As of late, labor markets have been a focus point in antitrust enforcement. In 2016 the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced an unprecedented policy to pursue no-poaching agreements criminally. More recently, in January 2018, the DOJ’s Attorney General indicated that the agency is following through on the policy. This Article argues that the DOJ’s new policy is logical and prudent because the economic effects that no-poaching agreements have on labor markets mirror the anticompetitive effects of customer allocation agreements. It also shows that the policy is well-supported by labor economics and antitrust policies. In efforts to comply with the DOJ’s policy, employers and their counsels should continue collaborations to ensure that their human resource practices comply with antitrust laws.
Rochella T. Davis,
TALENT CAN'T BE ALLOCATED: A LABOR ECONOMICS JUSTIFICATION FOR NO-POACHING AGREEMENT CRIMINALITY IN ANTITRUST REGULATION,
12 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L.
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol12/iss2/2