Reforming Antitrust: Addressing Data Monopolization in Two-Sided Digital Markets

Authors

• Linyi Li

First Page

485

Abstract

The rise of dominant digital platforms has revealed fundamental shortcomings in U.S. antitrust law. Grounded in the consumer welfare standard and its focus on price effects, current doctrine struggles to regulate markets in which services are offered at zero monetary cost and competitive power is derived from the accumulation and control of user data. In two-sided digital markets, data functions as a central competitive asset, enabling platforms to entrench market power, raise barriers to entry, suppress innovation, and impose non-price harms on consumers. These harms frequently escape antitrust scrutiny because they do not manifest as higher prices or reduced output. This Note argues that the existing U.S. antitrust framework is ill-equipped to address data-driven monopolization. By contrasting the U.S. approach with the European Union’s integration of data and competition law, the Note proposes reforms that recognize data as a competitive currency, strengthen merger review to account for data aggregation, and promote data portability to enhance competition. These reforms aim to modernize antitrust enforcement for the digital economy.

Recommended Citation

Linyi Li, Reforming Antitrust: Addressing Data Monopolization in Two-Sided Digital Markets, 20 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 485 (2026).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol20/iss2/8