making, as illustrated by UNCITRAL’s evolution, raises some troubling issues regarding the role of power in the normative modeling that informs global economic governance. This observation takes off from Braithwaite and Drahos’ argument that normative modeling can be a mechanism whereby relatively resource-poor actors exert disproportionate impact on global governance. The example of UNCITRAL, however, seems to suggest that the more plural, flexible, and multi-layered the structure of governance, the more that resource-rich actors are at an advantage in shaping the content and application of rules and norms. The exercise of real power over time in global governance requires the ability to be present and active at a number of sites and to simultaneously mobilize various agents and coalitions behind a common agenda that is pursued across different fora. In addition to being required by the plural and fluid ways in which governance takes place, this kind of forum-shifting ability allows its possessors to work around potential opposition that emerges in only one arena. At the international level, it seems clear that only the most resource-rich actors possess these abilities over time and across

193. Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 9, at 593–94.
issue areas. To the extent that the governance of the global economy continues to evolve in more fluid and plural forms, careful thought must be given to the implications of this pattern for the design of institutions through which rules and norms are made, diffused, and enforced, and for the ability to uphold claims to legitimacy made by these institutions.

194. See Cohen, Constructing Power Through Law, supra note 15; see also Drahos, supra note 15; Sell & Prakash, supra note 23. A similar argument has been made with great force, in the context of the debate regarding the “fragmentation” of international law, in Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007).