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Brooklyn Law Review

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Abstract

The Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in NRA v. Vullo found a plausible First Amendment violation by a state regulator for allegedly coercing private entities to cease business with the NRA. While the Court portrayed its decision as merely applying longstanding precedent, the facts of the case were quite different from the cases on which the Court relied, especially related to Vullo’s responsibilities as a regulator of the financial sector. This Article argues that the Court’s decision was misguided. Support for this view comes from case law about the chilling effects on government officials that come from potential liability, the Court’s own precedents about marginal deterrence relating to judicial protection of other constitutional rights, and academic studies about the perils of reputational risk for corporations and financial institutions in particular. These lines of support show that the Court should have been more sympathetic to Vullo as an individual civil servant facing a retaliatory lawsuit from one of the largest, most powerful advocacy organizations in the country. Given that others in the legal academy have made compelling arguments for the NRA to face legal liability for its conduct, the Court should have treated the NRA’s position with more skepticism. The First Amendment framing of the issues led the Court to treat the private party (the NRA) as the vulnerable underdog in the situation, and Vullo as an all-powerful potentate. To the extent that the case presented a David-versus-Goliath scenario, the Court sided with Goliath. This Article concludes that going forward, courts should read the Vullo decision narrowly and apply it sparingly.

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