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Common Sense and Conflict of Laws
A Welcome Change

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Common Sense is beginning to come to conflict of laws. Progress is slow and the steps are being made with hesitation but what is important in the final analysis is that some courts are beginning to talk the kind of language and write the kind of opinions that lawyers can understand. This has not been the tradition in the conflicts area. The courts have shifted from allegiance to the arid conceptualism of Restatement I and its outworn theory of vested rights to an equally dogmatic theory of rigid interest analysis. Dogma does not make good law and results in the conflicts cases bear out this thesis convincingly. The search for justice in general and "conflicts justice" in particular admittedly requires a theoretical framework; but, a heavy dose of common sense and genuine sense of balance is a value of equal importance. It is to the development of that sense of balance that this article will address itself.

To demonstrate what I consider the "common sense gap" in the decisional process, I shall call on two recent cases one that is wed to the old vested rights theory—the other an extreme application of interest analysis. In 1966 the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Landers v. Landers was asked to pass on a complaint by a wife against her husband which alleged that the wife was injured in Virginia when due to the gross negligence of the husband he lost control of his car. As a result, the car went off the highway and crashed into a creek. The cause of action was brought in Connecticut which permits a wife to sue a husband in tort—interspousal immunity having been abrogated by statute. One would think that this case should have provided no problem to the Connecticut court. Since both the husband and wife were Connecticut domiciliaries and the question before the court was whether a wife had the capacity to sue her husband, there should have been no difficulty in deciding the case for the plaintiff. The court found for the defendant. Why? Because in Virginia a wife lacks the capacity to sue her husband, there should have been no difficulty in deciding the case for the plaintiff. The court found for the defendant. Why? Because in Virginia a wife lacks the capacity to sue her husband, since the accident took place in Virginia under the theory of lex loci delicti that law must inexorably govern this cause of action. The rights of the parties were vested at the moment of impact as defined by the law of the state in which the impact took place. If one were to ask why should Virginia law governing interspousal immunity govern Connecticut

*Author's Note] Following the decision in Cipolla v. Shaposka which is discussed at length in my article the editors of the Duquesne Law Review undertook an extensive symposium to explore the views of some of the outstanding academic scholars on this important case. The symposium appears in Volume 9 of the Duquesne Law Review, pp. 347-465. The present article reflects a substantial revision of my comments which appeared in that symposium, in an article entitled: "Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers—The Pennsylvania Method," 9 DuqLRev 373 (1971). The scope of the comments in the Duquesne Law Review symposium are broad indeed. They reflect the great diversity of opinion in this field today in a striking fashion.

1 Restatement of Conflicts (1934).
2 The decisions of the New York and Wisconsin courts are notorious for their rigidity. Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis2d 468, 157 NW2d 579 (1968) and Tooker v. Lopez, 24 NY2d 569, 301 NYS2d 519, 249 NE2d 394 (1969) are examples of the extreme applications of interest analysis.

5 Public Acts 1877 c. 114 (as amended, General Statutes, c. 806).
domiciliaries, it is difficult to come up with a rational answer. Interspousal immunity is supported by two reasons; (1) that a law suit between husband and wife would disturb the family harmony and (2) the fear that the suit will not be an adversary one and that both husband and wife will collude to defraud the insurance company.\(^5\) Given these policy reasons behind the doctrine of interspousal immunity, why should Virginia law govern? The state that is most concerned with family harmony, in this instance, is Connecticut. Having decided that interspousal suits should be permitted, why should Connecticut be concerned with how Virginia deals with Virginia domiciliaries? As to the second policy reason for the immunity based on the fear of collusive suits, Connecticut has made the judgment that it can adequately control the fraud problem and that it is more important that there be adequate recovery for the injured plaintiff. Furthermore, the car was insured in Connecticut and premiums paid presumably on the assumption that there would be no interspousal immunity. It would appear that a miscarriage of justice has occurred when the plaintiff-wife was denied recovery merely because the accident occurred in Virginia, whose law denies recovery since the only relevant law to the problem which the court faced was that of Connecticut.\(^7\) Yet, the inexorable logic of *lex loci* led to the application of Virginia law. By analyzing the interest and policies behind the rule of interspousal immunity, it would have become clear that this apparent conflict was in reality a "false" one. A moderate dose of common sense would have led the court to the correct result. Reliance on the dogmatic vested rights theory led to an irrational result.

A recent case decided by the New York Court of Appeals demonstrates rather well that bad results are not limited to those courts which still follow the vested rights theory. In *Miller v. Miller*\(^8\) the New York Court demonstrated that a modern interest analysis approach, if rigidly applied, could be as much at odds with common sense as the old vested rights theory. In August 1961, the late Earl Miller, a resident of New York, embarked on a short business trip to Brunswick, Maine, where his brother resided and where they had mutual business interests. Two days after his arrival he went for a ride in a car owned by his sister-in-law and driven by his brother. Mr. Miller was killed when the vehicle suddenly swerved off the road and crashed into a bridge railing. Some three months after the accident the decedent's brother and sister-in-law who had been Maine residents, returned to reside in New York. Shortly thereafter, the decedent's wife filed suit against the decedent's brother and sister-in-law for the wrongful death of her husband. The defendants raised as a partial defense the $20,000 limitation on wrongful death in effect in Maine at the time of the accident. The court phrased the issue in the following manner:

The question presented by this appeal is whether the $20,000 limitation on recovery in wrongful death actions should be applied in this action for the benefit of the resident wife and children of a New York decedent against New York resident defendants where the accident took place in Maine and the defendants resided there at the time of the accident.\(^9\)

One would think that this was an easy case to decide. A Maine driver was driving his brother, a New York resident, who was visiting Maine for a short ride which began in Maine and was to end in Maine. It would appear rather obvious that defendant should have the law of Maine which limited wrongful death recovery to $20,000 apply to this accident. The court indulging in a fanciful interest analysis found for the plaintiff. It reasoned that New York had a strong interest in protecting its domiciliaries (the decedent's family) so that they be adequately compensated for the loss of the "bread winner." Having established a strong New York interest the court set about destroying Maine's interest in applying its wrongful death limitation to the case at bar. The court reasoned that in light of unlimited liability for cases in which the plaintiff was not killed it could not conclude that the Maine defendant "relief" on the Maine wrongful death limitation in purchasing appropriate insurance coverage. With respect to the liability of the insurer and its expectations the court concluded that the insurer must have expected that it might have to pay off claims

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\(^{7}\) See text accompanying footnote 45 for a partial rebuttal to this argument.

\(^{8}\) 22 NY2d 12, 290 NYS2d 754, 237 NE2d 877 (1968).

\(^{9}\) Id. 237 NE2d at 878.
for accidents outside of Maine in which the limited liability would not apply. The court also found it to be relevant that the defendant had moved to New York following the accident thus diminishing any interest Maine might have in "regulating the rights of its citizens" (protecting them from high speculative wrongful death claims).

One can hardly refrain from reacting with unrestrained cynicism to the New York court's decision. It would seem rather elementary that Maine would have a rather significant interest in applying its law to a set of events in which the defendants were Maine domiciliaries when those events transpired in Maine. If interest analysis leads to a different result then it is at odds with common sense. It is possible—indeed it is quite easy—to take issue with the New York court's evaluation of the interests. By manipulating the interest analysis discussion we could reach a different and sensible conclusion. However, the fault with that approach is that it admits the very validity of the system (interest analysis) which requires, in this author's opinion, serious re-evaluation.

THE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM

At the outset of this piece it was suggested that both the vested rights theory and the rigid interest analysis approach were often at odds with common sense. However, common sense is not a commodity one can purchase at a supermarket, nor can it be sold to an appellate court as the sole grounds in support of a position that one is advocating. One has some duty to articulate the factors that are ingredients of a common sense approach to choice of law. It is this author's opinion that the major factor which has upset the analytical balance in conflict of laws is the inability of courts and scholars alike to appreciate the appropriate role that territorialism must play in a rational choice of law system.

This statement may at first appear somewhat odd. After all, the First Restatement of Conflicts and the vested rights theory gave a pre-eminent role to territorialism. Under that theory all rights became rigidly vested depending on the geographical location of the parties at the time the judicial event took place. Yet, that was precisely the problem. Territorialism became a dogma. It was not dealt with as an important factor of the case it was the only factor. Under such an approach irrational decisions such as the Landers10 case discussed earlier were decided. The reaction to the territorialism of the "vested righters" was a total negation of territorial considerations by those positing an interest analysis. The fruits of that approach are now visible decisions such as Miller v. Miller,11 the New York wrongful death decision. However, the action-reaction syndrome has begun to play itself out. Court and scholars are attempting to consolidate the gains earned by the adoption of the interest analysis. There is evidence that this process is now well under way.

In March, 1970 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Cipolla v. Shaposka.12 The facts in the case are quite simple. The defendant, John Shaposka, a Delaware resident, had an accident while driving in Delaware. The plaintiff, Michael Cipolla was a passenger in the car. It appears that the defendant-Shaposka was driving his father's car which was garaged, licensed and insured in Delaware. The conflicts problem was a familiar one. Delaware has a host-guest statute which bars recovery in the absence of intentional or wanton misconduct, Pennsylvania permits recovery for ordinary negligence in host-guest cases. Process was served on the defendant in Pennsylvania.

Six years earlier in the now famous Griffith v. United Airlines13 case Pennsylvania had committed itself to the interest analysis theory. In subsequent cases, the court had indicated that it would take a principled approach to deciding such cases and would not use interest analysis to accomplish an unconscionable plaintiff bias.14 The Cipolla case, however, presented a challenge—it was a true conflicts case. Since the plaintiff was a Pennsylvania domiciliary the forum had an interest in applying its rule permitting a guest to sue a host thus granting compensation to him.

10Supra, note 4.
11Supra, note 8.
13416 Pa 1, 203 A2d 796 (1964).
On the other hand, the court acknowledged that Delaware's interest was substantial in applying its host-guest rule in favor of the Delaware defendant. Whatever, the policy reason behind the host-guest rule it is abundantly clear that Delaware's interest in having its law applied in favor of a Delaware domiciliary while driving in Delaware is an overriding one and its law should govern. Common sense would reject a contrary finding. To the credit of the Pennsylvania court they found in favor of the defendant. Yet, the court was faced with the problem that the interests of Pennsylvania were diametrically opposed to those of Delaware. How were they as a matter of principle to find against their own interest?

To aid in resolving this conflict the court turned to the monumental work of Professor David Cavers of the Harvard Law School, entitled The Choice of Law Process. Professor Cavers has attempted to work out what he calls "Principles of Preference" to assist in resolving "true conflict cases. Underlying the Cavers' Principles of Preference is a belief that "territorialism" plays an important role in choice-of-law. Although, I am in substantial agreement with much of what Professor Cavers advocates it has been my belief that his territorial theory has never been adequately explained. To the extent that a total rationale has not been worked out there are instances when a deeper appreciation for territorialism would lead one less often to a more balanced and less plaintiff oriented approach to choice-of-law. A brief exposure to the Cavers' Principles of Preference seems necessary at this juncture. It should be emphasized that a sophisticated and intelligent approach to territorialism is not merely of academic importance. Territorialism properly understood can provide the defense with strong arguments to blunt the heavy plaintiff bias presently operating in the choice-of-law area. It shall be the author's objective in the ensuing pages to present a critique of territorialism and then offer a new supporting rationale for this doctrine. Throughout the discussion an attempt will be made to integrate the territorial approach with the development case law under interest analysis.

COMMON SENSE AND PRINCIPLES OF PREFERENCE

Given a true conflict case a court is faced with an onerous decision. It could always prefer its own law thus giving effect to its own state interest and the temptation to do so is great indeed. Yet, the net effect of this approach as would be to parochialize the fifty states that make up this country. Underlying this approach is the belief that there is no rational way to decide sensitive choice of law problems. Admittedly there are tough cases which present vexing problems—perhaps almost impossible ones—for satisfactory resolution. Nevertheless, that is not true of the vast majority of choice of law problems.

Professor Cavers' Principles of Preference are devoted to indicating how a state court can in a balanced way decide a true conflicts case. To demonstrate the operation of Principle of Preferences the author will focus on two territorial principles which deal primarily with tort problems. Principle I declares:

Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of conduct or of financial protection against injury than do the laws of the state where the person causing the injury has acted or had his home, the laws of the state of injury should determine the standard and the protection applicable to the case, at least where the person injured was not so related to the person causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing the relationship.

Cavers reasons that a state's system of tort law is designed to safeguard the health and safety of people within its bounds and that the system of physical and financial protection would be impaired if a person who enters the territory were not subject to its law. He then argues that since a state's plan of financial protection for the victims of violations of its standards includes the civil liability of the violator, the fact that the violator would be held to a lower standard of care or of damage in his home state are matters of little consequence to the state of injury. Since all states realize

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15The majority was quite vague as to what it thought was the policy behind the Delaware host-guest rule. The dissent by Mr. Justice Roberts discussed the question at great length.
16D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS, (1965) at page 139.
17See text accompanying footnotes 18-39.
this need to maintain the integrity of their rules providing for physical and financial protection each state would wisely defer to the state of injury in a true conflict case, if the state of injury had a higher standard of conduct or financial protection.¹⁰

Now, all this sounds fine and quite reasonable but I’m afraid it won’t wash out. The arguments simply don’t support a territorial principle. Under traditional analysis a state has two reasons for enforcing its tort law: (1) Deterrence and (2) compensation.²⁰ In the vast majority of conflict cases the argument that a state’s higher standard of financial protection deters negligent conduct is fatuous.²¹ I thought the Pennsylvania court in McSwain v. McSwain²² did a rather nice job of laying that argument to rest. The Court was asked to apply Colorado’s non-immunity rule to a Pennsylvania husband-wife. Under Pennsylvania law the husband was immune from suit and plaintiff sought to apply the law of the state of injury (Colorado) which permitted interspousal law suits. The court addressed itself to the deterrent argument saying:

Unlike resort to a standard of care less rigorous than that demanded by Colorado of those who use its highways, resort to the law of Pennsylvania to bar the instant suit would have no adverse affect on any deterrence sought by Colorado through the use of tort liability. Since negligent operation of a motor vehicle invariably involves some hazard to persons beyond the family relationship, potential liability remains to deter unreasonable conduct on the part of those able to insulate themselves from intrafamily immunity.²³

With regard to the superior interest of the state of injury in compensation for the plaintiff so that he has adequate funds to pay his doctor and hospital bills (affectionately known as the “medical creditor” interest), it is indeed difficult to make this point the kingpin of a territorial principle for several reasons. First of all, the presence of first party insurance (Blue Cross, Blue Shield, medical pay etc.) has weakened this argument substantially. Furthermore, Cavers himself has decided that his first territorial principle survives even in the absence of a strong compensation interest on the part of the state of injury. Cavers raises the problem of what ought a court to do with a plaintiff who is a visitor from out of state who seeks the protection of the higher standard of financial protection of the state of injury which would be denied to him in his home state.²⁴ In a situation where the state of injury would satisfy its need for payment of medical and hospital costs it is hard to see why the state of injury has any interest in providing more liberal compensation to the out-of-state plaintiff at the expense of its own citizen. To respond to this most difficult question, Cavers makes the following observation:

This contention neglects the consideration that the financial protection a state has prescribed, being a part of its provision for the general security, is in part a sanction for wrongfully causing harm. As a consequence its purposes include elements of deterrence and retribution even though it may be couched in essentially compensatory terms.²⁵

I believe we have now come full circle. In the absence of a compensatory interest in the state of injury we must view its compensatory scheme as furthering deterrent goals. But, the deterrent goals are not really meaningful since we have plenty of deterrent clout in the absence of this particular plaintiff’s recovery.²⁶ Is then Cavers’ first principle of preference built on a foundation of quicksand? I think not, but one can hardly be satisfied with the rationality offered in its defense.

The second Principle of Preference is most important to our discussion since it

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¹⁰Id. at 140-141.
²³Id. at 96, 215 A2d at 683.
²⁴Cavers, supra note 16 at 143.
²⁵Id. at 144.
²⁶See note 22.
was directly relied on by the Cipolla court.\textsuperscript{27} It provides:

Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused an injury set a lower standard of conduct or of financial protection than do the laws of the home state of the person suffering the injury, the laws of the state of conduct and injury should determine the standard of conduct or protection applicable to the case, at least where the person injured was not so related to the person causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing the relationship.\textsuperscript{28}

The facts in Cipolla concerned a Pennsylvania plaintiff-passenger injured in Delaware by a Delaware host. The court analyzed the case before it as a "real conflict" case since Delaware had a defendant-protecting host-guest rule and Pennsylvania the domicile of the plaintiff sought to protect its domiciliaries by granting them compensation from negligent defendants.\textsuperscript{29} It would appear that the facts in Cipolla are tailor made for this second principle. Yet, when we probe to find the rationale behind this liability-denying principle the reasons are rather unsatisfying:

Consider the response that would be accorded a proposal that was the opposite of this principle if it were advanced against a person living in the state of injury on behalf of a person coming there from a state having a higher standard of care of financial protection. The proposal thus advanced would require the community the visitor entered to step up its standards of behavior for his greater safety or lift its financial protection to the level to which he was accustomed. Such a proposal would be rejected as unfair.\textsuperscript{30}

Unfair? Why? The answer must be because a Delaware citizen ought not to be exposed to greater liability than he planned on. He would be surprised even shocked to find that while driving in Delaware he is subject to Pennsylvania law. But, now we are far afield from an interest analysis. Lest we forget, this case deals with a host-guest conflict. Assume for the moment that the policy expressed by the Delaware host-guest rule is the fear that the guest and host may collude to defraud the insurer.\textsuperscript{31} Since the purpose of Delaware law is not to affect the level of defendant's conduct by encouraging him to take risks with his passenger guests, we remain with our concern that the Delaware insurer may be defrauded by collision between the guest and host. However, our concern now is for the insurer and not the principal defendant. And to be consistent we must say that it is "unfair" to the insurer (not the defendant) to subject him to this surprise liability. It would seem that Justice Roberts has much the better argument on this point:

[If] the majority means that the insurance company, here Allstate, relied on not being held liable when setting its rates, I agree with Professor Morris that (the) theory . . . is tautological. The rules of liability are to be dictated by insurance practices which are in turn, dictated by the rules of liability. All that can be concluded from such a premise is that whatever is, should be.\textsuperscript{32}

Even if we agree with Justice Roberts that the purpose behind the Delaware host-guest rule is to protect the generous host from an ungrateful guest\textsuperscript{33} it is difficult to generate much enthusiasm for an "unfair surprise" argument when the host was driving a Pennsylvanian to his home in Pennsylvania. Had the accident taken place after the crossing of the state lines in Pennsylvania I rather think the court would have found for plaintiff and would not have been overly concerned with the surprise of the defendant. And even, if the court would have seen fit to adopt Cavers' fifth principle of preference\textsuperscript{34} favoring the law of the state in which the

\textsuperscript{27}39 Pa at 567, 267 A2d at 856.
\textsuperscript{28}Cavers, supra note 16 at 146.
\textsuperscript{29}See note 27.
\textsuperscript{30}Cavers, supra note 16 at 146.
\textsuperscript{31}As noted earlier, one can only guess how the majority read the purpose behind the Delaware host-guest rule. Only the dissent induges in an in-depth analysis as to the policy behind the statute. In the discussion no question is raised as to the applicability of Delaware law in a totally domestic Delaware case where the motorist is uninsured. Although Delaware law will undoubtedly apply, if host-guest collusion is the policy behind the host-guest rule it has no relevance to the uninsured motorist case. This leads to the curious situation that Delaware will apply its law to a domestic situation when it furthers no rational purpose to do so. This author categorically rejects such nonsense.
\textsuperscript{32}39 Pa 572, 267 A2d at 859.
\textsuperscript{33}Id. at 858.
\textsuperscript{34}Cavers, supra note 16 at 177.
host-guest relationship was entered into; it would have done so to further values other than those of unfair surprise to the defendant. If the unfairness which troubles Cavers and the Cipolla court stems from the fear that a defendant should have the right to plan for his liability exposure we must assume that he is uninsured (for if he is insured the concern belongs to the insurer). Surely, territorialism is not built on the back of the uninsured motorist.

If I may hazard an educated guess, it would be that Cavers' territorialism is more potent than the rationale offered to support it. To support my "guesstimate" I should like to draw on a much discussed choice-of-law case arising from the embattled New York Court of Appeals, Tooker v. Lopez. It will be recalled that the tragic events of that case arose entirely in the state of Michigan. Plaintiff's and Defendant's deceased daughters, both New York residents, were co-eds attending Michigan State University. They and a third fellow student, a resident of Michigan embarked on a local Michigan trip which ended in the death of the two New Yorkers. The students were all in residence at the University and the trip was "intrinsically and exclusively a Michigan trip, concerned only with Michigan places, roads and conditions". The choice-of-law problem arose because New York has no host-guest rule and Michigan denies recovery in host-guest cases in the absence of "gross negligence or willful misconduct" on the part of the defendant.

The New York Court, in this case found for plaintiff and saddled the New York defendant with its higher standard of financial protection. In doing so, the court found it necessary to determine whether this case was a true or false conflict case. In a case almost exactly on point, Dym v. Gordon, the New York court had determined that this law-fact pattern was a true conflict. In Tooker, the court changed its mind:

The teleological argument advanced by some (see Cavers, Choice-of-law Process, p.298) that the guest statute was intended to assure the priority of injured non-guests in the assets of a negligent host, in addition to the prevention of fraudulent claims overlooks not only the statutory history but the fact that the statute permits recovery by a guest who can establish that the accident was due to the gross negligence of the driver . . . The only justification for discrimination between injured guests which can withstand logical as well as constitutional scrutiny . . . is that the legitimate purpose of the statute prevention of fraudulent claims against local insurers or the protection of local automobile owners—is furthered by increasing the guests' burden of proof. This purpose can never be vindicated when the insurer is a New York carrier and the defendant is sued in the courts of this state. Under such circumstances, the jurisdiction enacting such a guest statute has absolutely no interest in the application of its law.

Thus, New York has in this case on the basis of an interest analysis negated the Colorado interests which it had conjured up in Dym. The result—a false conflict case. I should like to create a hypothetical variant to this case by supposing that the Michigan court had spoken in the interim between Dym and Tooker and had made it crystal clear that the only policy reason supporting its host-guest rule was the "fraud on insurer" rationale. Michigan's Supreme Court being the highest appellate court of the state is presumptively the final authority when it comes to the interpretation of statutes passed by the Michigan legislature. It will do no good to rail at the Michigan court for failing to perceive

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35Cavers has serious qualms about Principle V. In certain instances such as husband-wife domiciled in a marital-immunity state who have an accident in a non-immunity state, Cavers is willing to recognize the validity of his fifth principle of preference favoring the law of the marital domicile which denies recovery. Although in McSwain v. McSwain, supra note 29, the court analyzed the case as a false conflict by negating Colorado's interests it is possible to read the case as a true conflict situation in which the court has decided the case in accordance with Cavers' Principle V. See discussion of Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co. infra at text accompanying footnotes 62-64. For another instance in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a Cavers' principle of preference without specifically alluding to it.

36The author recalls Professor Cavers' presentation at a round table discussion during the Association of American Law School convention in December 1969. He intimated at that time that his principles of preference might well apply in a false conflict setting.

37NY2d at 539, 301 NYS2d at 539, 249 NE2d at 409.

38NY2d 569, 301 NYS2d 519, 249 NE2d 394 (1969).

39Id. at 593, 301 NYS2d at 593, 249 NE2d at 409.

40NY2d 120, 262 NYS2d 465, 209 NE2d 792 (1965).

41NY2d at 575, 301 NYS2d at 523, 249 NE2d at 597.
Caver's teleological arguments. They have spoken with finality. Michigan's statute has one purpose and one purpose only—the prevention of fraud against insurance companies by a colluding host and guest.

Query. Now that this is a false conflict will Cavers argue for the application of New York law? I think not. Cavers has made it altogether too clear that he is greatly concerned with the development of a "statute personal" as the method for resolving conflicts problems.\(^4\) One does not, except in the rarest of situations, travel in the United States with the tough tort-law of his home state on his back. But, if we are to apply a territorial rule even in a false conflict setting, then we must openly admit a naked territorial bias unsupported by an interest analysis. Have we returned (heaven forbid) to Restatement I?

ENLIGHTENED TERRITORIALISM

What is missing today in choice-of-law analysis is a little bit of "soul." In the process of destroying Restatement I there was a heavy intellectual investment made . . . too heavy. Rules of law either furthered a particular policy or didn't—it was as simple as all that. We created categories called "false conflict" and "true conflict"—useful analytical tools to be sure—but they have gotten away from us. They have become our masters rather than our servants. A reappraisal as to the multitude of functions which law plays in our society is in order.

EXPECTATION AND SCHIZOPHRENIA

When I wake in the morning I expect the sun to shine. In the evening, I expect darkness to fall. Do these expectations have juridical significance? I believe they do. Those positing an interest analysis would argue that their significance arises from the fact that expectations affect conduct.\(^12\)

\(^4\) Cavers, supra note 16 at 150-157.

\(^12\) It is clear that Mr. Justice Roberts believes that choice-of-law expectations in the tort area have value only as a planning tool. If it would not lead to an alteration of either of the parties' behavior the expectations are irrelevant. Cipolla at 859. In this assumption Justice Roberts is in good company. See Weintraub, A Method For Solving Conflict Problems—Torts, 48 CORNELL LQ 213, 238 (1963); Currie, CONFLICT, CRISIS AND CONFUSION IN NEW YORK, 1963 DUKE L J 1, I undertake certain activities with an awareness of the amount of light that will be available to me. I suggest, however, that expectations play a far more potent role in our life style. There is a regularity and rhythm to life in which the familiar—the habitual plays a vital role. At times it affects conduct but even when it does not affect conduct, it affects our sense of tranquility. A meteor streaking along in the sky thousands of miles from us is of interest because it is a departure from the norm. We can take this departure from the norm with a fair degree of equanimity. If, however, we should go outside on a clear night in which the moon is clearly visible and find no stars it would upset us no end. It would upset us not because we depend on starlight, but because we have the right to believe in the regularity of nature.

Law is no stranger to human activity. If we live in a world of nature—we also live in a world of law. A Delaware driver, on a trip in Delaware expects Delaware law to apply. He may be driving a Pennsylvania guest to his home in Pennsylvania but his expectations prior and subsequent to any accident is that whatever the Delaware law may be it will apply to him. It is immaterial whether it affects his conduct. People have a right to expect a regularity and rhythm from the law. If this is what those who argue for certainty as a conflict of law value are concerned with then they have a point in their favor.

It appears to me that this is not the standard stare decisis type of argument. Change is part and parcel of the common law and the populace has learned to live
with it. What is difficult to accept is the notion that “time and space elements” play no role whatsoever in the legal framework of choice-of-law. I think we rather underestimate the embarrassment of the lawyer in the Cipolla case who had to explain to the defendant that he was being dragged through a trial because no one was quite sure which law governed his activities. The essence of a normal human existence is the ability to integrate one’s experience. We can provide for the throwout and the bizarre but it must be just that—bizarre. To demean “time and space” in the law of conflicts is to deny an important facet of the human experience. Delaware drivers driving in Delaware deserve Delaware law—for better or for worse. When the bizarre becomes the norm—we destroy the norm. The schizophrenic is the human symbol of this distorted point of view. It behooves those who advocate fragmented choice-of-law theory to reconsider normal expectancies as an appropriate function of the law.

Lest it be said that I am attacking the “intercessors” as the cause of mental disease in this country (some of my students swear it is true) let me emphasize again that I am only advocating territorialism as a normal operating principle. We can and will provide for the throwout and will do so honestly, reflecting the teaching of the interest analysis. But, the base rule should be a territorial one.

LAW AND THE HUMAN RESPONSE

The “false conflict” dogma has another glaring fault. It has been said and it bears repeating that determining the interests or policies behind both common law and statutory rules is a risky business. Jurisprudence becomes a deadly game rather than a philosopher’s musings. But, if we are to become jurisprudents we had better be good ones. It appears to me that the governmental interest analysis has missed some rather basic jurisprudential points in the development of its theory.

Let me spin a tale for you. If you are married and have married friends, I would expect that you have experienced something like this. You invite a young married couple over to dinner. During the conversation the husband makes a not so funny remark about his mother-in-law. No one laughs. Before very long the young bride is in tears and the husband enraged. After the young guests leave the host husband and wife carry on the argument—each taking sides. The next morning the host-wives calls the young bride and offers quasi-motherly advice. It is a topic of conversation in the hosts home for at least a week.

Now let me vary the hypothetical just a little. Instead of the argument between the young bride and her husband taking place in the home of the host it takes place at another friends house. After the quarrel Mrs. Friend waits until the young couple leaves and then calls her best friend Mrs. X who also knows the young bride and relates the story to her. Mrs. X may or may not relate the story to her husband. It certainly won’t be the basis of discussion in the X household for a week. And Mrs. X will definitely not get on the phone and call the young bride to offer motherly advice.

I would suggest that in conflicts parlance the first hypothetical I presented was a false conflict. Why should a husband and wife involve themselves in the marital problems of dinner guests. It would seem to be “none of their business” or “officious intermeddling.” And if it is their business why in Case Two do the very same friends remain uninvolved when the story is related to them second hand?

To me the answer to this problem is charmingly simple. Human beings are by nature “officious intermeddlers.” If we ask what engages human beings in the process of intermeddling, I think we should find a host of causes. In some instances, it is the relationship between the people involved, in others the problem is one which touches not only the combatants but also has tangential affects on others not directly involved. But, clearly one factor which leads human beings to react is the very sight of an injustice. “Seeing is believing” and “seeing is reacting.” When we react we need tools of justice to react with. This is the law in all its glory.

It has become an article of faith that in a false conflicts case the law of only one state has any claim to application. Yet, if we view some of the basic false conflict situations it would seem to me that this principle is open to serious question. Assume a husband-wife from a no immunity...
state who have an accident in an immunity state or a host-guest who started their trip in a non host-guest (common law) jurisdiction who have an accident in a host guest jurisdiction. The interest dogma teaches that since the state that imposes the immunity or disability on recovery in each instance has no interest in denying recovery it should not intermeddle and impose its law since it furthers no state policy to do so. In a recently published article, Professor Sedler in dealing with the problems of characterization aptly described many of the immunity type statutes and policies as “anti-tort.” In other words the conflict between the policies of the competing laws are not conflicts arising from differing resolution to tort problems but because one state has seen fit to foster policies over and above normal tort-compensatory policies—they are thus “anti-tort.” He then reasons:

Since the defenses of family immunity, charitable immunity and guest relationship are grounded in policies other than those to be advanced by that area of the law we call tort and are in fact directly antithetical to those policies, the state of injury has no interest in granting that kind of immunity. This issue does not involve a tort problem, and the state of primary reference—the state having an interest in granting the immunity claimed—is elsewhere. The law of that state should be consulted first and if immunity is not given by the law of that state, there is no reason to allow the defense.

I disagree. When a state makes an “anti-tort” policy determination it is making a policy judgment of the highest order. Whether its judgment is that the family order will be disturbed or that parties will conclude against insurance companies—its judgment is a moral one. To say that it is a localized judgment and that this high priority moral statement is for local consumption only is to deny the potency of the very decision to negate normal compensatory policies.

When an accident occurs within a state’s boundaries it would seem presumptuous to tell the state that its sense of morality is irrelevant to events that have transpired within. Family harmony and insurance fraud are national; not local, problems. If a problem arises in which the human tendency to react has been called upon, we can have little to say if the human tendency to impose one’s own notion of right or wrong to the problem is engaged. We have negated the experiential in the law and because of it our conflicts law is the poorer. Edmund Cahn in his classic work The Sense of Injustice put it very well:

Why do we speak of the “sense of injustice” rather than the sense of justice? Because “justice” has been so beclouded by natural-law writings that it almost inevitably brings to mind some ideal relation or static condition or set of perceptual standards, while we are concerned, on the contrary what is active, vital, and experiential in the reactions of human beings. Where justice is thought of in the customary manner as an ideal mode or condition, the human response will be merely contemplative and contemplation bakes no loaves. But the response to a real or imagined instance of injustice is something quite different; it is alive with movement and warmth in the human organism. (Emphasis added)

I do not mean to imply that the false conflict category is meaningless. Its input is important but not conclusive on the resolution of conflict problems. It tells us that in certain instances it would be far wiser for a court to say this is “less my business” than “yours.” However, as the “time and space” aspects of the case become more related to the state of injury, it becomes more “their” business in that the human reaction to the case becomes more vital. I rather agree with Professor Cavers that Dym v. Gordon was a good case and express my dismay at its demise. Because writ all over the case was the inability of the majority to wrench itself away from its human reaction to a case which was more a “Colorado” case than a “New York” case.

LAW AS AN EDUCATOR

The pure “interest analysis” theorists have failed to perceive another fundamental function of the law. Its educational dimension is a matter of rather substantial

45Id. at 54.
46See note 39.
47See Cavers, supra note 16, Appendix at 293.
significance. To demonstrate this function in a conflicts setting I propose to call on an excellent Cavers' hypothetical. It will be recalled that in the famous case of Bernkrant v. Fowler\textsuperscript{48} the California court was faced with an oral contract to make a will which was negotiated in Nevada in favor of a Nevada plaintiff. The consideration for the promise to make the will was that the plaintiff refinance his obligation and pay a substantial part of the indebtedness on a piece of Nevada land before the due date of the debt. In return the decedent promised forgiveness if there was any amount due and owing at the time of his death. The decedent died domiciled in California, a state, whose Statute of Frauds declares oral contracts to make a will invalid. The Nevada rule is to the contrary. The California statute is designed to reach a contract be denied enforcement? Will the contract be denied enforcement? Will the contract be denied enforcement? Would we argue that a false conflict case has due process implications but overuse of this argument in a standard F-X type case is, in the author's view, unsupportable.

How does one assess the above argument? Does it really make that much difference to California that this individual contract be denied enforcement? Will the impact on plans, hopes and expectations be altered throughout that great state simply because of the enforcement of this isolated contract? I think not. Yet, I believe Cavers to be correct.

The law is a teacher and an educator. No teacher is able to instruct in a vacuum. And the law does not do its teaching in a vacuum. It calls upon the events which transpire before it for its instruction—they are its primer. To say that a contract made totally in California and invalid under its law is not part of California jurisprudence is to utter an absurdity. I believe Cavers to be correct.

Professor Cavers' hypothetical twists the facts somewhat so that plaintiff is a Californian,\textsuperscript{49} the promise made and the property located there, and the decedent-vendor a California domiciliary at the time of the refinancing. If the decedent had become a Nevadan shortly before his death whose law would apply? Would we argue that since the decedent died domiciled in a state which enforces oral contracts to make a will that the case is a false conflict? Cavers concludes that California law should apply thus denying the enforcement of the contract. His reasoning is most interesting:

Surely the California statute is designed not merely to balk frauds and perjuries after the testator's death but also to exert pressure upon people to put their testamentary promises in signed writings, to discourage people from cherishing hopes, making plans, and taking action on the strength of oral promises of this sort. If these purposes are to be effectuated, the statute must have a present impact; the undertaking is born defective and remains so unless and until the promise is reduced to writing and signed or an estoppel is worked.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 60.
Preferences is in order. The task is now to learn to work with the tools which he has provided for us. This is a substantial task; because as Cavers suggests his method does not call for agreement on the particular principles or their applicability to given fact situations. There is much work to be done. To demonstrate the workability of the Cavers' principles I shall now briefly focus on their applicability to the already decided Pennsylvania cases.

CIPOLLA AND THE LOCUS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

_Cipolla v. Shaposka_ has relationship problems. Given the state of the record in the case it is not at all clear that by focussing more heavily on the factual context of the relationship that the court could have reached a different result. It should have, however, explored the possibility. The decision to apply Delaware law would have been all the more meaningful. Even if the majority could afford the luxury of less than careful examination of the facts, it seems clear that the lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Roberts, could have milked the facts of this case to support his result on more traditional grounds.

The relationship between the host and guest is the focal point of _Cipolla_. Where and how the relationship was entered into cannot be irrelevant to the resolution of the case. These facts not only affect this author's predilections on how to resolve this conflict problem but are crucial to a court which has openly embraced Cavers' principles of preference as the Pennsylvania court has done. When the court adopted Cavers' territorial principle favoring the lower standard of liability of the state of conduct and injury it was certainly aware of the caveat built into that principle viz. that it only applied "where the person injured was not so related to the person causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing the relationship." Where the "seat of the relationship" is a state which has a higher standard of financial protection than the state of injury, Cavers' fourth principle of preference selects that law to govern.

Admittedly seeking the "seat of the relationship" is a difficult task. Some have despaired of ever determining its locus. And if it could be found, it is argued, that it is of questionable relevance. Having argued so strongly in favor of a territorial bias earlier in this article it might appear unseemly to favor the anti-territorial "relationship" principle. However, the "time and space" elements of a conflict case can make the relationship between the parties the dominant influence in deciding between two interested jurisdictions. As such, even an anti-territorial "relationship" principle takes on a territorial cast—but now it is the "territory" in which the relationship is centered.

Now back to _Cipolla_. In this case the record indicates that the defendant, Shaposka, drove the plaintiff-Cipolla home on the fateful day because defendant wanted to pick up some tools he had lent the plaintiff. It is also clear that defendant drove the plaintiff home on numerous occasions when he had difficulty getting a ride home. Is this sufficient to invoke the anti-territorial "relationship" principle and thus apply the Pennsylvania higher standard of financial protection? I think not. But, in all honesty one must admit that there is a slight tug toward finding a Pennsylvania relationship. Assume, however, that defendant Shaposka has come to Pennsylvania to study for final exams with plaintiff _Cipolla_. If Shaposka had driven back to school and the accident had occurred in Delaware, a stronger case could be made out for the Pennsylvania relationship so that Pennsylvania law might govern. It might well be that Cavers would support such a conclusion. One can only guess since Cavers leaves that question somewhat open. He raises the following question:

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53Cavers, supra note 4 at 136.

54Id. at 146.

55Id. at 166.

56Rosenberg, supra note 43 at 463.

57Id.

58In certain cases, such as in Dym v. Gordon or Tooker v. Lopez, the "time and space" elements may so dominate the case that even if the case is analytically a false conflict, the territorial law should govern. See text accompanying footnote 39.


60Deposition of John Shaposka, Id. at 37.
Suppose, however, that one or both of the parties came from the state of injury or from another state with a guest-passenger statute. Does the fact that the relationship was created in New York (a common law jurisdiction) override this circumstance? Ought New York law still to be viewed as controlling a guest passenger relationship created in New York between two Ontario citizens in view of that province’s refusal to allow a guest to recover under any circumstances? I should think an affirmative answer to that question very doubtful, despite the fact the principle may in terms appear to cover it. More however can be said for applying New York law to a New York driver who injures an Ontario guest in Ontario or even for giving its benefit to a New York guest who is in Ontario by his Ontario driver, the relationship having in both cases begun in New York. (Parentheses, explanations and emphasis added.)

Translating the above into Cipolla facts it appears that Cavers would suggest that if a nominal Pennsylvania relationship between Cipolla and Shaposka could be established then it might be fair to apply Pennsylvania law to the case. If the mere fact that the parties entered into the car to make a trip together from Pennsylvania is enough to build a Pennsylvania relationship then perhaps the fact that the purpose of the trip was a Pennsylvania act (the returning of defendant’s tools in Pennsylvania) is sufficient to establish a Pennsylvania relationship.

At this point, I find myself pushed to an even stronger territorial bias than Cavers. It seems to me that the “seat of the relationship” rule requires stronger “time and space” considerations than Cavers allows. If the territorial considerations which I have developed earlier have any validity then they cannot be side-tracked by synthetic relationships which have no “time and space” dimensions. I am willing to support the application of anything but Delaware law when a Delaware driver is driving in his own home state unless the Pennsylvania relationship between the plaintiff and defendant has true depth and dimension to it. I can envisage a case where a Delaware citizen drives into Pennsylvania and requests a Pennsylvania doctor to come to his home for an emergency house call. The Delawarean drives the doctor to his home and on the way back before crossing the Delaware line is involved in an accident in which the doctor is injured. To argue for the application of Pennsylvania law in this instance does not upset me since the case is essentially a “Pennsylvania case.” The Pennsylvania relationship has time and space dimensions and can be defended as being crucial to the resolution of the case.

Notwithstanding my own bias as to how to handle the “relationship” issue and my conclusion that on any reading of the facts in this case Delaware law should apply. I am genuinely sorry that the decision did not focus in on this problem. As precedent, it would have made the decision a far more potent one. For the majority it would have meant shaping the contours of Cavers’ second principle of preference upon which they relied. It would have said that unless the relationship between plaintiff and defendant is more clearly a Pennsylvania one, Delaware law will apply. The dissent could have argued for the application of Pennsylvania law on something more than—equal interest + better law = common law liability. At the very least, the dissent should have sought to wrench this case from the strong Delaware ties which appear on its face. The pattern and practice of driving the plaintiff home to Pennsylvania and the trip in this instance to pick up tools from the plaintiff in Pennsylvania would go a long way toward making the dissent’s conclusion to apply Pennsylvania law a credible one. Furthermore, it would have permitted Mr. Justice Roberts greater leeway in future cases to apply the territorial law where the out of state factors are not so clearly visible.

THE FORGOTTEN ELSTON CASE

The Pennsylvania court correctly characterized Cipolla as a true conflict case. It also concluded that it could seek little direction from prior Pennsylvania conflict cases since they were false conflict cases. I am puzzled. In 1966 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided a rather important true conflict case. For some inexplicable reason it did not even rate a footnote citation in Cipolla. Tis a shame that the only clearly relevant authority was so blatantly ignored.

The case is Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co. A Pennsylvania resident work-
ing in New Jersey was injured there while operating a fork-lift truck purchased from a Pennsylvania corporation. Elston, the injured workman sought and received workmen’s compensation benefits pursuant to the New Jersey Workmen’s Compensation Act. Subsequently, Elston filed suit for negligence in Pennsylvania against Industrial Lift Truck Co., the manufacturer of the lift-truck. Industrial then sought to join Elston’s New Jersey employer by filing a third-party complaint alleging that the employer by reason of its conduct was jointly and severally liable. The New Jersey employer sought to resist the joinder claiming that New Jersey law insulated him from liability since it provides that when an employee entitled to workmen’s compensation benefit pursues a common law action against a third party based upon negligence, the third party is barred from joining and claiming contribution from the plaintiff’s statutory employer. Industrial, the Pennsylvania corporation seeking the joinder, argued that Pennsylvania law should govern since it permits a joinder limiting the contribution of the statutory employer to the extent of his liability under workmen’s compensation.

Mr. Justice Roberts, put the issue very clearly in focus:

In the instant case, however, Industrial, the party asserting a right to contribution, is a stranger to the compensation system. And, in a narrow sense, unlike an employee covered by New Jersey’s compensation program it received no quid pro quo from that state to compensate for the loss of its right to contribution.

The issue then very simply is, that a Pennsylvania domiciliary seeks recovery (contribution) from a New Jersey defendant. New Jersey law will not permit contribution because it has provided for a compensation plan which does not load the cost of contribution on the employer even if he is negligent. On the other hand the plaintiff seeking the contribution is not a New Jerseyite. New Jersey’s workmen’s compensation problems are not his concern and his state has sought to spread the cost of industrial accidents in a different manner. How resolve this conflict?

The Pennsylvania court concluded that New Jersey law must govern. Why?

[W]ere Industrial to prevail, the Pennsylvania policy of permitting contribution would be imposed upon the New Jersey program of workmen’s compensation. Pennsylvania thus, would interject a limitation on the manner by which New Jersey could determine to meet the social costs of its industrial accidents. Such an approach, in our view would be unsound. The extent to which the New Jersey program of workmen’s compensation should assimilate the equities underlying contribution is a determination more appropriately to be made by that state.

Are we truly to believe that an occasional third party contribution suit will throw the costing of New Jersey Workmen’s Compensation program out of kilter? I suggest that what the Pennsylvania court did in Elston is adopt Cavers’ second principle of preference just as they did in Cipolla. The court viewed it as unfair for a New Jersey employer who acted and caused injury in New Jersey to be subjected to Pennsylvania law simply because a Pennsylvania corporation would be adversely affected if New Jersey law would apply. Since the Elston facts did not indicate any special Pennsylvania relationship which would take the case out of the operation of Cavers’ second territorial principle the court decided to apply the New Jersey law which denied liability. The principle applied seems to be a rational one. The integrity of any state’s system of law should not be tampered with merely because there are out-of-state side effects. Very special circumstances must exist for an anti-territorial principle to operate and when they are not clearly in focus the territorial bias stands firm.

In failing to draw the Elston analogy the majority missed a golden opportunity to place the Cipolla case in a broader context thus demonstrating the overall utility of principles of preferences not only as an analytical tool but also as method of effectively predicting results in conflicts cases. Elston strengthened their position considerably. Mr. Justice Roberts who authored all of the very excellent Pennsylvania conflict opinions including Elston, in failing to discuss the impact of Elston has left us guessing as to his future choice-of-law methodology. The two cases can without doubt be distin-
guished. I do not believe, however, that they are poles apart. Though expectancy and reliance interests differ in the two cases I am unwilling to accept these arguments as the basis of the territorial preference in Elston over the domiciliary interest to Cipolla. Something more must support the differing results.

WORDS OF CAUTION

To the embattled attorney faced with evaluating a conflicts case under pressures of everyday practice, it is quite evident that this area of the law is altogether too complex. If an attempt is to be made, however, to fashion sensible territorial arguments to convince a court the lawyer will have to pay careful attention to the factual nuances of the case before him. Where the relationship of the parties was entered into, what was the purpose of the trip; was the trip an isolated instance or part of a continuing relationship etc., are examples of the kinds of questions that must be probed in depth in the preparation of a host-guest case. In close cases the ability to convince a court which is willing to accept a territorial argument could depend on the ability of the lawyer to paint the kind of picture which brings out its territorial dimensions.

CONCLUSION

The territorial bias of Cipolla v. Shapolska augers well for the development of conflict of law. The decision is strong not because it adopted a Cavers' principle of preference or because it indulged in a rigorous interest analysis. The strength of Cipolla lies in the willingness of the court to trust its judicial instincts of fairness and justice to the parties over the overly sophisticated attempts of the scholars to intellectualize legal concepts to the point of absurdity. Having attempted to support with argumentation that the territorial bias is based on some rather common sense notions about law and its functions in our complex world, I revel in the court's decision. Even handed justice had a good day in Pennsylvania.

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