Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause

Peter Tillers

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I struggled quite a bit over what I should talk about today. I know a little bit about exploratory fact investigation and about related matters such as induction and what philosophers of science call the logic of discovery. I thought about discussing the worrisome implications of Crawford v. Washington for constitutional regulation of early phases of criminal investigation, and I considered talking about the possibility that Crawford might further weaken the already

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1 Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.


2 Today the notion of a logic of discovery is much discussed. Karl Popper, perhaps inadvertently, deserves credit for first popularizing this notion. See KARL POPPER, LOGIK DER FORSCHUNG (1934) (the word “Forschung” is best translated as “research” or “investigation,” but the first English translation of Popper’s book rendered the title “The Logic of Scientific Discovery.” See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (Basic Books, 1959)).


4 Truth-oriented federal constitutional constraints on preliminary phases of criminal investigation are already de minimis. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (no due process violation because government failure to preserve breath samples in a drunk driving case was not done in bad faith). It is possible – if not inevitable – that the skepticism voiced by the Court in Crawford about the possibility of appellate assessment of the trustworthiness of testimonial evidence augurs continuing or even heightened reluctance by the Court to require the judiciary to police the trustworthiness of police investigation in the name of due process. Of course, Crawford does cast a backward shadow – it does influence pretrial police investigation – but the size of that shadow may be rather small because relatively few types of pretrial statements may turn out to be “testimonial” for the purposes of a Crawfordized, or Friedmanized, Confrontation Clause. (By speaking of Friedmanization, I am referring to Professor Richard Friedman’s substantial role in persuading the Supreme Court to revamp its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.) In any event, under any interpretation of Crawford – whether narrow or broad – the Confrontation Clause has no application to tangible evidence that does not contain symbols deposited by human beings that are designed to communicate information – to evidence such as blood, fingerprints, glass fragments, tire tracks, footprints, and images recorded by automatic cameras.
faint prospect that the Court might use the general due process guarantee to scrub criminal investigation of some pathologies that John Langbein complains about, as well as other pathologies that do not seem to worry him nearly as much.

But as alluring as this topic is, it has nothing to do with the topic under discussion in this symposium. So I have decided to stick to the assigned topic—the role of history in the interpretation and elaboration of the Confrontation Clause.

But my decision not to go off on a tangent dooms me to play the role of a Harold Carswell; I have to be a kind of academic version of Harold Carswell. Carswell, you may recall, was one of Richard Nixon’s nominees to the Supreme Court. You will also recall that Senator Roman Hruska spoke out in defense of that unsuccessful nomination and nominee. Hruska, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Creighton University, said:

Even if [Carswell] was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a little chance? We can’t have all Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that there.

This, alas, is the role I have to play – the role of a Harold G. Carswell – because I know practically nothing about legal history, and the little I once knew I have forgotten.

But what’s the point of having an ignoramus involved in this symposium? Being an ignoramus, I struggled over this question. After due deliberation, I concluded that even an ignoramus can contribute to an understanding of the role of history in constitutional argument about the Confrontation Clause. How can that be?

You might think of me as a cheap stand-in for Justice Scalia. I know what some of you are thinking. You’re thinking, “I know Justice Scalia. In any event, I know

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6 John Langbein does not worry nearly as much about unimaginative investigation. But imagination is essential to effective investigation. See Tillers & Schum, supra note 1, at 934; see also Peter Tillers, The Fabrication of Facts in Investigation and Adjudication (1998), http://tillers.net/fabrication.html.


8 Justice Scalia was the author of the Court’s opinion in Crawford.
something about you, Tillers, and I know this much: Tillers, you're no Scalia!"

I confess that I'm no Justice Scalia. In particular, I confess that I can't begin to match Scalia's historical learning. But this fact just proves my point because even Justice Scalia's formidable historical learning wasn't good enough!

The papers presented by Professors Kirst and Davies for this conference make a convincing case that Justice Scalia got some important parts of his legal history wrong and that some of Scalia's mistakes were elementary from a historian's point of view. Although Professors Kirst and Davies agree that history was misused in Crawford, the precise moral each draws from this differs. Professor Kirst's paper suggests that the remedy for the Court's misuse of history is for the Court to avail itself of better historical scholarship – scholarship that gives a truer (and broader) picture of the original purpose, or intended meaning, of the Confrontation Clause. Professor Davies, by contrast, hints that the appropriate remedy for the Court's abuse of history is for the Court to (largely) abandon the use of history (at least for the interpretation of some constitutional rules or principles).

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11 Professor Davies argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, did somewhat better than Justice Scalia, but that Rehnquist's historical scholarship also suffered from grievous flaws. See Davies, supra note 10, at 113-14.
12 Professors Kirst and Davies point to different errors in Justice Scalia's legal history and they draw different lessons from the distinct errors that they identify. Professor Davies identifies errors more pertinent to the purposes of my little peroration because, although Professor Kirst's paper makes a very plausible case that the Framers saw the Confrontation Clause as a broad – or "political" – ideal, it is practically incontestable that Justice Scalia did commit the historical errors that Professor Davies identifies and it is hard to avoid Davies' conclusion that a competent legal historian would not have committed the errors that Justice Scalia committed.

My comment does not address the question of whether an accurate rendition of the historical record or whether reliance on a different swath of human history would support the result that the Court reached in Crawford. My comment addresses only the question of the extent to which the Court should rely on its understanding of centuries-old legal precedents and practices to fashion and interpret constitutional guarantees in the twenty-first century. For this purpose it is pertinent that the historical account that Justice Scalia constructed was demonstrably incorrect.

Although I think Justice Scalia got his legal history wrong, it does not necessarily follow that I think that Crawford is an unwelcome decision. This comment does not address the more general question of whether Crawford is a good thing. (My answer would be a qualified one; I would say that the answer depends on how Crawford is read and on its implications. See supra note 4.)
Professor Kirst’s argument suggests that the appropriate remedy for the Court’s shabby historical scholarship is better historical scholarship for and on the Court. I suspect that this remedy will not work. The reason for my skepticism is that I think there is an important sense in which cutting-edge historical scholarship was available to the Court. If the Court’s reliance on history was something more than mere adhockery and more than a makeweight, the historical distortions and mistakes found in Crawford (and in similar decisions) occurred not only because the Court didn’t know how to do legal history, but also because the Court didn’t know how to use legal history. Crudely put, the problem is that the Court couldn’t have recognized good legal history even if it had fallen over it.

It’s time for ignoramus Tillers to make a reappearance. If the Scalias of the judicial world can’t get their legal history straight, it’s practically certain that the Harold Carswells and Peter Tillerses of the world can’t do so either. Ignoramuses (“ignorami”?) like me don’t know how to do good legal history. Furthermore, ignoramuses can’t tell the difference between good legal history and bad legal history; consequently, they don’t know how to sniff out the good historical stuff.

I don’t mean to suggest that the current Justices of the Supreme Court are as ignorant of legal history as I am. In this respect they are surely at least a step or two above the Carswells and the Tillerses of the world. I doubt, however, that any of them are much better at their legal history than Scalia and Rehnquist. Indeed, I suspect that in this respect some of them are at least a notch or two below Scalia and Rehnquist. If I am right about that, I have to agree with Professor Davies: It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever get its legal history straight.

The problem here resembles a problem that arises under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, a decision that requires federal trial judges to serve as “gatekeepers” and use their own wits to allow good science into federal courtrooms and to keep junk science out: How can you get amateurs to make sound professional judgments? If you can’t do that, how do you get amateurs to make sound judgments about the credentials and conclusions of professionals?

There is no easy answer to this puzzle. The history of judicial use of history suggests it is not easy to turn sow’s ears into silk purses.