Abstract
Chevron deference has been a foundational principle for administrative law for decades. Chevron provided a two-step analysis for determining whether an agency would be given deference in its decision-making. This deferential test finds its legitimacy on the grounds of agency expertise and accountability. However, when the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Loper Bright Enterprise v. Raimondo, it positioned itself to potentially overrule or severely limit Chevron. An overruling of Chevron would place judicial deference to administrative agency decisions in peril by allowing courts to substitute their own views over the informed opinions of agency experts. This article discusses the potential consequences of Loper’s impending decision.
Recommended Citation
Michael M. Epstein,
Agency Deference After Loper: Expertise as a Casualty of a War Against the “Administrative State”,
89 Brook. L. Rev.
871
(2024).
Available at:
https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol89/iss3/4
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