#LosingTheThread: Recognizing Assembly Rights in the New Public Forum

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INTRODUCTION

The specter of banishment from the vibrant public forum of social media to the empty streets and deserted sidewalks is a matter of increasing political, social, and cultural importance. Today, nearly every government official maintains a social media presence on Facebook or Twitter, generally to promote initiatives, share ideological positions, engage constituents, and tangle with critics. Privacy controls and content moderation tools, however, offer government officials tantalizing opportunities to discretely and effectively muffle disapproval, stifle dissent, and shield themselves from criticism on their public social media accounts with “blocking” features. At the end of 2017, responses to public records requests showed that U.S. governors—Democrat and Republican—and federal agencies had blocked “at least 1,298” individual accounts from their official Facebook and Twitter

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1 STEPHEN SONDHEIM, Everybody’s Got the Right (Reprise), on ASSASSINS (1991).
2 See Nicholas Carr, How Social Media Is Ruining Politics, POLITICO (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/2016-election-social-media-ruining-politics-213104 [https://perma.cc/C5E5-88ML] (“Social media favors the bitty over the meaty, the cutting over the considered. It also prizes emotionalism over reason. The more visceral the message, the more quickly it circulates and the longer it holds the darting public eye.”).
3 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (No. 15-1194) (Justice Kagan) (“[E]verybody uses Twitter. All [fifty] governors, all [one hundred] senators, every member of the House has a Twitter account. So this has become a crucial—crucially important channel of political communication.”).
accounts. Though most of these blocked accounts belong to individual constituents who recognize themselves as “sassy” critics, some have “no idea why” they were blocked from commenting on or viewing their elected official’s social media page.

The proclivity of politicians to block critical, dissenting, or hostile speech expressed on social media by citizens extends from a relatively modest local government official from Loudoun County, Virginia to the office of the President of the United States. A most infamous Twitter user, counting over sixty-six million followers as of October 20, 2019, President Donald J. Trump frequently blocks critics from viewing his @realDonaldTrump Twitter feed. Such

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6 Id. Unwilling to accept exile from political discourse, some of the 492 account holders blocked from Maryland Governor Larry Hogan’s official Facebook Page started a Group of their own, “[o]pen to all registered Maryland voters who have been blocked by Supreme Benevolent Governor Larry Hogan for criticizing or not sufficiently praising him.” Marylanders Blocked By Larry Hogan on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/254061628339792 [https://perma.cc/HXF3-Y7Y9].

7 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the interactive space of the President’s Twitter account is a public forum under the First Amendment and that he cannot selectively exclude disfavored voices and critics by using the platform’s blocking feature), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d. Cir. 2019); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 703, 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) (holding that a local county official who used a Facebook Page to engage with her constituents exercised state action when banning a constituent for alleging impropriety in the local school board elections), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 666–67 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Robinson v. Hunt County, 921 F.3d 440, 445–47, 449 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that a sheriff is a final policymaker with regard to a county sheriff’s Facebook Page and that plaintiff could bring claims for viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment after her critical comments were deleted and she was banned from the Page by the sheriff); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1005, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (holding that the Kentucky governor’s official Facebook and Twitter accounts are government speech immune from First Amendment coverage because they are private platforms used by him to communicate his own speech and that “he is under no obligation to listen or respond to critical constituents”); Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-cv-00296-JAW, 2018 WL 4134628, at *1 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2018) (refusing to dismiss a lawsuit challenging the Maine governor’s practice of blocking constituents from his official Facebook Page because plaintiffs plausibly stated a claim for violation of their First Amendment rights); Complaint, Laurenson v. Hogan, No. 8:17-cv-02162-DKC (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2017) (complaint against Maryland governor Larry Hogan for blocking critics on Facebook).

8 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump [https://perma.cc/2BK5-VE8T]. President Trump’s tweets are official Presidential records, which must be preserved. See Letter from David S. Ferriero, Archivist of the U.S., Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., to Sen. Claire McCaskill 2 (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.archives.gov/files/press/press-releases/autos-to-sens-mccaskill-carper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9G8-4X7B] (“NARA has advised the White House that it should capture and preserve all tweets that the President posts in the course of his official duties, including those that are subsequently deleted, as Presidential records, and NARA has been informed by White House officials that they are, in fact, doing so.”).

9 Ashley Feinberg, A Running List of People Donald Trump Has Blocked on Twitter, WIRED (June 14, 2017, 03:38 PM EST), https://www.wired.com/story/donald-trump-tweet-blocked/ [https://perma.cc/P8QG-FJ5K].
critics are not only deprived of the opportunity to easily view President Trump’s tweets; they are denied the ability to congregate with others in conversational retweets and threads regarding their reactions to his various assertions.\textsuperscript{10}

Courts are just starting to grapple with the First Amendment implications of exclusion from these new spaces of political discourse and are deliberating whether social media accounts created and controlled by government officials are constitutionally-protected public forums.\textsuperscript{11} The modern public forum doctrine, however, is dominated by a vision of public forums as places where people speak directly to the government, rather than as spaces where citizens congregate.\textsuperscript{12} The speech rights of the loudmouth, the rabble-rouser, the disrupter, and the provocateur are easy to protect, with the help of a willing lawyer.\textsuperscript{13} But what about the rights of the quiet ones to gather and bear witness to the conduct of fellow citizens and government officials in space dedicated to public use? If courts are willing to protect a constitutional right to speak in the interactive spaces of government officials’ Twitter threads and Facebook comments, litigators should consider fighting to define a related right to assemble in those spaces. This note builds on recent scholarship dedicated to the “lost” and “forgotten” Assembly Right\textsuperscript{14} and applies the concept to equally protect a thoroughly modern right to congregate in virtual spaces for social and political purposes. “More speech, not less”\textsuperscript{15} will not happen if the people are prevented from entering the public square and assembling together, regardless of whether they are impeded by police barricades or by Twitter blocks.


\textsuperscript{11} See cases cited supra note 7.


\textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., Lozman v. City of Rivera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1948–49 (2018) (where the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Clinic represented local gadfly Fane Lozman in his lawsuit against the municipality for ordering police to arrest him during the public comment session of an open meeting in retaliation for engaging in speech critical of local politicians); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398–99 (1989) (where the Center for Constitutional rights represented Gary Lee Johnson in his lawsuit against Texas’ prohibition on politically-expressive flag burning); ACLU v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 303 F. Supp. 3d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2018) (where the ACLU represented itself and conservative commentator Milo Yiannopoulos in a lawsuit against the Authority for content-based advertising restrictions).


\textsuperscript{15} Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 240 (2d. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that the best response to disfavored speech on matters of public concern is more speech, not less.”).
Part I of this note offers a short primer on how private social media companies build and engineer responsive interfaces where the potential to connect with others is both easy and limitless. Part II briefly examines the First Amendment public forum doctrine, which sets the level of protection granted to individual speech in forums opened by the government for public comment and discussion. Part III dives into the recent application of traditional public forum analysis to social media, considering two federal court cases where First Amendment advocates have successfully articulated a claim that viewpoint-based social media blocking by government officials on Facebook and Twitter is anathema to those who value individual free speech rights. And Part IV proposes a revitalized use of the Assembly Clause as another path to defining the rights available to individuals who wish to engage with their government officials on private social media platforms as the assembled members of a public collective of citizens and residents.

I. SOCIAL MEDIA: A SHORT PRIMER

A. Why Use Social Media?

Social media corporations develop private networking platforms that allow registered users to post information, photos, and videos to their own individual accounts so that others may see, respond to, and engage with their content. People use social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat to satisfy a variety of human needs and desires. Friends and family use social media to stay in touch and keep each other

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16 Beyond the scope of this note is the issue of whether private online platform owners, such as Facebook and Twitter, are sufficiently government-like to implicate the state-action doctrine or are self-regulating private entities charged with designing and enforcing a system of governance not at odds with Americans' general expectation of free speech rights. See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018) (arguing that private social media platforms are private, self-regulating entities that normatively reflect the free speech expectations of their users and encourage participation in a democratic culture).


18 According to a 2018 Pew Research Center poll, nearly sixty-eight percent of U.S. adults use Facebook; seventy-three percent use YouTube; thirty-five percent use Instagram; twenty-seven percent use Snapchat; and twenty-four percent use Twitter. In total, nearly seven out of ten U.S. adults use at least one social media platform. Most users visit these social media sites multiple times per day either with a computer or on their mobile device. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/8S9V-756W].
informed about the major and day-to-day events in their lives. Free online emotional support groups offer succor to people struggling with the hard realities of their lives. Some look for comrades to inspire and teach them how to free themselves from the shackles of capitalism and travel the United States in retro-fitted vans, or achieve financial independence to retire early. Some people with disabilities create avatars who live in virtual worlds where some of the most important relationships and moments of their lives unfold and develop. Grassroots organizers have turned to the promise of social media as a tool to link calls for social change and acts of cultural protest, most saliently exemplified in the United States by the #BlackLivesMatter and #MeToo movements.

People also increasingly use social media to debate and discuss issues of local and national political importance, both with each other as a body politic and directly with their government officials. More than 10,000 U.S. federal agencies and sub-agencies, all 100 senators, almost all of the 435 representatives, and thousands of state and local officials and agencies have multiple active social media accounts to serve and engage their constituents and share official information.

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23 It is estimated that twenty to fifty percent of the active members of online virtual world Second Life are people living with disabilities, many of whom have joined the platform’s utopian Virtual Ability Island. Kristen French, First They Got Sick, Then They Moved into a Virtual Utopia, WIRED (Feb. 13, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/first-they-got-sick-then-they-moved-into-a-virtual-utopia/ [https://perma.cc/ZE4Z-JCAX].


26 See Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4–9, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
People now expect to participate in political discussions with their elected officials and government institutions online, and public officials have responded by using social media as critical tools of official communication and constituent engagement. Local, state, and federal government officials livestream town hall meetings, coordinate emergency responses to natural disasters, issue public service announcements, and advertise government job application periods. The government is also using social media to modernize voter registration and enrollment. Viewed in the most positive light, the government’s embrace of such inexpensive and accessible technology—particularly on the local level—increases “small-d democracy” by facilitating two-way conversations between elected and government officials with previously unreachable constituents.

Cheap speech, however, is not free. Social media has been implicated in a wide range of twenty-first century ills, ranging from the digital divide and youth screen addiction, to the radicalization.


31 In 1995, Eugene Volokh, a prominent First Amendment scholar, wrote that new media and the internet would democratize speech by reducing economic barriers to distributing speech, with the result that “far more speakers—rich and poor, popular and not, banal and avant garde—will be able to make their work available to all.” Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806–07 (1995); see also Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 201 (2018) (“No doubt cheap speech has increased convenience, dramatically lowered the costs of obtaining information, and spurred the creation and consumption of content from radically diverse sources. But the economics of cheap speech also have undermined mediating and stabilizing institutions of American democracy including newspapers and political parties, with negative social and political consequences.”).

of domestic terrorists and stoking state-sponsored and stateless violence. Devices that bring technology into our relationships have become more intimately attached to our bodies, integrated into our cognitive capabilities, and invited into our homes. And privacy as an individual or common value may already be passé, as people continue to use the platforms despite their misgivings because of their ubiquity, convenience, and efficiency.

B. Social Media Involves Speech and Response

The Supreme Court has already recognized the power of social media to encourage individual speech and self-expression. In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds a state law barring convicted sex offenders from holding social media accounts or accessing websites with social media components, including sites as varied as Facebook, Twitter, the Washington Post, and Amazon. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy asserted that social media platforms—and Facebook in particular—are vehicles for expressive speech, for “[w]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”


Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
The Packingham Court also recognized in dicta that social media is the primary tool people now choose to communicate and connect with others. Social media platforms provide “perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’” Recognizing that one generally does not hope to speak into a vacuum, the Supreme Court implicitly comprehended that the freedom to speak on social media is tightly connected to the ability to call to—and know that you have reached—an audience. Social media is, at the end of the day, about connecting with others; dreams of potential connections enthrall users and encourage them to return, repeatedly, to the platform.

C. Responsive and Interactive Spaces on Social Media

Social media is social, even if the response to our call consists only of mere engagement, such as likes or retweets, in the addictive exchange of “giving and seeking attention.”

40 Id. at 1732, 1735 (“[Social Media sites] are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. . . . On Facebook, for example, users can debate religion and politics with their friends and neighbors or share vacation photos. On LinkedIn, users can look for work, advertise for employees, or review tips on entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”).

41 Id. at 1737 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).


44 See Rainie, supra note 37.

45 See Lauren Oyler, Habitual User: Tweeting on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, BAFFLER (No. 41), https://thebaffler.com/outbursts/habitual-user-oyler [https://perma.cc/DR4L-695R] (“My self-deprecating commentary—‘nothing more embarrassing than being complimented on your Twitter thread’—never quite manages to ironize itself out of what it is: a
Differentiated from traditional news media such as newspapers and broadcast journalism, social media interfaces are engineered to promote participatory discussions through a diverse range of mediums, including “text, video, audio, live feeds, [and] photos.”

Subsequently, private online platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, engineer social media interfaces to promote bilateral and multilateral conversations, not just unilateral speech.

1. Facebook

Facebook is the largest social media platform in the United States, counting some sixty-eight percent of U.S. adults as account holders. The platform’s mission is to “[g]ive people the power to build community and bring the world closer together.”

Facebook users connect with others through private Profiles, public Pages, or a spectrum of public or private Groups. Profiles feature an individual user’s Timeline, essentially a reverse-chronological, visual, scrolling display of a person’s Facebook activity. Facebook users “follow” different accounts to see instantaneous and archived posts reflecting other people’s social plea for attention among infinite other pleas for attention. The ‘connection’ we were promised is not so different from a broadcast: I make up a character and play it for ratings.”


Smith & Anderson, supra note 18.

About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/?ref=page_internal [https://perma.cc/LU5P-UWJ7].


Jill Duffy, 12 Things You Should Know About Facebook Timeline, PCMAG (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2393464,00.asp [https://perma.cc/F23B-FNKJ] (“[T]imeline is a cross between visual blog and online scrapbook.”).

media activity (i.e., “Stories”)) in their private News Feed, a “personalized, ever-changing collection of photos, videos, links, and updates from the friends, family, businesses, and news sources you’ve connected to on Facebook.”

News Feed content is governed by algorithms that order “Stories” based on an individual’s historical engagement with the Profile or Page that posted the update, the type of content they tend to interact with most (i.e., photos, videos, news articles), and the extent of their past interactions with similar posts.

Government officials can create Facebook Pages to connect with constituents who may or may not be known personally by the Page holder. For example, New York City Council Member Laurie Cumbo has a Facebook Page that allows individuals with and without Facebook Profiles to follow her posted activities and announcements. People without Facebook Profiles, as well as Facebook users who are logged out of their accounts, can look at the information posted on Council Member Cumbo’s Page but are unable to like, share, or comment on her posts.

Facebook allows for three main types of interactions, or possible responses to any given post: likes, comments, and shares.


56 See News Feed, supra note 54.


Interactions on Facebook are generally public acts, subject to monitoring and notice by the eyes of others.60

Clicking the “like” button under a post lets the original poster and their Facebook Friends know that someone reacted to their post; a like is akin to a “quick and easy nod” of support, affirmation, or expression of empathy.62 Commenters may also select one of several emoticons (“Like, Love, Haha, Wow, Sad, Angry”) to further characterize the nature of their response.63

Engaged Facebook users often use the “comment” and “sharing” features to respond to posts by others, including government officials. Simply by clicking the “comment” button displayed immediately beneath a new post and entering either text or GIF images, Facebook users can converse directly with the original poster, reply to other people’s comments about the


63 About Reactions to Your Ad, supra note 61.


65 Molly McHugh, You Can Finally, Actually, Really, Truly Post GIFs on Facebook, WIRED (May 29, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/real-gif-posting-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/9Z4N-JKTJ].
original post, or even invite other users who have not yet engaged with the post to weigh in on the topic by “mentioning” their Facebook name. 66 Highly-engaged Facebook users also often share posts that they see in their News Feed by clicking the “Share” button, 67 which copies the content to their own Timeline, to a specific Facebook Friend’s Timeline, to the posts of a Facebook Group, or to a public Page they manage. 68

Facebook users can exercise varying degrees of control around the privacy and shareability of their posts. They can limit the audience for particular posts or restrict the ability of other users to comment or share their posts (i.e., limiting post visibility only to “Friends” or “Friends of Friends” versus allowing the “Public” to see and share posts, including Facebook users who are unknown to the original poster). 69 Public Page owners, including government officials, also have access to a suite of content moderation tools to control what shows up in their comment boxes, including blocks on certain words, a profanity filter, and options to hide or delete comments left by visitors to the Page. 70 Page owners may also ban individual Facebook users, prohibiting banned users from following the Page, liking or commenting on Page posts, using the interactive space of the Page posts to engage others through the mention function, and sending direct messages to the Page owner. 71

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66 Commenting, supra note 64. “Mentioning” a person, Page, or Group in the comment box of a Facebook post involves typing their Facebook username into the comment box and selecting the name from a list that appears. Id. The mentioned person is then linked into that comment box, is notified that they have been mentioned, and other Facebook users can generally see that you have been mentioned. Privacy settings may limit the visibility of the link to a wider audience. Id.

67 People share posts to promote information, to define themselves to others, to stay connected to others with similar interests, to support or champion political, social, or cultural issues they care about, or to feel more involved in their communities. N.Y. TIMES CUSTOMER INSIGHT GRP., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SHARING: WHY DO PEOPLE SHARE ONLINE (2011), https://www.bostonwebdesigners.net/wp-content/uploads/POS_PUBLIC0819-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMJ4-9TAA].


70 Banning and Moderation, FACEBOOK: HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/248844142114117?helpref=hc_fnav [https://perma.cc/NPJ4-Q348]. “Hiding” an individual’s comments on a public Facebook Page means that only the original poster and their Facebook Friends can see and engage with the comments; Facebook users who are not Friends with the objectionable commenter will not see the comment. Id. Deleting a comment removes it from the Page completely. Id.

71 Id.
2. Twitter

Twitter is a social media platform that captures “what’s happening in the world and what people are talking about right now.” Unlike Facebook, which organizes user-generated content and responses around Pages, Groups, and networks of Friends, Twitter’s defining feature is unbridled interactivity amongst its millions of individual users. There are no private or closed groups on Twitter; every aspect of an individual account holder’s activity on the platform is visible to anyone else, including those without Twitter accounts, unless a user chooses to make their own account entirely private or send a surreptitious direct message.

Twitter users post “tweets” up to 280 characters in length (or, alternatively, a photo, video, or link) to a webpage hosted on Twitter associated with the user’s account. “Retweets” are analogous to Facebook’s “Share” button, allowing Twitter users to share another user’s tweet publicly on their Timeline (with or without adding their own commentary). A record of an individual Twitter user’s tweets and retweets is found on the user’s unique webpage (a “Profile timeline”). Users can “thread” together multiple tweets to tell longer stories. They can also subscribe to other Twitter users’ account activities by “following” those accounts. Individual Twitter users can review the tweets and retweets of other Twitter users that they follow on their “Home” page (the “Home timeline”).

Similar to Facebook’s News Feed, Twitter offers users a Timeline, a stream of constantly-updating, reverse-chronologically...
ordered tweets from other Twitter users (often called the “Feed”).\(^{81}\) Twitter users engage with other people’s tweets by replying to them, liking them, or retweeting them.\(^{82}\) Twitter users adopt a “handle”—an @symbol followed by a chosen identifier (e.g., @realDonaldTrump)—that can be used to send a public “hey, over here[!]” call letting them know that they are being tweeted about and adding them to a conversation.\(^{83}\) Hashtags (e.g., #MeToo) can be added to join a larger conversation amongst many Twitter users; they are clickable, indexed keywords that allow people to follow topics, trends, and movements they are interested in.\(^{84}\)

Unique amongst social media platforms is Twitter’s ephemerality, the rush of being at a crowded party where many distinct yet related conversations are happening simultaneously.\(^{86}\) Twitter is a “weird” space where users engage in self-referential “metatextual commentary” with and about other peoples’ tweets.\(^{87}\) Users have no control over the replies, retweets, and replies-to-replies generated in response to their tweets, in “multiple...

\(^{81}\) *How to Use Twitter: Critical Steps for New Users*, supra note 74; see *About Your Twitter Timeline*, supra note 77.

\(^{82}\) *About Your Twitter Timeline*, supra note 77.

\(^{83}\) *How to Use Twitter: Critical Steps for New Users*, supra note 74. Using the @twittername function to mention someone on Twitter is similar to mentioning a Facebook user in a comment box. *About Replies and Mentions, Twitter: HELP CTR.*, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/mentions-and-replies [https://perma.cc/2RJS-RPXK].


\(^{86}\) See *How to Use Twitter: Critical Steps for New Users*, supra note 74.

overlapping” conversations among and across the Twitterverse. These collections of conversations are “comment threads” that can temporally stretch over hours, days, weeks, and beyond.

Twitter users can exert limited control over who engages with their public tweets with the use of the “mute” and “block” functions. “Muting” removes another user’s tweets from your Timeline without unfollowing them, whereas “blocking” prevents the other user from seeing and replying to your tweets and results in dissolution of the “following” relationship. Muted users will not know that they have been muted (and the muting party will not be notified of their attempts to engage via tweet, retweet, reply, or @ mention), whereas blocked users will immediately notice that they have been blocked if they try to visit the Profile Timeline of the blocking user while using their Twitter account. Blocked users can log out of their Twitter accounts to view the Twitter feeds of individuals who have blocked them; however, to do so they would have to follow the blocking Twitter user with a newly created account or simply read the public tweets while logged out of Twitter. Both workarounds, however, limit the ability of the blocked user to engage with the original poster’s tweets and participate in the comment threads.


89 For example, President Trump’s tweets regularly attract more than 100,000 likes and retweets over the course of several days. Stipulation at 16–18, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 17-cv-5205).


93 See How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, supra note 91; How to Block Accounts on Twitter, supra note 92.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The First Amendment

Americans are an expressive people. 96 So highly did the Founding Fathers value individual and collective freedom to speak truth to power—in language and in deed—that they adopted a First Amendment prohibiting the government from “abridging the freedom of speech...or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.” 97 Probing the contours of what it means for individuals and groups to have five distinct yet interconnected expressive rights, 98 the Supreme Court’s modern First Amendment

97 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was ratified into the Bill of Rights in 1791 and incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states in 1925. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The First Amendment’s Firstness, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2014).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
jurisprudence constrains the government from squelching the speech and conduct of protesters, rabble rousers, and dissidents “simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”99 The scope of the First Amendment’s protection for a contrarian’s expressive rights in the “interactive space” of government officials’ social media accounts is the focus of this note.100

1. The Free Speech Clause

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government officials from discriminating against speakers based on the content of their messages or the ideological viewpoint of the messenger.101 The right to speak—and the opportunity to be heard—is not without limits. People cannot defame or defraud others,102 distribute obscene material,103 holler “fighting’ words,”104 utter “true threats,”105 or incite a mob to imminent violence106 and expect to be shielded from prosecution by the Free Speech Clause.

100 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“The interactivity of Twitter is one of its defining characteristics, and indeed, the interactive space of the President’s tweets accommodates a substantial body of expressive activity.”). aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d. Cir. 2019).
101 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding that government discrimination among viewpoints—or the regulation of speech based on “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker”—is a “more blatant” and “egregious form of content discrimination”); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
103 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (holding that state obscenity laws are permissible if they reflect the sensibilities of an “average person, applying contemporary community standards” to material that “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” and appeals to a merely “prurient” interest in sex); see Marks v. Massachusetts, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482–85 (1957), abrogated by Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
104 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (holding that “insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace” are not constitutionally-protected speech); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 20–23 (1971) (holding that wearing a “Fuck the Draft” jacket in a courthouse did not constitute “fighting words” under the First Amendment because an immediate violent reaction was not provoked by the expressive donning of the jacket).
105 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (stating that the government has a legitimate interest in “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur”); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that “political hyperbole” is not a “true ‘threat’.”)
106 The Supreme Court draws a distinction between individuals advocating a theoretical use of force or incitement to violate state and federal laws, and individuals whose “advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (“Strong and
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence suffuses individual political speech with the highest levels of scrutiny and protection\(^\text{107}\) in the service of advancing knowledge and truth in a “marketplace of ideas,” facilitating representative democracy and self-government, and promoting individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment.\(^\text{108}\) Political speech includes a range of verbal, associational and symbolic expression, from face-to-face speech to door-to-door solicitation, leafleting and pamphleteering, and pro-life “sidewalk counseling.”\(^\text{109}\) By engaging in lawful political speech,\(^\text{110}\) an individual does not gain an affirmative right to be believed or heeded by others but has the freedom to advocate a public message—regardless of content\(^\text{111}\) or viewpoint\(^\text{112}\)—largely uncensored, unencumbered, and unrestrained by the government.\(^\text{113}\)

2. The Assembly Clause

The Assembly Clause of the First Amendment proscribes state actors from fettering the “right of the people peaceably to

effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must be free to stimulate his [or her] audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech.”).

\(^{107}\) Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 913 (“[E]xpression on public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).


\(^{110}\) See Black, 538 U.S. at 365 (“[S]omebody engaging only in lawful political speech [is] at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”).

\(^{111}\) Content-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972) (holding that government regulations of expressive speech, e.g., peaceful picketing, because of its substantive message, ideas, or subject matter must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests).

\(^{112}\) State-sanctioned discrimination against speech because of preference for alternative “views on disfavored subjects” taken by speakers is impermissible viewpoint discrimination. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983) (“When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the State may not pick and choose.”).

\(^{113}\) Debate rages on the scope and permissibility of government restrictions on speakers encountering “hostile audience[s],” provoked by the heightened political and social tensions characterizing the early years of the Trump Administration. FREDERICK SCHAUER, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUMBIA UNIV., EMERGING THREATS: THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE REVISITED 2–3 (2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Schauer_Hostile_Audience.pdf [https://perma.cc/93KF-6CSK].
Carried over from English common law, the right of assembly was “neither created nor altered” by the Framers, but affirmed separately—and “virtually without comment”—into the federal Constitution. The distinct nature of the right to assemble in public spaces was sharpened in the short debate on the issue of whether to restrict the act of assembly to gatherings that promoted the common good. Absolutely not, argued one congressman, because “[i]f the people could be deprived of the power of assembling under any pretext whatsoever, they might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the clause.” Instead, the Framers agreed to qualify the right of people to collectively assemble so long as they did so peaceably, preserving the purpose of assemblies as forums for expressing public dissent.

Courts have largely retired the Assembly Clause as an analytical tool, despite a longstanding tradition of collective social movement advocacy by abolitionists, suffragists, workers, and minorities. The Supreme Court has not issued a major decision interpreting the Assembly Clause in the past thirty-five years, relegating it to “little more than a historical footnote.”

Today, courts treat people’s right to gather in public spaces as a facet of their freedom of speech, centering their analysis on threshold issues of whether the government’s discrimination against legitimate expressive activity is impermissibly content- or viewpoint-restrictive.

This singular focus on speech, rather than the acts of meeting and gathering, may have profound implications for the protection of collectives of people engaging in social and political practices “central to democratic government,” particularly in

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114 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
116 El-Haj, supra note 14, at 564.
118 Inazu, supra note 117, at 1168.
119 INAZU, supra note 14, at 1.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984), where the justices found that a National Park Service regulation prohibiting demonstrators from living in tent cities located in central Washington, D.C. parks did not violate the First Amendment because it was content-neutral. See also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 5 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.54(g)(i), Westlaw (database updated May 2019) (“When the government limits the rights of persons to communicate in public, it is most common for courts to examine the governmental action in terms of the freedom of speech rather than the freedom of assembly.”).
spaces classified by the courts as public forums, which is the subject to which this note now turns.  

B. The Public Forum Doctrine

Speech falls even further within the ambit of the First Amendment when it occurs in a public forum. The Supreme Court's public forum doctrine evolved from traditional understandings of streets, sidewalks, and town squares as stages where citizens encounter each other, engage in public discourse, and enact structures of democratic governance. The starting point for any review of the public forum doctrine is *Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations*, a 1939 case stemming from a dispute between leftist labor organizers and local government officials in New Jersey.

In 1937, Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague used a municipal ordinance specifically prohibiting labor meetings in public without a permit from the police chief to bar the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) from engaging in a recruitment drive. The police chief withheld the permit on the Mayor's behalf, on the grounds that the CIO was a "Communist" organization, and "with violence and force" evicted organizers and

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122 El-Haj, *supra* note 14, at 547. Scholars proposing a reinvigorated judicial use of the Assembly Clause generally contend that the Supreme Court's collapse of the public right of assembly into the individual right of free expression is a loss of protection for people actively engaged, or even preparing to engage, in collective action. See *id.* at 547, 589; *Inazu, supra* note 117, at 1169.

123 Because the bearing of this note rests on doctrine emanating from the traditional and designated public forums and their application to government officials' social media accounts, a brief foray into the characteristics of both forums is required, with a particular focus on cases where the suppressed parties' activities include acts of collective protest and gathering. Comprehensive analyses of the public forum categorizations can be found in James M. LoPiano, *Note, Public Fora Purpose: Analyzing Viewpoint Discrimination on the President's Twitter Account*, 28 *Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J.* 511, 528–37 (2018), and Lyrissa Lidsky, *Public Forum 2.0*, 91 *B.U. L. Rev.* 1975, 2017–20 (2011).

124 *Rodney A. Smolla, 2 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 16:3*, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2019) (noting that "the vast body of law governing the right to speak, march, or leaflet" in public forums is usually treated as a "species of free speech jurisprudence," despite also involving the "rights of assembly, association, and petition").

125 See *Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org.*, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.").


pamphleteers from the public streets, plazas, and parks, placing them on “ferry boats destined for New York” and “beyond the limits of the city” to “remote places.”

After two years of litigation, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the CIO, holding that Mayor Hague had violated the organizers’ First Amendment rights of speech and assembly. Citing to an earlier case where the Court had refused to incorporate the Assembly Right to the States, Justice Roberts noted that “[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.” And in declaring the Jersey City ordinance void on its face, he balanced the rights of CIO organizers to speak and assemble with the needs of local government to maintain public order by observing:

The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communications of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all . . . .

. . . But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right.

The tensions at play between the government’s “managerial interest” and the collective right of assembly grappled with by the Hague court culminated until the formulation of the modern public forum doctrine in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association. In Perry, a dispute about whether a school district’s interschool mail system constituted a public forum where one union could block another from sending out recruitment mailers, the Court distinguished between several types of public forums, each triggering a different level of protection for individual and collective speech on government property. The constant factor in any public forum analysis is that the government must control the forum;

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128 Id.
129 Id. at 513 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53 (1876)). “It has been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by this Court, without a dissenting voice, that freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizenship, by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 519 (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
130 Id. at 515–16; see id. at 513 (“No expression of a contrary view has ever been voiced by this court.”).
132 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–50. The Supreme Court held that giving preference to the “duly elected exclusive bargaining representative” of the school district’s teachers did not violate the rival union’s First Amendment rights because the interschool mail system was not a public forum. Id. at 38, 55.
government control is required to implicate the state action doctrine, particularly in instances where the forum is located on otherwise private property.\(^{133}\)

1. Traditional Public Forums

Individual and collective speech rights are at their zenith in “quintessential public forums”: the streets, parks, and sidewalks maintained at the direction of local governments at public expense “by long tradition or by government fiat.”\(^{134}\) State and local governments may regulate access to these traditional public forums with “time, place, and manner” restrictions so long as they are content-neutral, serve significant government interests, and leave open “ample” alternate communication channels.\(^{135}\) For example, the NYC Parks Commissioner may lawfully require groups to apply for a special events permit out of legitimate concerns for public safety or neighborhood tranquility.\(^{136}\) Under this regime, groups who wish to gather for a demonstration, protest, large-scale performance, or other gathering of more than twenty people must follow all applicable and neutrally-applied rules to maintain order, including abiding by the park hours, attendance limits, and noise amplification restrictions.\(^{137}\) The First Amendment would restrain the Parks Commissioner, however, from declining to issue a permit to a group based on the content of their expression or character of their politics.\(^{138}\)

\(^{133}\) See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (“[I]t must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”).

\(^{134}\) Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Streets, sidewalks, and public parks are traditional public forums because they are “held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Id.

\(^{135}\) Id.

\(^{136}\) N.Y.C. Parks Dep’t, § 2-08 Special Events and Demonstrations, https://www.nycgovparks.org/rules/section-2-08 [https://perma.cc/P2CG-2NPF]; see N.Y.C. CHARTER § 533.

\(^{137}\) See N.Y.C. Parks Dep’t, Parks Special Event Permit Request, https://nyceventpermits.nyc.gov/Parks/ [https://perma.cc/64QJ-4MPS]; see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1989) (holding that New York City did not violate performers’ First Amendment rights by requiring them to use a city-employed audio technician and city-owned equipment to exercise volume control because the government had a legitimate interest in protecting residents and park dwellers from excessive noise emanating from the Central Park Bandshell).

\(^{138}\) See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791–92.
2. Non-Traditional Public Forums

Generally, the government owns and operates traditional public forums, and the Supreme Court has been loath to encompass spaces other than public parks, sidewalks, and streets “beyond [the] historic confines” of this categorization.\(^\text{139}\) However, in the context of a privately-owned company town in Alabama, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment binds private owners and actors.\(^\text{140}\) State supreme courts have found that individuals maintain free speech rights in the public spaces of some shopping malls.\(^\text{141}\) In Perry, the Court said that when a government dedicates a formerly private space to public use—perhaps by leasing a private performing arts space to serve as a municipal theater,\(^\text{142}\) offering state university students free use of the facilities,\(^\text{143}\) or hosting a school board meeting\(^\text{144}\)—it creates a designated or limited public forum.\(^\text{145}\)

In designated public forums, individual and group expressive rights are protected in the same manner as in traditional public forums, i.e., reasonable time, place and manner restrictions that are content-neutral are permissible,\(^\text{146}\) so long as

\(^\text{140}\) Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946) (“Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored.” (footnote omitted)).
\(^\text{141}\) The shopping mall jurisprudence depends on whether a state’s constitution affirmatively grants free speech rights on the private property and the features of the mall property that make a public space more or less akin to a traditional town square. See, e.g., Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 346–47 (Cal. 1979) (people may engage in political solicitation, leafletting, and expressive speech at large shopping malls); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 62 (Colo. 1991) (people have the right to free speech in shopping malls that provide a public function, such as operating a police substation or permitting voter registration drives); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (Mass. 1983) (people may engage in signature gathering drives to qualify political candidates to appear on electoral ballots at large shopping malls); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 782-783 (N.J. 1994) (regional and community shopping centers must permit leafletting on societal and political issues). Reasonable time, place, and manner of expressions are generally permissible, so long as they are content- and viewpoint-neutral. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
\(^\text{146}\) Id. at 46. The Court stated that content-based regulations “must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest,” which suggests that the Court will apply strict scrutiny in traditional and designated public forums. Id. (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269–70).
the government “retain[s] the open character” of the space.\textsuperscript{147} Speakers congregating in a limited public forum are similarly existentially constrained by the potential closure of the forum by the government and the reversion of the space to government property closed to public use.\textsuperscript{148} However, individuals engaging with limited public forums, such as public university students seeking to access the student activity fund, may have their speech restricted on the basis of content to satisfy the requirements of the “limited and legitimate purposes for which [the forum] was created” as long as the government does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint and is “reasonable.”\textsuperscript{149} More succinctly: “[T]he application of forum doctrine must be consistent with the purpose, structure, and intended use of the space.”\textsuperscript{150} And critically, designated or limited spaces opened to the public need not be physical; public forums may be “metaphysical,” perhaps even interactive.\textsuperscript{151}

Consider a hypothetical to drive home the distinctions and implications of the public forum doctrine. Suppose the NYC Chancellor of Education leases a small private theater, Puppetworks, to use as a forum for educating public school parents about the upcoming middle school integration plan in Brooklyn’s District 15.\textsuperscript{152} He intends to open the space to sponsor

\textsuperscript{147} Id. Reversion of a previously open designated or limited public forum to a closed space destroys the forum. \textit{Id.} at 45–46 (“Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”).


\textsuperscript{149} Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 681 (2010) ("Any access barrier [to a limited public forum] must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral["]); see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–33 (1995) (holding that the university engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination against students seeking financing from the student activity fund to start a Christian newspaper when the fund was set up to finance such types of student-led publications, activities, and events); see also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–93 (1993).

\textsuperscript{150} Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), \textit{aff’d}, 928 F.3d 226 (2d. Cir. 2019).

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Rosenberger}, 515 U.S. at 830 (asserting that a public university’s student activity fund is “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense”); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985) (considering whether a federally-distributed charity drive communication constituted a public forum “lack[ing] a physical situs”); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974) (treating advertising spaces on city-owned buses as a public forum).

\textsuperscript{152} This hypothetical is based on the N.Y.C. Department of Education’s recent approval of a community-developed middle school integration plan for some Brooklyn
information sessions about the district’s middle schools and host weekly meetings to answer questions from community members affected by the integration plan. Has he established a public forum at Puppetworks? Yes. But what kind, and what meaningful rights attach for participants?

Since Puppetworks theater is not a public sidewalk, street, or park, it is not a traditional public forum and would be either a designated or limited public forum.\(^{153}\) Given the Chancellor’s managerial interest in promoting public participation while maintaining public order, he can set reasonable restrictions on public attendance at the Puppetworks facility, such as limiting operating hours or capping attendance in accordance with the City’s fire code.\(^ {154}\) If the Chancellor hosts a regular weekly meeting at Puppetworks to which all are invited, he has created a designated public forum where he may not eject individuals who protest his integration plan or take away their microphone during the public comment session because they are (or he fears they might be) openly, profoundly, or even profanely critical or off-topic.\(^ {155}\) But if the Chancellor further narrows the scope of a meeting to the specific issue of adopting a culturally-responsive curriculum for the affected schools, and advertises it as such, he may have established a limited forum where he must allow those with critical views of the proposal to speak, but may eject those who attend primarily to protest the City’s redevelopment of a vacant Armory into a mixed-use housing development.\(^ {156}\)

But what if the Chancellor decides to livestream all meetings and deliberative processes on a social media platform like Facebook or Twitter? Can he block or ban disruptive participants, spammers, or users critical of his plans? Some lawyers argue that the answer is no, because social media platforms selected by the Chancellor as spaces to host discussion, debate, and information sharing are non-traditional public forums like the brick-and-mortar Puppetworks theater, and participants in the forum have the right not to be


\(^{154}\) See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.

\(^{155}\) See supra notes 139–151 and accompanying text.

\(^{156}\) See supra notes 139–151 and accompanying text; see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“Any access barrier [in a limited public forum] must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”).
subjected to viewpoint discrimination. This argument is explored in depth in Part III of this note.

III. LITIGATING SOCIAL MEDIA BLOCKING UNDER THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE

Plaintiffs bringing federal cases against the government officials who blocked them from their social media accounts have invoked the public forum doctrine to protect their First Amendment speech rights. Two federal courts have weighed in on the issue of whether government officials violate the constitutional rights of their constituents by blocking them on social media, situating their rationale within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. A similar lawsuit brought against the Kentucky governor by constituents he banned on Facebook was decided in his favor, and settlements have been reached with two government officials who blocked constituents from their social media accounts.

A. Finding Public Forums in Social Media Accounts

1. Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors

On the evening of February 3, 2016, Brian Davison was banned from the Facebook Page of Phyllis J. Randall, the elected Chair of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, after posting comments alleging corruption and conflicts of interest on the part of the Loudoun County School Board members and their  

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families. Chair Randall, offended by Mr. Davison’s accusations “regarding her colleagues on the School Board,” deleted her original post, including all comments. She then banned Mr. Davison’s Facebook account from commenting on her Page, reasoning that “if [he] was the type of person [who] would make comments about people’s family members, then maybe [she] didn’t want [him] to be commenting on [her] site.” Chair Randall’s ban on Mr. Davison lasted “at most [twelve] hours,” at which point she “reconsidered” her action and unbanned him. Mr. Davison then sued Chair Randall in her official and individual capacities for violating his First Amendment rights in the “limited public forum” of her Facebook Page.

The federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia had several issues to contend with when confronted with Brian Davison’s lawsuit, including whether Randall operated the Facebook Page in her personal or official capacity. Citing Fourth Circuit precedent, the Davison court determined that Randall had opened a public forum on her “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook Page by “deliberately permitting public
comment”\footnote{Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.} and requesting “virtually unfettered discussion on that [P]age.”\footnote{Id. (‘I really want to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, compliment, or just your thoughts. However, I really try to keep back and forth conversations . . . on my county Facebook [P]age (Chair Phyllis J. Randall) or County email (Phillis.randall@loudoun.gov.’).)} And interestingly, the court chose to forego the public forum analysis, because Randall engaged in quintessential viewpoint discrimination “prohibited in all forums” in banning Davison from her Page.\footnote{Id. at 717 (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006)).} Indeed, Randall was found to have “committed a cardinal sin under the First Amendment” because she banned Davison to suppress his “critical” viewpoint that her school board colleagues acted unethically or illegally.\footnote{Id. at 717–18; see also Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (asserting that criticism of official conduct lies at the very “heart” of the First Amendment).}

Notably, the Davison district court did not thoroughly analyze the Facebook Page user interface that allows constituents like Mr. Davison to engage with their government official.\footnote{See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716.} Eschewing discussion of Facebook’s comment boxes and Page timelines, the court simply stated that “[w]hen one creates a Facebook [P]age, one generally opens a digital space for the exchange of ideas and information.”\footnote{Id.} On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit took up the challenge of reviewing “the interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page” and affirmed the district court’s decision.\footnote{Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673, 686 (4th Cir. 2019).} Finding that the “middle column” of Randall’s Facebook Page—essentially the Page’s version of a News Feed—allowed for and indiscriminately invited all-comers to “post comments, reply to posts, and ‘like’ comments and posts,”\footnote{Id. (citing Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).} Judge Wynn wrote that Randall both effectively controlled the forum and had opened a public forum in calling for responses to her official speech as a government actor.\footnote{Id. at 687. (“Randall ‘effectively controlled’ certain aspects of the Chair’s Facebook Page: she curated the Chair’s Facebook Page’s left and right columns [metadata and official contact information] and made posts to the middle column. But Randall also expressly opened the Chair’s Facebook Page’s middle column—its interactive space—for ‘ANY’ user to post on ‘ANY issues,’ and therefore did not retain ‘final approval authority’ over that aspect of the Chair’s Facebook Page.” (citations omitted)).} Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that Randall’s decision to ban Davison from the comments section of her Chair Page was the act of a government official, and the fact that her intention was to “suppress [his]
opinion” constituted viewpoint-based discrimination in a public forum in violation of core First Amendment protections.178

2. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Donald J. Trump

In July 2017, just days before the Davison decision, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University sued President Donald J. Trump on behalf of itself and seven individual Twitter users who found themselves blocked shortly after tweeting critical messages at his @realDonaldTrump handle.179 As in Davison, the federal court in Knight was confronted with a “distinctly twenty-first century medium”—here, Twitter—and individuals alleging they were tossed out of the virtual public square because of their viewpoints.180

District Judge Naomi Buchwald quickly dispatched with the threshold question of whether the blocked individuals engaged in protected speech by characterizing Twitterers’ engagement with the @realDonaldTrump account as speech that “fall[s] within the core of First Amendment protection.”181 She then addressed whether the public forum analysis was appropriate for the @realDonaldTrump account, hinging her rationale around how much control President Trump as a government actor has over access to Twitter’s “private property” that he may have “dedicated to public use.”182 Dividing the Twitter user interface into four distinct areas where a “metaphysical”183 public forum “lack[ing] a physical situs”184

178 Id. at 687–88.
179 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff'd, 928 F.3d 226 (2d. Cir. 2019). For example, University of Maryland Professor Philip Cohen was blocked shortly after tweeting a reply to a @realDonaldTrump tweet about his air traffic control initiative. Professor Cohen’s reply tweet superimposed a picture of the President with the words “Corrupt Incompetent Authoritarian.” Stipulation at 18–19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F.Supp.3d541(S.D.N.Y.2018)(No.17-cv-5205).
180 Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549, 564.
181 Id. at 565 (quoting Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008)).
182 Id. at 566 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)). Rejecting the Government’s argument that @realDonaldTrump was a personal account held by the President rather than an official government social media account (compared with @POTUS, the official Twitter account of the President of the United States), Judge Buchwald characterized @realDonaldTrump as being “a presidential account . . . [used] to take actions that can be taken only by the President as President,” including “the appointment of officers (including cabinet secretaries), the removal of officers, and the conduct of foreign policy.” Id. at 567.
183 Id. at 566 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)).
184 Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)).
could potentially lie, she examined: (1) “the content of the tweets sent,” (2) “the timeline comprised of those tweets,” (3) “the comment threads initiated by each of these tweets,” and (4) “the ‘interactive space’ associated with each tweet in which other users may directly interact with the content of the tweets by . . . replying to, retweeting, or liking the tweets.”

Judge Buchwald then determined that the “interactive space” associated with each @realDonaldTrump tweet is a designated public forum under the President’s exclusive control. Considering how the social media platform allows “users to interact with other Twitter users in relation to [their tweets],” she zeroed in on how the harm done to the blocked users prevented them from engaging with their President in the “direct manner” they might expect given the nature of the social media interface. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s directive in Cornelius v. NAACP to focus on the nature of the access to the public forum sought by the potential speaker, Judge Buchwald contemplated that the desire of the blocked Twitter users is to “directly interact with a tweet sent” by the President. The “essential function” of Twitter allows individual speakers access to interactive spaces where they can engage with the content of a

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185 Judge Buchwald rejected the idea that the first three components of @realDonaldTrump were a public forum. She ruled that the content of @realDonaldTrump’s tweets was government speech not subject to the bounds of the First Amendment; similarly, the account’s timeline “merely aggregate[d]” the content of @realDonaldTrump’s tweets, all of which was government speech. Id. at 571–72. She further determined that President Trump lacked the requisite authorial control over the “subsequent dialogue” created by thousands of replies and retweets beyond “control exercised over first-order replies through blocking” to create a public forum in the comment threads. Id. at 570.

186 Id. at 566.

187 Unlike the Davison court, Judge Buchwald performed a comprehensive forum analysis outlined in Perry Education to determine the nature of the forum created in @realDonaldTrump’s interactive spaces. She declined to view @realDonaldTrump’s interactive spaces as traditional public forums like parks and sidewalks because “there is simply no extended historical practice” of the medium of Twitter “being used for public speech and debate since time immemorial.” Id. at 574–75. Neither did she perceive @realDonaldTrump’s Twitter space as “incompatible with expressive activity” that would implicate a nonpublic forum. Id. at 574. Rather, because the President had expressed intent to use @realDonaldTrump to “communicate[] directly . . . [to] the American people,” it is a designated forum. Id. at 574–75 (“The interactivity of Twitter is one of its defining characteristics, and indeed, the interactive space of the President’s tweets accommodates a substantial body of expressive activity.”).

188 Id. at 568 (“[D]etermining that a particular facility or location is a public forum usually suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state action subject to the First Amendment limitations.” (quoting Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2018))).

189 Id. at 574 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).


191 Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573.
given tweet through replying and retweeting. Unless the blocked users log out of their Twitter accounts and create new ones, they cannot interact directly with the President; the act severs a connection between speaker and forum host that “cannot be completely reestablished” until they are unblocked.

Judge Buchwald concluded that “continued exclusion” of the seven plaintiffs based on the viewpoints expressed in their tweets critical of the President was “impermissible” under the First Amendment. Drawing a comparison to the traditional public forum, where a government official is free to ignore an offensive speaker but cannot eject them from the forum on the basis of their viewpoint, Judge Buchwald recommended that the President mute critical Twitterers rather than blocking them. While the First Amendment does not require government officials to listen or provide answers to any given speaker in a public forum, blocking goes too far because the President would not see any tweets from a blocked user and the blocked user would be prohibited from speaking to the President in tweets or retweets in a “discrete[] [and] measurable way.” And despite the fact that the impediment on the blocked Twitterers is a “narrow [] slice of speech,” Judge Buchwald writes that it is “real” and “no more is needed to violate the Constitution.”

The Second Circuit recently upheld the district court’s decision in *Knight*, finding that evidence of the official nature of President Trump’s use of his Twitter account is “overwhelming” and that “he may not selectively exclude those whose views he disagrees with” from a social media platform he intentionally opened to millions of followers. Furthermore, blocking accounts inhibits the expressive conduct of replying, retweeting, and liking that falls within the ambit of the First Amendment when a government

192 *Id.* at 572–74.
193 *Id.* at 573.
194 *Id.* at 575. Judge Buchwald allowed that “some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed” in metaphysical forums. *Id.* (quoting *Matal v. Tam*, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017)).
195 *Id.* (“Regulation of a [designated public forum] is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum . . . [and must be] narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest.” (first alteration in original) (quoting *Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee*, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992))).
196 *Id.* at 576.
198 *Knight*, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 577.
199 *Id.* (“[T]he First Amendment recognizes, and protects against, even de minimis harms.”).
200 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 234 (2d. Cir. 2019).
official like the President attempts to silence expressions of discontent in a public forum he has both created and controls.  

B. Limitations Under the Free Speech Clause

Plaintiffs in Davison v. Loudoun County and Knight Institute v. Trump have (so far) been successful in their arguments to federal courts that their government officials’ social media accounts are spaces where the public forum doctrine can apply and where they can exercise their constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. Chair Randall and President Trump have each lost their appeals in the Fourth and Second Circuit Courts respectively, and further development of the public forum doctrine in the context of social media is highly anticipated by both the legal and tech communities.

On appeal, both President Trump and Chair Randall advanced arguments that their social media accounts do not constitute public forums because they are privately-owned property that serve as vehicles for their own private speech. President Trump offered a particularly compelling argument that blocking critics from @realDonaldTrump does not violate their First Amendment rights because his intention in using the account was to “disseminate his own views to the world,” not create a public forum where other Twitter users can “piggyback” on his speech to “amplify their own.” Pointing to the fact that the @realDonaldTrump account existed before he ascended to the Presidency, and will remain his primary Twitter account after he leaves office, President Trump argues that the account “belongs to him, not to the federal government” and that “bootstrapping” First Amendment protections into the “interactive space” of his tweets “by applying the ‘forum’ label” creates an unprecedented “tool for judicial superintendence of personal Twitter accounts and private interactions among Twitter users.”

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201 Id. at 237–38.
204 See Brief for Appellants at 20, Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-2002); Brief for Appellants at 1, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1691).
205 Brief for Appellants at 3, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1691).
206 Id. at 15, 20, 30, 33.
While the Second Circuit did not hand President Trump the victory he sought, another Circuit may yet, if not to the President then to some other government official fighting for the right to curate the content and appearance of their official social media accounts. The Second and Fourth Circuits’ rulings in *Knight* and *Davison* are remarkable wins for those who wish to designate all social media sites held by government officials as putative public forums, particularly if private citizens are invited by and encouraged to communicate with the official via private social media platforms.\(^{207}\) Yet, such victories, as glorious as they are, perpetuate the use of the public forum doctrine to protect a limited view of speech where the only harm suffered by the muffled speaker is their inability to speak directly to President Trump in the form of Twitter replies and retweets and to Chair Randall in the form of Facebook comments.\(^{208}\) The provenance of social media, however, is not just unilateral or linear forms of communication, like telephone calls, emails, soapboxes in parks, or microphones at the town hall.\(^{209}\)

In the context of interactive social media, where most if not all communications between users are public and open to the eyes and comments of others, the deeper harm suffered by people banned or blocked from a government official’s social media presence is exclusion from the collective of followers. Even after being banned from Chair Randall’s Facebook Page, Mr. Davison could post “essentially the same” critical message on multiple other Facebook Pages, including his own.\(^{210}\) But Chair Randall did not merely take away Mr. Davison’s ability to speak to her through her Facebook Page; she excluded him from the congregation of those assembled in the virtual space of her Page. Briefly noting that among the burdens of being blocked are the inability “to participate in the comment threads associated with the President’s tweets” and “to converse on Twitter with others who may be speaking to or about the President,”\(^{211}\) Judge Wynn did not explore the social and political consequences of being banished from the public forum. Mostly lost in the *Davison* and *Knight* decisions is consideration for how people use social media

\(^{207}\) See, e.g., Lidsky, *supra* note 123, at 2024.

\(^{208}\) See *id.* at 2017–20 (advancing an argument that modern public forum jurisprudence is organized around a “linear model of speech [that] gives inadequate consideration to the interest[s] of speakers” and audiences).

\(^{209}\) See *id.* at 2015, 2017–19. See also *supra* Part I for a discussion of how social media engineers call-and-response into platform communication options.


\(^{211}\) Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 232, 238 (2d. Cir. 2019).
to meet others and congregate “in groups, in communities, among strangers, [and] among people they come to know.”  

Social media, for better or worse, creates spaces for people to interact, protest, and assemble in groups. The interactions may be metaphysical, ephemeral, and mediated, but that does not mean the conversations, debates, discussions, information sharing, and relationships created by and through and in these spaces are not real. There is a compelling need to remedy the exclusionary harms caused to individuals banned or blocked from participating in the public forum of a government official’s social media, a thoroughly modern need that calls for the revitalization of the First Amendment’s Assembly Clause and its ancient protections for the rights of people to congregate in groups for social and political purposes.

IV. CHALLENGING SOCIAL MEDIA BLOCKING UNDER THE ASSEMBLY CLAUSE: POTENTIALS & POSSIBILITIES

Modern public forum jurisprudence is limited by its singular focus on individual speech rights, particularly in the new context of social media accounts created and maintained by government officials. Regardless of whether the official intended to open their account as a place where individuals could gather and discuss important political or social issues in the presence of state actors, the reality is that people are engaging interactively with the social media profiles of more than 10,000 U.S. federal agencies and sub-agencies, all 100 senators, almost all of the 435 representatives, and thousands of state and local officials and agencies. Exclusion from any of these social media accounts through blocking or banning tools offered by the social media platform harms the blocked individual not only because they are deprived of a right to speak directly to the government official who holds the account, but also because they have been banished from the “virtual assembly” of their peers and fellow constituents.

213 See supra Part I.
214 Prominent scholars John D. Inazu and Lyrissa Lidsky argue that the public forum doctrine’s reliance on the Free Speech Clause has hobbled the development of robust doctrine asserting the right of individuals to assemble in groups in public spaces. See Inazu, supra note 117, at 1166–67; Lidsky, supra note 123, at 1976–78.
215 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
A. The Assembly Clause Protects the Rights of Individuals to Join with Others in Public Spaces

The Assembly Clause offers a rich historical framework for conceiving of the issues relating to recognizing public forums on social media. Recent scholarship confirms that the assembly right has deep roots in English and American systems of democratic government, stemming from early modern English recognition of a right to associate with others and petition the government. Pointing to the importance of the assembly right as an essential precursor of and requirement for political activism and civic participation throughout American history—illustrated by examples as varied as precolonial Revolution Societies, the abolition movement, women’s clubs, the labor movement, and Occupy Wall Street—scholars have also argued that assembly is “essential to democratic self-governance.”

The Supreme Court first recognized the right of assembly in *De Jonge v. Oregon*, where Dirk De Jonge was convicted for violating the state’s “criminal syndicalism” law prohibiting advocacy of “unlawful acts or methods as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution.” He was arrested for teaching Communist doctrine to several hundred people gathered in a meeting hall. Striking down Oregon’s law as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”

Since the mid-1960s and the *Perry* decision, however, the Supreme Court has moved in the direction of presuming that government regulation of access to public forums is legitimate so long as the restriction on speech meets a “formalistic threshold” of content and viewpoint neutrality. People, though, need and desire places to assemble, both for the value of the congregation itself as a group and as a space where they can define themselves as a group to others. The value of a right to assembly underlies the ability of individuals to “join with others . . . embolden[ing] them to come forward, and to participate in social and political

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220 Id. at 358–59.
221 Id. at 364.
222 Inazu, *supra* note 117, at 1175. *But see* Kalven, Jr., *supra* note 126, at 23 (arguing that restrictions on access to public forums should be minimal and focus on meeting the need for “some commitment to order and etiquette”).
activities[...] [in] a variety of individual acts of defiance, contention, and expression.”

Amplifying the relational context, for “one can speak alone; one cannot assemble alone,” the assembly right allows members of a group to engage with and speak to an external audience “but also with one another within a group to foster ideas and identities in the ‘pre-political’ and ‘pre-expressive’ moments of group formation.” Significant modern public forum disputes have involved collectives of individuals seeking access to government properties to assemble, coordinate themselves, recruit, and share their message with the government or other members of an interested audience. Groups may be denied access to the town hall or the public park or the sidewalk not only because the government wants to suppress their viewpoint, but also to suppress the existence of the assembly itself. It is that right that needs to be strengthened today in the new context of social media.

B. The Assembly Clause More Accurately Evokes the Rights People Want to Claim in Social Media Spaces

People go onto social media for a variety of reasons: to speak, to see, to be seen, to be spoken to, and to be spoken about. Facebook and Twitter satisfy those all-too-human urges with user interfaces that capture all of that overlapping public dialogue, discussion, reaction, and notice, with tools like Facebook’s “mentions” and Twitter’s @ call-outs. Given the interactive, multilateral nature of social media platforms, the Assembly Clause offers a tighter conceptual fit than the Free Speech Clause to remedy the harms caused by government officials when they block critics on Facebook or Twitter.

Relying on traditional public forum doctrine that focuses on whether the government official impermissibly discriminated against someone because of their viewpoint, the courts in Davison

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224 Inazu, supra note 117, at 1169.


226 See supra Part I.

227 See supra Part I.
v. Loudoun County and Knight Institute v. Trump focus on the harm of not being able to “speak” directly to the government official via Facebook comments or Twitter replies and retweets. The harm caused by blocking has more than an individual repercussion, however; it exerts control over the collective assembling of individuals in the virtual space created through the government official’s social media account. The integrity of the group of individuals who choose to follow the government official on social media is disrupted. To return to the earlier hypothetical about the NYC Chancellor of Education’s use of the Puppetworks theater to host regular meetings about a district’s middle school integration plan, here the critics are not being silenced by having the microphone taken away. Instead, they are being ejected from the Puppetworks theater by government bouncers and refused re-entry to the meeting space even if they promise to refrain from speaking. Absent truly disruptive, obscene, or abusive conduct, such exclusion from the assembly space should be unconstitutional in a public forum.

Consider Judge Buchwald’s deliberations in Knight v. Trump. She went to great lengths to divide Twitter’s user interface into different sections and to figure out which section might or might not be a public forum, and she determined that the “interactive space” of @realDonaldTrump’s tweets—but not the comment threads—constitute a public forum because that is the specific tool individuals can use to direct private speech at the government on Twitter.229 Even though “the interactive space of a tweet can accommodate an unlimited number of replies and retweets,” Judge Buchwald considers only direct responses to @realDonaldTrump’s tweets worthy of protection on First Amendment grounds.230 Only on appeal did Judge Wynn even mention the potentially implicated rights of those who wish to converse with others “about the President” in the comment threads emanating from the President’s tweets,231 and that was only a passing notion written in dicta.

Importantly, we must ask: Why should we be content with such small patches of interactive cyberspace to exercise our First Amendment rights? Judge Buchwald’s conception of the forum privileges unilateral and bilateral speech between original posters and a single follower—here, between @realDonaldTrump

228 See supra notes 210–211 and accompanying text.
230 Id. at 573.
231 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 238 (2d Cir. 2019).
and any one of his millions of followers. But those exchanges are not where the real dialogues happen on Twitter. It is in the comment threads, which truly represent the unrestrained “vast democratic forums of the Internet” described in Reno v. ACLU, where users debate and discuss important issues and mobilize for protest and demonstration.232 Users cannot easily engage in any of this public-facing activity in @realDonaldTrump’s comment threads if they are blocked. For the excluded users to engage in the prodigious waves of tweets, retweets, replies, @mentions, and #s, they would have to use different Twitter accounts or try jumping in on the action via another Twitter follower who may respond to @realDonaldTrump’s tweets. Though the individual harm is de minimis—blocked users may use their own Twitter accounts to say whatever it is they want to say about President Trump—the exclusion is harm enough to implicate First Amendment protection.233

Consequentially, Judge Buchwald considers that blocked users are restricted from speaking to audiences that extend beyond mere replies to @realDonaldTrump, shifting the forum analysis focus slightly from a one-speaker-one-listener model to one more reflective of Twitter’s multilateral, overlapping structuring of user exchanges.234 Yet she places a restriction on the forum by bounding it to the interactive space allowing for direct replies and retweets that obscures the reality of how people communicate and organize on Twitter. This artificial restriction belies a disproportionate favoring of the right of speakers in the forum, rather than the rights of users to congregate in a forum to listen, learn, and perhaps speak.235


233 See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).

234 Id.

235 The First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly form a “close nexus” where freedoms of speech and assembly engender a freedom to associate for one’s own beliefs and, in a few cases, to receive information from others. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
Using the Assembly Clause to recognize spaces on the internet where First Amendment rights are protected would honor the historical right of people to stand with others in a group for a common political or social purpose in a thoroughly modern forum. Distinct from the Free Speech Clause, which focuses on the speaker's right, the Assembly Clause countenances the rights of the listeners, those who engage with fellow citizens and government officials “through the performance of communal acts, [whose] communicative possibility exists in joining, excluding, gathering, proclaiming, engaging, or not engaging.”

For advocates and scholars searching for an opportunity to revive the Assembly Clause, to divine new affirmative rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or to more thoroughly understand the harms suffered by users blocked, banned, or otherwise excluded from public forums on social media, the coming years could be a golden opportunity for experimentation and novel argument.

CONCLUSION

Streets, sidewalks, and parks are “quintessential public forums” for “assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” The public forum has officially re-located from the streets, parks, and sidewalks to the internet, more specifically to a range of social media platforms where government officials host virtual town halls, promote their own Twitter hashtags for constituents to share and use as advocacy tools, and solicit opinions on everything from playground design proposals to middle school integration plans. Government officials who block, ban, or otherwise exclude their followers from their social media channels violate their constitutional rights to speak and to assemble under the First Amendment. It is time to revive the moribund Assembly doctrine to protect the rights of people to congregate in social media’s public forums, particularly when user interfaces have been designed around the concept of multilateral, temporally diffuse conversations, interactions, and responsive engagement. The ephemeral and protean nature of the interactive social

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238 See Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34–36, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1691).
media environment demands no less than a newly defined right for a modern era.

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